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THE SUPREME COURT DURING CRISIS:
HOW WAR AFFECTS ONLY
NON-WAR CASES
LEE EPSTEIN, DANIEL E. HO, GARY KING & JEFFREY A. SEGAL*
Does the U.S. Supreme Court curtail rights and liberties when the nation’s security
is under threat?  In hundreds of articles and books, and with renewed fervor since
September 11, 2001, members of the legal community have warred over this ques-
tion.  Yet, not a single large-scale, quantitative study exists on the subject.  Using the
best data available on the causes and outcomes of every civil rights and liberties
case decided by the Supreme Court over the past six decades and employing
methods chosen and tuned especially for this problem, our analyses demonstrate
that when crises threaten the nation’s security, the justices are substantially more
likely to curtail rights and liberties than when peace prevails.  Yet paradoxically,
and in contradiction to virtually every theory of crisis jurisprudence, war appears to
affect only cases that are unrelated to the war.  For these cases, the effect of war and
other international crises is so substantial, persistent, and consistent that it may sur-
prise even those commentators who long have argued that the Court rallies around
the flag in times of crisis.  On the other hand, we find no evidence that cases most
directly related to the war are affected.
We attempt to explain this seemingly paradoxical evidence with one unifying con-
jecture:  Instead of balancing rights and security in high stakes cases directly related
to the war, the justices retreat to ensuring the institutional checks of the democratic
branches.  Since rights-oriented and process-oriented dimensions seem to operate in
different domains and at different times, and often suggest different outcomes, the
predictive factors that work for cases unrelated to the war fail for cases related to
the war.  If this conjecture is correct, federal judges should consider giving less
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weight to legal principles established during wartime for ordinary cases, and attor-
neys should see it as their responsibility to distinguish cases along these lines.
The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people,
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protec-
tion all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. . . .
. . . .
. . . When peace prevails, and the authority of the government
is undisputed, there is no difficulty of preserving the safeguards of
liberty; . . . but if society is disturbed by civil commotion . . . these
safeguards need, and should receive, the watchful care of those
intrusted with the guardianship of the Constitution and laws.
—Ex parte Milligan1
We uphold the exclusion order. . . . In doing so, we are not
unmindful of the hardships imposed by it upon a large group of
American citizens.  But hardships are part of war, and war is an
aggregation of hardships.  All citizens alike, both in and out of uni-
form, feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measure.  Citizen-
ship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in time of
war the burden is always heavier.  Compulsory exclusion of large
groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances of
direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic govern-
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mental institutions.  But when under conditions of modern warfare
our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect
must be commensurate with the threatened danger.
—Korematsu v. United States2
INTRODUCTION
Running through these quotations from landmark Supreme
Court decisions is a common strand:  The justices seem to suggest that
their institution ought to play a different role in times of “emergency
and peril” than when “peace prevails.”3  But the cases cited above
stand for fundamentally different propositions about that role.
Milligan implies that the justices must become especially vigilant in
protecting rights and liberties during “commotions.”4 Korematsu
commends quite the opposite:  that the justices ought to be especially
willing to subordinate rights and liberties when America is
“threatened.”5  If Korematsu is testimony to the continued viability of
Cicero’s maxim inter arma silent leges (“during war law is silent”),6 as
2 323 U.S. 214, 219–20 (1944).
3 Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 123–24.  We invoke the terms “emergency and peril,”
“commotions,” and “crisis” here to signify major international events, including war, that
threaten the security of the nation.  In Part III.B, we provide more precise definitions.
4 This also corresponds with Oren Gross, who noted that “[u]nder the Business as
Usual model of emergency powers, a state of emergency does not justify a deviation from
the ‘normal’ legal system. . . . Thus, Justice Davis could state in Ex parte Milligan that the
Constitution applied equally in times of war as well as in times of peace.”  Oren Gross,
Chaos and Rules:  Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE
L.J. 1011, 1043–44 (2003) (citations omitted); see also Jules Lobel, The War on Terrorism
and Civil Liberties, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 767, 769–72 (2002) (discussing war/emergency
paradigms).
5 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 220; see also, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Judicial Function
and the Elusive Goal of Principled Decisionmaking, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 837, 841–49 (dis-
cussing crisis decisionmaking); Charles Fairman, The Law of Martial Rule and the National
Emergency, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1253, 1287–89 (1942) (arguing that courts must recognize
constitutional war powers and practical reality of war and limit judicial interference); John
P. Frank, Ex parte Milligan v. The Five Companies:  Martial Law in Hawaii, 44 COLUM. L.
REV. 639, 639 n.2 (1944) (citing critics of Milligan); Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese
American Cases—A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 489–90 (1945) (discussing martial rule and
Japanese internment).
6 Cicero’s phrase was “silent enim leges inter arma” (“when arms speak, the laws are
silent”).  14 CICERO, Pro T. Annio Milone Oratio, in PRO M ILONE—IN P ISONEM—PRO
SCAURO—PRO F ONTEIO—PRO R ABIRIO P OSTUMO—PRO M ARCELLO—PRO L IGARIO—
PRO R EGE D EIOTARIO 16–17 (N.H. Watts trans., Harvard Univ. Press 6th prtg. 1979)
(n.d.).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 4 28-MAR-05 17:19
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many suggest that it is,7 then Milligan provides a counter punch:
During war the law speaks loudly.8
While the Court did not cite Milligan in its Korematsu decision,9
and subsequently has repudiated at least the “racist basis” of
Korematsu, it has overruled neither decision.10  Both apparently
remain valid law.11  But this is not so in the eyes of many members of
the legal community.  To an overwhelming majority, the Court’s juris-
prudence in times of crisis is far more in line with the dictates of
Korematsu than with the language of Milligan.12  Indeed, the belief
7 See generally WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: C IVIL LIBERTIES
IN WARTIME (1998) (surveying history of civil rights and liberties during wartime); MARTIN
S. SHEFFER, THE JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (1999) (dis-
cussing expansion of war powers in U.S. history); Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese
American Cases and the Vagaries of Constitutional Adjudication in Wartime:  An
Institutional Perspective, 19 U. HAW. L. REV. 649, 649–50 (1997) (concluding that Court has
historically countenanced executive powers during war).
8 In 1866, the New York Times, commenting on Ex parte Milligan, noted that “[t]he
experience of our past history showed the wisdom of the framers of the Constitution, in
constructing it to be alike efficient in war as in peace.” Military Trials of Civilians in Loyal
States, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1866, at 1.
9 Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
10 Grossman, supra note 7, at 650.  While it is true that the U.S. Supreme Court has not R
overruled itself, a federal district court vacated Korematsu’s original conviction in
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1409, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).  Moreover,
Congress apologized for the internment of Japanese Americans and provided for repara-
tions in the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1989–1989b-9 (2000)).
11 See, e.g., David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:  Civil War and
Reconstruction, 1865–1873, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 133–39 (1984) (discussing Milligan in
context of Reconstruction); Edwards, supra note 5, at 843 (noting that “the Supreme Court R
has yet to overrule or repudiate Korematsu”); Dean Masaru Hashimoto, The Legacy of
Korematsu v. United States:  A Dangerous Narrative Retold, 4 ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72, 77
(1996) (noting that “the Court continues to cite and rely on Korematsu in modern cases”).
12 See Shira A. Scheindlin & Matthew L. Schwartz, With All Due Deference:  Judicial
Responsibility in a Time of Crisis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 795, 806 (2004) (“[M]ost scholars
now recognize that ‘the real legacy of Ex parte Milligan is confined between the covers of
constitutional history books.  The decision itself has had little effect on history.’” (quoting
MARK E. NEELY, JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: A BRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
184 (1991))).  President Roosevelt’s Attorney General, for example, counseled him that
“[p]ractically, . . . the Milligan case is out of the way and should not again plague us.”
Michal R. Belknap, A Putrid Pedigree:  The Bush Administration’s Military Tribunals in
Historical Perspective, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 433, 477 (2002) (alteration in original) (quota-
tion marks omitted).
Some discount the importance of Milligan altogether, arguing that it cannot be taken
to stand for the proposition that justices must become especially vigilant guardians of the
Constitution during times of war because (a) the case was decided after the Civil War
ended and therefore cannot shed light on how the Supreme Court acts during times of war,
and (b) the case, despite its language, begs the question of how the Constitution applies in
times of war and peace. See, e.g., Donald A. Downs & Erik Kinnunen, A Response to
Anthony Lewis:  Civil Liberties in a New Kind of War, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 385, 394.  The
empirical analysis in Part V addresses both these concerns by providing an explicit and\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 5 28-MAR-05 17:19
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that the Court acts to suppress rights and liberties under conditions of
threat is so widely accepted in post–September 11 America,13 and has
been so widely accepted since the World War I period,14 that most
exogenous framework for distinguishing war and peace cases, as well as a transparent mea-
surement of the causal effect of war on case outcomes.
13 See, e.g., Floyd Abrams, The First Amendment and the War Against Terrorism, 5 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 5, 10–11 (2002) (arguing that war on terror requires yielding some
privacy and Fourth Amendment rights); Gross, supra note 4, at 1014–17, 1034–37 (dis- R
cussing constitutional tradeoffs imposed by violent crises and Court’s response); Philip B.
Heymann, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of September 11, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 441, 441–42 (2002) (discussing constitutional tradeoffs of rights of
Americans after September 11); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal:  Executive Power,
Judicial Deference, and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 2–5 (2002) (noting that deference to executive discretion in
name of national security can permit racial scapegoating); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H.
Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt:  Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259,
1259–60 (2002) (postulating that times of war are not appropriate times to tamper with
fundamental constitutional rights and laws); Anthony Lewis, Civil Liberties in a Time of
Terror, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 257, 264–66 [hereinafter Lewis, Civil Liberties] (discussing his-
tory of civil liberties in times of war); Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?:  Reflections
on Civil Liberties in Wartime, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 273, 284–87 (asserting that threats to
constitutional framework will become part of national landscape); Anthony Lewis,
Marbury v. Madison v. Ashcroft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at A17 (opining that in times
of war, courts have abdicated their function of guarding liberties); Richard A. Posner,
Security Versus Civil Liberties, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 2001, at 46 (discussing balance
of security and liberties under constitutional law); Judith Resnik, Invading the Courts:  We
Don’t Need Military ‘Tribunals’ to Sort Out the Guilty, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 14, 2002, at 34
(arguing against military tribunals); Sanford Levinson, What Is the Constitution’s Role in
Wartime?:  Why Free Speech and Other Rights Are Not as Safe as You Might Think (Oct.
17, 2001) (noting that “the Constitution is often reduced at best to a whisper during times
of war”), at http://writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20011017_levinson.html.
14 Some trace the idea back to Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time,
32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 932–34 (1919) [hereinafter Chafee, Speech in War Time] (noting
that freedom of speech has been subject to widespread curtailment during wartime).  For
supporting work published subsequent to Chafee, see generally RALPH S. BROWN, JR.,
LOYALTY AND SECURITY (1958); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED
STATES (1941) [hereinafter CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH]; THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) [hereinafter EMERSON, SYSTEM OF FREEDOM]; FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS FROM HAMILTON TO THE WARREN COURT (Harold L. Nelson ed., 1967);
IRVING HOWE & LEWIS C OSER, THE A MERICAN C OMMUNIST P ARTY (Frederick A.
Praeger Inc. 1962) (1957); MICHAEL LINFIELD, FREEDOM UNDER FIRE:  U.S. CIVIL LIBER-
TIES IN TIMES OF WAR (1990); PAUL L. MURPHY, THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH
(1972); J.G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN (1951); REHNQUIST,
supra note 7; CLINTON ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF R
(1951); JEROME H. SKOLNICK, THE POLITICS OF PROTEST (1969); Abrams, supra note 13; R
Thomas Church, Jr., Conspiracy Doctrine and Speech Offenses:  A Reexamination of Yates
v. United States from the Perspective of United States v. Spock, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 569
(1975); Nanette Dembitz, Racial Discrimination and the Military Judgment:  The Supreme
Court’s Korematsu and Endo Decisions, 45 COLUM. L. REV. 175 (1945); Norman Dorsen,
Foreign Affairs and Civil Liberties, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 840 (1989); Edwards, supra note 5; R
Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1
(1964); Thomas I. Emerson, Freedom of Expression in Wartime, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 975
(1968) [hereinafter Emerson, Freedom of Expression]; Ted Finman & Stewart Macaulay,\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 6 28-MAR-05 17:19
6 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
observers no longer debate whether the Court, in fact, behaves in this
way.  Instead, the discussions are over how this came about or
whether the Court should embrace a “crisis jurisprudence.”  As
Norman Dorsen puts it:
[N]ational security[ ] has been a graveyard for civil liberties for
much of our recent history.  The questions to be answered are not
whether this is true—it demonstrably is—but why we have come to
this pass and how we might begin to relieve the Bill of Rights of at
least some of the burden thus imposed on it.15
This is a strong claim, and one strongly endorsed by a large frac-
tion of the analysts who have examined the relationship between
Court decisions and threats to national security.  But does this claim,
sometimes called the “crisis thesis,” accurately capture jurisprudence
during threats to the nation’s security?  Do the justices, in fact, rally
around the flag, supporting curtailments of rights and liberties in war-
times that they would not support during periods of peace?
We raise these questions because—despite the crisis thesis’s resil-
ience—no study has rigorously assessed it:  Virtually all evidence in its
favor comes from isolated anecdotes or descriptions of a few highly
selected Court decisions rather than from systematic analyses of a
broad class of cases.  Determining whether a piece of conventional
wisdom can withstand rigorous scrutiny is almost always a worthwhile
undertaking, but it is made even more so here because the crisis thesis
continues to provide fodder for debate.  A number of judges,16 along
Freedom to Dissent:  The Vietnam Protests and the Words of Public Officials, 1966 WIS. L.
REV. 632; Margaret A. Garvin, Civil Liberties During War:  History’s Institutional Lessons,
16 CONST. COMMENT. 691 (1999); Grossman, supra note 7; Harry Kalven, Jr., Ernst Freund R
and the First Amendment Tradition, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 235 (1973); Roscoe Pound, Civil
Rights During and After the War, 17 TENN. L. REV. 706 (1943); David M. Rabban, The
Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1207 (1983); Rostow,
supra note 5; Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of R
Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crises, Address at the Law School of Hebrew
University (Dec. 22, 1987) (transcript available at http://www.brennancenter.org/resources/
downloads/nation_security_brennan.pdf).
15 Dorsen, supra note 14, at 840. R
16 See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651, 664 (6th Cir. 1971)
(“It is the historic role of the Judiciary to see that in periods of crisis, when the challenge to
constitutional freedoms is the greatest, the Constitution of the United States remains the
supreme law of our land.”); ABE F ORTAS, CONCERNING D ISSENT AND C IVIL D ISOBEDI-
ENCE 38 (1968) (“It is the courts—the independent judiciary—which have, time and again,
rebuked the legislatures and executive authorities when, under stress of war, emergency, or
fear of Communism or revolution, they have sought to suppress the rights of dissenters.”);
Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging:  The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116
HARV. L. REV. 16, 149 (2002) (“[M]atters of daily life constantly test judges’ ability to
protect democracy, but judges meet their supreme test in situations of war and terrorism.
The protection of every individual’s human rights is a much more formidable duty in times
of war and terrorism than in times of peace and security.”).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 7 28-MAR-05 17:19
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with a handful of commentators,17 challenge the idea in its entirety,
suggesting that, in line with Milligan, the Court acts as a guardian, not
a suppressor, of rights during times of war.  We call this view the
“Milligan thesis.”  Many more, though, question the breadth and
depth of the crisis thesis, with one group claiming that its reach
extends to all cases pertaining to rights and liberties,18 and another
asserting that its coverage is limited to particular types of disputes, to
certain kinds of crises, or even to specific classes of litigants.19  Debate
also exists over the duration of the crisis effect.  Some suggest that the
In their off-bench writings, Justices Brennan and Rehnquist both emphasize the
Court’s decision in Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and other cases that flow directly from
war or other emergencies and endorse some form of the crisis thesis. REHNQUIST, supra
note 7, at 224–25; Brennan, supra note 14. R
17 One of these commentators, Harold Koh, noted:
In the days since [September 11], I have been struck by how many
Americans—and how many lawyers—seem to have concluded that, somehow,
the destruction of four planes and three buildings has taken us back to a state
of nature in which there are no laws or rules.  In fact, over the years, we have
developed an elaborate system of domestic and international laws, institutions,
regimes, and decision-making procedures precisely so that they will be con-
sulted and obeyed, not ignored, at a time like this.
Harold Hongju Koh, The Spirit of the Laws, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 23, 23 (2002); see also
Mary L. Dudziak, The Supreme Court and Racial Equality During World War II, 1996 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 35, 37–45 (discussing Supreme Court antidiscrimination cases during World
War II); Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215, 243 (2003)
(“[I]t is often said that the Supreme Court will not decide a case against the government on
an issue of military security during a period of national emergency. . . . In fact, however,
this does not give the Court its due.”); Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive
Constitutionalism:  The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative
Models, 1 INT’L J. CONST. L. 296, 312–24 (2003) (discussing examples of Court supporting
personal liberties during Cold War and specifically contrasting U.S. to Soviet Russia);
George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 1, 2002, at 26
(addressing “the fundamental question of whether the Constitution . . . is different in war-
time versus peacetime” and noting that “[t]he fact of ‘wartime’ does not change the
meaning or scope of due process—either linguistically or historically”); Linda Greenhouse,
Judicial Restraint:  The Imperial Presidency vs. the Imperial Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2002, § 4, at 3 (asserting that judiciary has played “restraining role” on executive authority
in war on terrorism and that “[e]ven judges whose every instinct is to defer to plausible
claims of national security have recoiled”).
18 See, e.g., EMERSON, SYSTEM OF F REEDOM, supra note 14, at 56 (stating that war R
tensions created serious infringements on freedom of expression); see also Resnik, supra
note 13, at 34 (“[I]n times of war, courts often do not protect against incursions on civil R
liberties.”).
19 For commentary suggesting that the thesis is not so much about Court treatment of
alleged infringements of rights and liberties made by all types of parties, but rather about
deference strictly in cases when the U.S. government is a party, see, for example,
ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 54; Lobel, supra note 4, at 774–75, 781–90, drawing parallels R
between modern and historical Courts that “adopt[ed] an extremely deferential ‘reasona-
bleness’ standard of review” during World War II, “support[ed] the extension of emer-
gency authority” during the Cold War and Vietnam War eras, and more recent efforts by
the government to circumvent courts altogether; and John C. Yoo, The Continuation of
Politics by Other Means:  The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167,\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 8 28-MAR-05 17:19
8 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
justices suppress rights only while a war is ongoing, while others argue
that the curtailments linger well after the threat has subsided.20
These debates continue to date for good reason:  No one has yet
attempted a large-scale systematic study aimed at addressing the fac-
tual underpinnings of the crisis thesis.  It has been only in the last
decade or so that scholars have developed the high-quality data and
statistical tools required to conduct such a study.  With those data and
tools now in place, we undertake to put the crisis thesis to the test.21
Using the best data available on the causes and outcomes of
every civil rights and liberties case decided by the Supreme Court
since 1941 and employing methods chosen and tuned especially for
this problem, we explore systematically the Court’s decisions during
periods when the country is in “emergency and peril” or in relative
peace.22  Our findings provide the first systematic support for the exis-
182–87, 287–90 (1996), discussing the constitutional origins of traditional judicial deference
to the Executive’s exercise of its war powers.
20 Compare Gross, supra note 4, at 1073–75 (discussing temporal fluidity of emergency R
and normalcy), with Tushnet, supra note 13, at 279–80 (discussing social learning in context R
of wartime civil liberties infringements). See also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Accommodating Emergencies, 56 STAN. L. REV. 605, 610–26 (2003) (discussing ratchets).
21 The timing could not be more auspicious.  In the aftermath of September 11, mem-
bers of the legal, policy, and journalistic communities—in scores of scholarly articles and
books, in numerous media reports, and in symposium after symposium—have engaged in a
serious debate over the role of the federal judiciary in the war on terrorism. See, e.g., THE
WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: C IVIL LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (Richard C. Leone
& Gregory Anrig Jr. eds., 2003) (discussing effects of September 11 on civil liberties);
Barak, supra note 16 (discussing importance of judges as protectors of civil liberties); Sym- R
posium, Civil Liberties in a Time of Terror, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 253 (compiling lectures on
effect of wartime and terror on civil liberties); Symposium, Civil Liberties in Times of War,
28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215 (2003) (collecting articles discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence
in times of war); James E. Coleman, Jr. & Barry Sullivan, Foreword, 65 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (2002) (examining Bill of Rights after September 11); Viet D. Dinh, Freedom and
Security After September 11, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 399 (2002) (discussing
Department of Justice’s efforts to incapacitate terrorists and President’s creation of mili-
tary tribunals after September 11); Gross, supra note 4, at 1014–27 (discussing judicial R
responses to times of crisis); Heymann, supra note 13, at 456 (discussing capacity of courts R
to deal with post–September 11 risks to civil liberties); Joo, supra note 13, at 2 (discussing R
racial scapegoating); Katyal & Tribe, supra note 13 (discussing military tribunals); Lewis, R
Civil Liberties, supra note 13 (discussing perceived threat to civil liberties of Bush adminis- R
tration’s response to September 11); Lobel, supra note 4 (comparing war-time executive R
and judicial powers throughout U.S. history); Greenhouse, supra note 17 (suggesting that R
judiciary restrained Executive in wake of September 11); Levinson, supra note 13 (urging R
public debate aimed at influencing Congress rather than reliance on judiciary to protect
civil liberties).
22 This investigation is in line with a strand of international relations scholarship that
examines the effects of international relations on domestic politics, often termed “the
second image reversed.” See, e.g., INTERNATIONALIZATION AND D OMESTIC P OLITICS 6
(Robert O. Keohane & Helen V. Milner eds., 1996); Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image
Reversed:  The International Sources of Domestic Politics, 32 INT’L O RG. 881, 881–82
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tence of a crisis jurisprudence: The justices are, in fact, significantly
more likely to curtail rights and liberties during times of war and other
international threats.23  On the other hand, contrary to what every pro-
ponent of the crisis thesis has so far suggested, while the presence of
war does affect cases unrelated to the war, there is no evidence that the
presence of war affects cases directly related to the war.
We discuss this seemingly counterintuitive finding on two levels.
First, at the theoretical level, we posit that the Supreme Court decides
cases most related to war from an institutional-process perspective
rather than from a first-order balancing of security and liberty rights.
Because the institutional-process dimension is mostly unrelated to
conventional rights-oriented conceptions, the presence of war does
not necessarily tilt the Court in favor of security for war-related cases.
Conversely, in cases unrelated to war, the Court seeks to balance
security and liberty interests, as scholars have commonly conjectured,
and the presence of war does tilt the Court in favor of security.
Second, at the normative level, our findings indicate that the Court
should give legal principles established while a war is ongoing less
precedential weight.  Practicing attorneys should see it as their respon-
sibility to distinguish cases along these lines.  This would allay the fear
that a principle decided in wartime “lies about like a loaded weapon
ready for the hand of any authority,”24 while at the same time pre-
serving the integrity of the judicial process during times of war.
We begin, in Parts I and II, with the crisis thesis and examine its
supporting literature, why the Court might respond to threats to the
national security by suppressing rights, and what kind of evidence
exists for this outcome.  While less consensus exists in the literature
about what types of cases are likely to be affected by war, virtually all
supporters of the crisis thesis suggest that the effect is strongest for
cases most directly related to war.  Part III explains the basic
approach we bring to the debate, defining the concepts of a “crisis”
and war-related cases, describing the set of civil rights and liberties
cases we analyze, and discussing alternative explanations and con-
founding factors for which we account.  In Part IV, we introduce a
statistical framework for testing causal inference that may prove par-
23 This finding, as we explain in Parts V and VI, is robust to a host of other factors that
analysts suggest affect Supreme Court decisions, such as long-term changes in legal culture,
positions taken by the lower courts, public exposure of the cases, and judicial ideology. See
infra Parts V–VI.  Moreover, it does not appear that well-known selection effects of litiga-
tion are driving the effect. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4–5 (1984) (arguing that cases will proceed to
trial when plaintiff has about fifty percent chance of winning).
24 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 10 28-MAR-05 17:19
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ticularly useful in empirical legal studies.25  In Parts V and VI, we
deploy this method to examine empirically six decades of Supreme
Court decisions.  Our results present a puzzle to both adherents and
detractors of the crisis thesis alike:  War does not appear to affect
cases most directly related to the conflict.  Consequently, we discuss a
more encompassing theory that may explain these results and further
evidence consistent with this account.  Finally, we discuss our primary
implications in Part VII.
I
POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO WAR
Proponents of the crisis thesis argue that the Supreme Court
assumes “a highly deferential attitude when called upon to review
governmental actions and decisions” during times of threat to the
nation’s security,26 supporting curtailments of civil liberties and rights
it otherwise would not.  On this account, then, there are two relevant
sets of responses to crises:  the government’s and the Court’s.  The
former takes steps to curtail rights and liberties during wartimes, and
the justices—to a greater extent than they would in times of peace—
uphold those measures, along with others that may infringe on rights
and liberties.
In what follows, we detail these responses, beginning with the
political branches of government and then turning to the primary
focus of our inquiry, the Court.  As we demonstrate, while commenta-
tors agree that the government acts to suppress rights during periods
of threat to national security, they are in less accord over the justices’
responses.  In other words, the crisis thesis, as it pertains to the Court,
may have the lion’s share of support, but it is not without its fair share
of detractors.
25 Specifically, we employ matching in order to assess the causal effect of war.  This
method relies to a lesser degree on restrictive functional form and distributional assump-
tions than traditional regression-based models, and has been widely and successfully
employed in a variety of academic fields to estimate causal inferences. See, e.g., PAUL R.
ROSENBAUM, OBSERVATIONAL STUDIES 77–80 (2d ed. 2002); JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE,
ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF CROSS SECTION AND PANEL DATA 603–44 (2002); Joshua D.
Angrist & Alan B. Krueger, Empirical Strategies in Labor Economics, in 3A HANDBOOK
OF L ABOR E CONOMICS 1277 (Orley Ashenfelter & David Card eds., 1999); Paul W.
Holland, Statistics and Causal Inference, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 945, 945–61 (1986); Daniel
E. Ho, Kosuke Imai, Gary King & Elizabeth A. Stuart, Matching as Nonparametric
Preprocessing for Reducing Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference (2004)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://gking.harvard.edu/files/matchp.pdf).
26 Oren Gross, “Once More unto the Breach”:  The Systemic Failure of Applying the
European Convention on Human Rights to Entrenched Emergencies, 23 YALE J. INT’L L.
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A. Political Responses to War
When societies confront crises, they respond in different ways.
Sometimes they use military force to attack their aggressors; some-
times they do not.27  Sometimes they impose economic sanctions;
sometimes they do not.28  Sometimes they undertake diplomatic
efforts; sometimes they do not.29  But, as many studies reveal, one
response is essentially universal:  In times of emergency—whether
arising from wars, internal rebellions, or terrorist attacks—govern-
ments tend to suppress the rights and liberties of persons living within
their borders.30  They may respond in this way out of a desire to pre-
27 See, e.g., ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 9–49 (1981) (pro-
posing theory of differential growth of power to explain war and change in international
political system); KALEVI J. HOLSTI, PEACE AND WAR: A RMED CONFLICTS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL ORDER 1648–1989, at 1–24 (1991) (describing causes of war and developing frame-
work to explain variation in conflict).
28 See Daniel W. Drezner, Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions:  When
Is Cooperation Counterproductive?, 54 INT’L ORG. 73, 73–78 (2000) (examining determi-
nants of sanctions cooperation); Lisa L. Martin, Credibility, Costs, and Institutions:  Coop-
eration on Economic Sanctions, 45 WORLD POL. 406, 407 (1993) (noting that international
cooperation on economic sanctions varies widely).
29 See ANDREAS HASENCLEVER ET AL., THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 8–22
(1997) (reviewing regime theory); ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: C OOPERA-
TION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 49–64 (1984) (defining interna-
tional cooperation); STEPHEN M. WALT, THE O RIGINS OF A LLIANCES 17–49 (1987)
(reviewing factors that impact alliance formation); Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett,
Introduction and Theoretical Overview, in SECURITY COMMUNITIES 1 (Emanuel Adler &
Michael Barnett eds., 1998) (discussing theory of security communities); Judith Goldstein
et al., Introduction:  Legalization and World Politics,  in  LEGALIZATION AND W ORLD
POLITICS 1, 1–16 (Judith Goldstein et al. eds., 2001) (examining role of legalization as form
of cooperation in world politics); James D. Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International
Cooperation:  Distribution Versus Information, 48 INT’L ORG. 387, 387–90 (1994) (positing
game theoretic model of international cooperation).
30 See, e.g., Cecil T. Carr, Crisis Legislation in Britain, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 1309, 1311
(1940) (reviewing British experience with legislation during national crises and “extraordi-
narily wide powers which have been conferred on the executive”); Cecil T. Carr, A Regu-
lated Liberty:  War-Time Regulations and Judicial Review in Great Britain, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 339, 344–55 (1942) (reviewing British judicial review of wartime detention and noting
that “Parliament . . . expressly created the power of the executive to intern suspects
without trial”); Dinh, supra note 21, at 399–400 (noting roots of perceived necessity to R
curtail liberties in crises); Henry J. Fletcher, The Civilian and the War Power, 2 MINN. L.
REV. 110, 122–23, 126–30 (1918) (discussing U.S. and British domestic curtailments of lib-
erties during World War I); Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism:  The
Balance Between the Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human
Rights, 6 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 120–39 (2001) (reviewing interrogation
practices in light of crises in Israel, Britain, United States, and Canada); Heymann, supra
note 13, at 443–53 (noting varying options of fighting war on terror that all entail sacrifices R
of individual liberty); Karl Loewenstein, Legislative Control of Political Extremism in
European Democracies, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 591, 591–622 (1938) (reviewing legislative
measures to repress subversive activities in United States and surveying measures in
European democracies to suppress fascism); Herbert Marx, The Emergency Power and
Civil Liberties in Canada, 16 MCGILL L.J. 39, 43–56 (1970) (reviewing history of martial\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 12 28-MAR-05 17:19
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sent a unified front to outsiders, their perception that cleavages are
“dangerous,”31 or, of course, their belief that national security and
military “necessity” must outweigh liberty interests if government is to
be protected and preserved.32
Whatever the reason, the United States is no exception to this
rule.33  Indeed, America’s history is replete with executive and legisla-
tive attempts, during times of “urgency,” to restrict the people’s ability
to speak, publish, and organize; to erode guarantees usually afforded
to the criminally accused; or to tighten restrictions on “foreigners” or
law in Britain, United States, and Canada); John Lord O’Brian, Restraints upon Individual
Freedom in Times of National Emergency, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 523, 525–35 (1941) (reviewing
suppression of liberties during World War I); Stone, supra note 17, at 215–41 (reviewing R
history of civil liberties in wartime and noting that “[i]n time of war . . . we respond too
harshly in our restriction of civil liberties”); Eugene Wambaugh, War Emergency:  A Gen-
eral View, 30 HARV. L. REV. 663, 663–67 (1917) (describing British World War I emergency
legislation); Shirin Sinnar, Note, Civil Liberties in Great Britain and Canada During War,
55 HARV. L. REV. 1006, 1006–18 (1942) (discussing civil liberties during war in Britain and
Canada).
31 As Attorney General Ashcroft told the Senate Judiciary Committee:
To those who . . . scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my
message is this:  Your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national
unity and diminish our resolve.  They give ammunition to America’s enemies
and pause to America’s friends.  They encourage people of goodwill to remain
silent in the face of evil.
Editorial, The Ashcroft Smear, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2001, at A40 (alteration in original).
32 See, e.g., William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National
Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 2–10 (2000) (describing necessity of more
aggressive government investigations into threats to national security); Emerson, Freedom
of Expression, supra note 14, at 55–56 (describing why war leads governments to curtail R
rights); Fairman, supra note 5, at 1302 (“Government in an emergency presents a special R
and extreme aspect of administrative action.  The public necessity is greater, the opportu-
nity for inquiry and deliberation much less. . . . [For this reason, courts] will in the same
spirit give fair scope to the constitutional power to wage war.”); J. Edgar Hoover, Alien
Enemy Control, 29 IOWA L. REV. 396, 396 (1944) (defending necessity of aggressive FBI
tactics in response to “the threat from within to our security” posed by “[l]arge numbers of
those of foreign birth in our midst” during World War II); Jordan J. Paust, Political Oppres-
sion in the Name of National Security:  Authority, Participation, and the Necessity Within
Democratic Limits Test, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 178, 178–79, 186 (1982) (acknowl-
edging that “derogations” from certain rights may be necessary when national security is
truly at stake but warning that this rationale is too often used as pretext for political
oppression).
33 As Alexander Hamilton presciently wrote:
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct.
Even the ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates.  The
violent destruction of life and property incident to war—the continual effort
and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the
most attached to liberty, to resort for repose and security, to institutions, which
have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, at 31 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 13 28-MAR-05 17:19
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perceived “enemies.”34  The “ink had barely dried on the First
Amendment,”35 as Justice Brennan once observed, when Congress
passed two restrictive legislative enactments:  the Sedition Act,36
which prohibited speech critical of the United States, and the Enemy
Alien Act,37 which empowered the President to detain or deport alien
enemies38 and which the government has used during declared wars to
stamp out political opponents.39  During the Civil War, President
Abraham Lincoln took steps to suppress “treacherous” behavior,
most notably by suspending habeas corpus, out of the belief “that the
34 See Norman Dorsen, Introduction, in OUR E NDANGERED R IGHTS, at xi (Norman
Dorsen ed., 1984) (discussing government’s exclusion of press from Grenada invasion in
October 1983); MURPHY, supra note 14, at 3–10 (mapping developments and setbacks to R
free speech between World Wars I and II); REHNQUIST, supra note 7, at 218–22 (com- R
paring Congressional and Executive response to declared wars); Brennan, supra note 14, at R
2–6 (reviewing history of government suppression of dissent in times of crisis); Paul G.
Casell, Restrictions on Press Coverage of Military Operations:  The Right of Access, Gre-
nada, and “Off-the-Record Wars,” 73 GEO. L.J. 931, 931–45 (1985) (surveying history of
press coverage of military operations up to Grenada invasion and discussing constitution-
ality of press restrictions); Chafee, Speech in War Time, supra note 14 (noting widespread R
government curtailment of free speech during World War I); Frank B. Cross & Stephen M.
Griffin, A Right of Press Access to United States Military Operations, 21 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 989, 990–1007 (1987) (discussing history of press coverage of military operations up
to Grenada invasion); David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court:  The Second
World War, 1941–1946, 37 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 4–27 (1987) (surveying cases affecting
rights of criminally accused); Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Vallandigham, and Anti-War
Speech in the Civil War, 7 WM. & MARY B ILL R TS. J. 105, 105–36 (1998) (discussing
restraints on free speech during Civil War); Developments in the Law—The National
Security Interest and Civil Liberties, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1130 (1972) [hereinafter Develop-
ments in the Law] (surveying effects of classification of government documents, surveil-
lance, and emergency powers on civil liberties); Emerson, Freedom of Expression, supra
note 14, at 975 (noting that war creates strains on system of freedom of expression); Stone, R
supra note 17, at 215 (discussing regrettably harsh restrictions on civil liberties during times R
of national crisis); Note, The Internal Security Act of 1950, 51 COLUM. L. REV. 606 (1951)
(surveying Act and its effects on civil liberties); Rostow, supra note 5, at 491 (discussing R
weakening of basic civil liberties).
35 Brennan, supra note 14, at 2. R
36 Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
37 Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (current version at 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2000)).
38 Id.
39 See David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 990 (2002) [hereinafter Cole,
Enemy Aliens] (“The Roosevelt Administration used the Enemy Alien Act during World
War II to round up, question, and detain thousands of German, Italian, and Japanese
aliens.”); David Cole, The New McCarthyism:  Repeating History in the War on Terrorism,
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15 (2003) [hereinafter Cole, The New McCarthyism] (“Pres-
idents invoked the Enemy Alien Act during the War of 1812, World War I, and World War
II . . . .”); J. Gregory Sidak, War, Liberty, and Enemy Aliens, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1402,
1405–24 (1992) (discussing history and application of Enemy Alien Act).  In response to
the Alien and Sedition Acts, James Madison asserted that “perhaps it is a universal truth
that the loss of liberty at home is to be charged to provisions against danger, real or pre-
tended, from abroad.” MORTON H. HALPERIN & DANIEL H OFFMAN, FREEDOM VS.
NATIONAL SECURITY: S ECRECY AND SURVEILLANCE, at ix (1977).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 14 28-MAR-05 17:19
14 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
nation must be able to protect itself in war against utterances which
actually cause insubordination.”40  Prior to America’s entry into
World War I, President Woodrow Wilson “predicted a dire fate for
civil liberties should we become involved.”41  With passage of the
Espionage Act of 191742 and the Sedition Act of 1918,43 Wilson’s pre-
diction was realized—with Wilson as a prime accomplice.  World War
II brought yet more repressive measures, most notably executive
orders limiting the movement of and providing for the internment of
Japanese Americans.44  The Korean War and the supposed “commu-
nist menace”45 resulted in an “epidemic of witch-hunting, paranoia,
and political grandstanding” directed against “reds” across the
country.46  And Vietnam was accompanied by governmental efforts to
silence war protests.47  Thus, in the United States, “[t]he struggle
between the needs of national security and political or civil liberties
has been a continual one.”48
Of course, politicians would have a difficult time enacting and
implementing such curtailments on rights and liberties if those mea-
sures lacked public support.49  But that has not been the case during
40 LEE E PSTEIN & THOMAS G. WALKER, CONSTITUTIONAL L AW FOR A C HANGING
AMERICA: R IGHTS, LIBERTIES, AND JUSTICE 210 (4th ed. 2001) (quoting CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH, supra note 14, at 266).  Earlier during the Civil War, after Major General John R
Fremont of the Union Army proclaimed that all slaves owned by Confederates in Missouri
were free, the New York Times noted presciently, “The Proclamation of Gen. Fremont . . .
only states the inevitable result of the rebel war . . . . Inter arma silent leges.” The War and
Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1861, at 4.  It is a fact of historical irony that it was Abraham
Lincoln himself who then reprimanded and ultimately replaced Fremont, stating in a pri-
vate letter:  “Can it be pretended that it is any longer the government of the U.S.—any
government of Constitution and laws,—wherein a General, or a President, may make per-
manent rules of property by proclamation?”  Letter from President Abraham Lincoln to
Senator Orville H. Browning (Sept. 22, 1861), in ABRAHAM L INCOLN: S PEECHES AND
WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 268, 269 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989).
41 Carl Brent Swisher, Civil Liberties in War Time, 55 POL. SCI. Q. 321, 321 (1940).
42 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2388 (2000)) (prohibiting any attempt to “interfere with the operation or success of the
military or naval forces of the United States . . . [,] to cause insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces . . . , or [to] willfully obstruct the
recruiting or enlistment service of the United States”).
43 Act of May 16, 1918, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (prohibiting uttering, printing, writing, or
publishing of anything disloyal to government, flag, or military forces of United States)
(repealed 1921).
44 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–17 (1944).
45 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 331 (2002).
46 Id. at 331–32.
47 See LINFIELD,  supra note 14, at 113–56 (discussing civil liberties infringements R
accompanying Vietnam War).
48 Developments in the Law, supra note 34, at 1133; see also Stone, supra note 17, at R
242–45 (noting long struggle of weighing national security with individual liberty).
49 On foreign policy decisions and public opinion, see generally THE D OMESTIC
SOURCES OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: I NSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE (Eugene R. Wittkopf\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 15 28-MAR-05 17:19
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crises for which we have survey data.  In a general sense, the data
reveal that public confidence in the President, who is often the cata-
lyst for repressive legislation,50 soars in the face of international
crises.51  This “rally effect”52 gave Franklin Roosevelt a twelve-point
increase after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, John Kennedy a
thirteen-point lift during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and George H.W.
Bush a fourteen-point boost when Iraq invaded Kuwait.53  As Figure 1
shows, in the wake of September 11, 2001, George W. Bush’s approval
rating jumped a record-setting thirty-five points, from fifty-one per-
cent on September 7 to eighty-six percent on September 14.
& James M. McCormick eds., 3d ed. 1999), surveying how domestic media, interest groups,
and the intelligence community affect U.S. foreign policy; OLE R. HOLSTI, PUBLIC
OPINION AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY (1996), showing the stability of public opinion
towards foreign policy and reactions to external events; and RICHARD SOBEL, THE IMPACT
OF P UBLIC O PINION ON U.S. FOREIGN P OLICY S INCE V IETNAM: C ONSTRAINING THE
COLOSSUS (2001), arguing that public opinion constrains but does not set U.S. foreign
policy.
50 MURPHY,  supra note 14, 283 (discussing President Truman’s calls to strengthen R
national security as Cold War tensions increased).
51 So, for example, the correlation between the most profound sort of international
crisis—war—and this presidential rally effect is significant at the p .0001 level.
52 See, e.g., RICHARD A. BRODY, ASSESSING THE P RESIDENT: T HE M EDIA, ELITE
OPINION, AND PUBLIC SUPPORT 45–78 (1991); JOHN E. MUELLER, WAR, PRESIDENTS, AND
PUBLIC OPINION 208–13 (1973); Richard A. Brody, International Crises:  A Rallying Point
for the President, PUB. OPINION, Dec.–Jan. 1984, at 41; Samuel Kernell, Explaining Presi-
dential Popularity, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 506, 509–10, 512–13, 518 (1978); Lee Sigelman &
Pamela Johnston Conover, The Dynamics of Presidential Support During International
Conflict Situations:  The Iranian Hostage Crisis, 3 POL. BEHAV. 303, 303 (1981).
53 For more on rally effects, see infra note 206. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 16 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Figure 1:  Percentage of Americans approving of the way George W. Bush is handling
his job:  The “rally effect” generated by September 11, 2001.54
Survey data also reveal a public supportive of specific efforts on the
part of political actors to curtail rights and liberties.  Consider
Americans’ response to September 11.55  As Table 1 shows, all but one
restriction on rights designed to furnish the government with signifi-
cant authority to combat terrorism—the indefinite detainment of ter-
rorist suspects without charging them—attained the support of a
substantial majority of respondents.56
54 Between February 1, 2001, and February 2, 2003, the Gallup Organization fielded
eighty-three polls on the public’s approval of President George W. Bush.  The question
asked in all instances was:  “Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is
handling his job as president?”  We depict the percentage of respondents approving of his
performance.  September 14, 2001, is the date of the first Gallup poll fielded after
September 11, 2001.  The data may be found in David W. Moore, Bush Approval Rating
Remains at 70% Level (May 1, 2003), at http://www.gallup.com/poll/content/
default.aspx?ci=8308 (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
55 Coleman & Sullivan, supra note 21, at 5 (“It is equally clear that many Americans R
already have concluded that many of our traditional values of due process and personal
liberty must yield to the dangerous realities brought home by the terrorist acts of
September 11.”).
56 What we do not know is whether Americans supported such measures prior to
September 11, 2001.  But the conclusion reached in a recent paper, which analyzed public
opinion data on rights and liberties, is suggestive:
Americans are not ready to concede all of their civil liberties and personal
freedoms in order to feel secure from the terrorist threat. . . . But a sense of
threat makes for more reluctant defenders of constitutional rights across the
political spectrum and among whites, Latinos, and African Americans.
Darren W. Davis & Brian D. Silver, Civil Liberties vs. Security:  Public Opinion in the
Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 28, 43 (2004) (emphasis\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 17 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Measure Support Oppose Don’t Know
Wiretap telephone 69 29 2
Intercept email 72 23 5
Intercept ordinary mail 57 39 4
Examine Internet activity 82 15 3
Detain suspects for a week without charging them 58 38 3
Detain terrorists indefinitely without charging them 48 48 4
Examine students’ education records 76 22 2
Examine telephone records 82 17 1
Examine bank records 79 20 1
Track credit card purchases 75 21 4
Examine tax records 75 24 1
Table 1: Percentage of Americans supporting and opposing anti-terrorist measures in
the wake of September 11, 2001.57
B. The Court’s Response to War
In light of the public opinion data, it should not be a surprise that
the U.S. Justice Department undertook many of the activities listed in
Table 1,58 or that Congress passed and the President signed the USA
Patriot Act of 2001,59 which also contains some of these measures.
Nor should we be surprised that legislators, with the backing of the
President, proposed the Patriot Act in the first instance.60  Such a
added).  Moreover, evidence from other survey data specifically on racial profiling suggests
that September 11 did in fact lead to a substantial rise in the willingness to curtail civil
liberties. See DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION:
SACRIFICING C IVIL L IBERTIES IN THE N AME OF N ATIONAL S ECURITY 168 (2002) (dis-
cussing ethnic profiling).
57 The survey had 603 total respondents.  The question was:  “In order to reduce the
threat of terrorism in the U.S., would you support or oppose giving law enforcement
broader authority to do the following things?  Would you support or oppose giving them
broader authority to [INSERT EACH ITEM]?”  The data are from a National Public
Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government survey conducted from
October 31, 2001, to November 12, 2001.  The results are available at http://www.npr.org/
programs/specials/poll/civil_liberties/civil_liberties_static_results_4.html (last visited Oct.
30, 2004). Subsequent polls show that Americans, on average, do not believe that the
government’s war on terrorism is impinging on their liberties.  From September 25 to
September 29, 2002, for example, ABC News asked Americans whether they “personally
feel that the government’s anti-terrorism efforts are intruding on your civil liberties, or
not?” Only 17% of respondents deemed the efforts a “major” or “minor” intrusion; 80%
said they were “not an intrusion”; 3% had no opinion.  ABC News, Telephone Poll,
Question 001 (Oct. 1, 2002), WL, Public Opinion Online, Question ID No. USABC.100102
R43.
58 See, e.g., Dinh, supra note 21, at 401–05; see also infra Part VII. R
59 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections in numerous titles of U.S.C.).
60 In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, a large amount of commentary has
addressed the efforts of the political branches of government to suppress rights. See gener-
ally Diane B. Wood, The Rule of Law in Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455 (2003)
(examining effects of post–September 11 restraints on liberties on rule of law); Avidan Y.
Cover, Note, A Rule Unfit for All Seasons:  Monitoring Attorney-Client Communications\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 18 28-MAR-05 17:19
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response to an “emergency” on the part of elected officials is not an
anomaly.
In contrast to the President and Congress, the Supreme Court
lacks an electoral connection and is supposedly insulated from public
pressure.  While it can take years for lawsuits connected to conflicts to
make their way to the nation’s highest tribunal, does the Supreme
Court nevertheless respond contemporaneously to crises?  The answer
to this question falls generally under one of two rubrics:  (a) the
Milligan thesis of the Court as a guardian of immutable rights, leading
the Court to depart dramatically from the preferences of the public
and elected officials; and (b) the crisis thesis, reflecting Korematsu,
that the Court’s response mirrors that of the citizenry and its leaders.
Proponents of the Milligan thesis stress difference:  While the bal-
ance of American society rallies around the flag in times of crisis, the
Court takes a more deliberate approach, electing to protect rather
than curtail rights and liberties.61  The justifications for this claim, as
we explain in Part II, are constitutional, institutional, and behavioral
in nature, but each begins with the design of the federal judiciary as
juxtaposed against the political branches of government.  Because the
justices hold life-tenured positions, they are freer than elected officials
to ignore public opinion.62  In fact, by removing the Court from the
whims of the electorate and their elected officials, the Framers explic-
itly sought to create an institution of government that would stand
above the fray and enforce the law free from overt political influences.
The Court would be a force for legal stability.  It would decide cases,
not on the basis of politics, but according to the law63 and would
“guard the constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects
of those ill humours which the arts of designing men, or the influence
of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves.”64
Many prominent legal scholars and jurists, from Geoffrey R.
Stone,65 to George Fletcher,66 to Justice Abe Fortas,67 have subscribed
Violates Privilege and the Sixth Amendment, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 1233 (2002) (discussing
Bureau of Prisons rule allowing monitoring of inmates’ communications with attorneys);
Note, Patriotic or Unconstitutional:  The Mandatory Detention of Aliens Under the USA
Patriot Act, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1419 (2003) (arguing that mandatory detention of aliens
violates Due Process Clause).
61 For supporting work, see supra notes 16–17. R
62 We adopt some of the material in this paragraph from LEE EPSTEIN & JOSEPH F.
KOBYLKA, THE SUPREME COURT AND LEGAL CHANGE 2 (1992).
63 This is not to say that constitutional sources for a crisis jurisprudence fail to exist;
they, in fact do, as we elaborate in Part II.
64 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 381 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
65 Stone, supra note 17, at 222–23, 243. R
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to the Milligan thesis of the Court as a guardian of rights in times of
war, and not as a suppressor of those very rights.  But far more com-
mentators, and just as influential ones at that—including important
legal academics, such as Zechariah Chafee Jr.,68 Thomas I. Emerson,69
and Sanford Levinson;70 social scientists, such as Edward Corwin71
and Joel Grossman;72 and many federal judges73—have advanced the
67 See FORTAS, supra note 16, at 38–39 (pointing to Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 R
(1943), where “[a]lthough we were in a desperate war against Nazi Germany, the Supreme
Court in 1943 reversed the conviction of persons who distributed literature condemning
the war and the draft and opposing the flag statute”).
68 CHAFEE, Free Speech, supra note 14, at 97 (“[I]t is extremely ominous for future R
wars that the Supreme Court at the close of the World War was so careless in its safe-
guarding of the fundamental human need of freedom of speech, so insistent in this sphere
that the interests of the government should be secured at all costs.”).
69 Emerson, Freedom of Expression, supra note 14, at 975. R
70 Levinson, supra note 13. R
71 EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 177 (1947).
[I]n total war the Court necessarily loses some part of its normal freedom of
decision and becomes assimilated, like the rest of society, to the mechanism of
the national defense.  Sometimes it is able to put on a stately parade of judicial
clich´ es to a predetermined destination, but ordinarily the best it can do is pare
down its commitments to a minimum in the hope of regaining its lost freedom
in quieter times.
Id.
72 Grossman, supra note 7, at 649 (“Notwithstanding the worldwide emergence of con- R
stitutions and constitutionalism, the proliferation of constitutional courts with powers of
judicial review, and the spread of the rights revolution and concerns for international
human rights, rights are always at risk in wartime and other national security crises.”).
73 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 5, at 844. R
Though it is perhaps the most graphic example of crisis-driven decisionmaking
and its results, Korematsu does not stand alone . . . . That the judiciary [does]
not act decisively to protect First Amendment freedoms during [times of crisis]
represents a failure of significant proportions.  Its reverberations [echo] for
years, in the lives of those directly affected and in the distorted and disjointed
development of First Amendment doctrine.
Id.
Even jurists who disagree over nearly all other matters of law agree on the existence
of a crisis jurisprudence.  Consider, for example, Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and
Justice William J. Brennan.  Between the 1971 and 1985 terms, then-Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Brennan voted together in only 36.3% of 435 cases involving matters of criminal
procedure.  With no other justice did Brennan so often disagree; only with Thurgood
Marshall (33.6%) did Rehnquist conflict more frequently than he did with Brennan. See
LEE E PSTEIN ET AL., THE S UPREME C OURT C OMPENDIUM 556–65 tbl.6-6 (2003).  Yet
Rehnquist and Brennan agreed on the existence of crisis jurisprudence.  As Rehnquist has
written:  “[T]here is some truth to the maxim Inter arma silent leges . . . . Is this reluctance a
necessary evil—necessary because judges, like other citizens, do not wish to hinder a
nation’s ‘war effort’—or is it actually a desirable phenomenon?” REHNQUIST, supra note
7, at 221.  Similarly, Brennan has noted: R
When I think of the progress we have made . . ., I look upon our system of civil
liberties with some satisfaction, and a certain pride.  There is considerably less
to be proud about . . . when one reflects on the shabby treatment civil liberties
have received . . . during times of war . . . .\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 20 28-MAR-05 17:19
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crisis thesis.  Whether writing in the early 1900s,74 the early 2000s,75 or
eras in between,76 they argue that when the nation’s security is under
threat, the Court adopts a jurisprudential stance that leads it to curtail
rights and liberties it otherwise would not, an effect that is widely per-
ceived to be stronger for cases directly related to the war.  The Court’s
response to wars is the same as that of the rest of American society:  It
too endorses the efforts of elected officials to suppress rights and does
not “guard” the Constitution.77
Chafee, Emerson, Levinson, Corwin, and the others take little
issue with the general argument of the crisis thesis, but variation exists
over the reach of the thesis and the duration of its effect.  Some com-
mentators assert that its reach is wide:  that in times of national emer-
gency, the Court clamps down on all rights and liberties, whether
related to the crisis or not.  Thomas Emerson’s The System of
Freedom of Expression maps the effect of various wars and other
national emergencies on the Court’s jurisprudence in a range of legal
areas—some of which are directly connected to the particular emer-
gency (such as internal security and the rights of conscientious objec-
tors) and some of which seem less so (such as privacy and religious
liberty).78  Emerson’s analysis demonstrates that even if a particular
case is not related directly to the ongoing crisis, the effect of that crisis
may spill over to an otherwise “ordinary” dispute.79  Others, however,
suggest that the crisis thesis’s reach is far more circumscribed.  To
these commentators, the Court engages in crisis jurisprudence only in
especially salient disputes (such as Korematsu), in particular classes of
cases (such as those raising questions about criminal procedure, or the
rights of conscientious objectors, aliens, and war protestors), or in liti-
gation to which the U.S. government is a party.80  Debate also exists
over the duration of the effect of wars and other threats to the
nation’s security, with one school asserting that the justices suppress
Brennan, supra note 14, at 1. R
74 See, e.g., Chafee, Speech in War Time, supra note 14 (commenting on restrictions on R
speech during World War I).
75 The literature on the courts and civil liberties in the wake of September 11, 2001, is
voluminous. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 13, 21. R
76 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 14. R
77 See Lewis, Civil Liberties, supra note 13, at 270 (“Through much of U.S. history, in R
times of war and tension, the courts have bent to claims of presidential power.”).
78 EMERSON, SYSTEM OF F REEDOM, supra note 14, at 55–56; see also Resnik, supra R
note 13. R
79 Or, as Gross, writing about the current war against terrorism, put it, “[W]hen judges
decide ‘ordinary’ criminal cases, they will take into consideration the impact of their rul-
ings on the fight against terrorism.”  Gross, supra note 4, at 1095 (emphasis added). R
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rights only while a war is ongoing, and a second claiming that the cur-
tailments endure and may even grow in intensity over time.81
II
EXISTING SUPPORT FOR THE CRISIS
AND MILLIGAN THESES
If the crisis thesis is correct, then we should ask:  Why might the
Court curtail rights and liberties during times of crisis?  Proponents of
the thesis offer three general sets of explanations:  constitutional,
institutional, and behavioral.  For each of these explanations, propo-
nents of the Milligan thesis offer theoretically parallel
counterarguments.
In the first three Sections of this Part, we analyze the three sets of
theoretical explanations for the reaction anticipated by the crisis and
Milligan theses.  In Section D, we examine the empirical basis on
which these explanations rest.  This examination reveals that, even
though the vast majority of studies have validated some version of the
crisis thesis, empirical support for any one is weak or nonexistent.
A. Constitutional Mechanisms
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have argued that there are two
dominant views about the “proper role of the Constitution” during
times of crisis:  “The accommodation view is that the Constitution
should be relaxed or suspended during an emergency. . . . [The strict
view] is that constitutional rules are not, and should not be, relaxed
during an emergency.”82
As a practical matter, the difference between the two views will be
reflected in the aggressiveness of the courts.  Under the first view,
the courts will defer to emergency policy once they determine that
an emergency exists.  Under the second view, courts may permit
many emergency measures, but only after subjecting them to
review, and courts are likely to strike down many emergency mea-
sures as well.  The first view has generally been adopted by
American courts during emergencies; the second view is the favored
position among civil libertarians and law professors.83
Supporters of the crisis thesis presumably would agree with
Posner and Vermeule.  To them, as we show below, the justices have
made a series of doctrinal moves in the areas of war powers (and for-
eign affairs more generally) and civil rights and liberties that enable
81 For a review of this debate, see Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 610–26. R
82 Id. at 606, 608.
83 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies 2–3 (n.d.) (manu-
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them to relax constitutional guarantees, such that, in line with the
thesis, they often repress rights (or “accommodate” the interests of
government) during wartime.
1. War Powers
For supporters of the crisis thesis, the war powers of the elected
branches of government constitute a starting point for the analysis of
the Court’s response to emergencies.  These commentators maintain
that the Constitution demands judicial deference to the Executive and
the legislature during times of international crisis.84  Such a reading of
the war powers doctrine might follow from the Constitution’s explicit
grant of emergency powers to the Executive85 and the legislature86
and its silence with regard to the judiciary.87  It also follows, accom-
84 See Downs & Kinnunen, supra note 12, at 390 (“The provisions relating to the war R
powers of the executive and legislative branches and a long line of Supreme Court prece-
dents indicate that the government possesses greater power in times of war than in times of
peace, and that the concomitant balance between liberty and security may properly shift
. . . .”); Posner, supra note 13, at 46 (describing balancing process of liberty and security R
interests); Justice Stephen G. Breyer, Liberty, Security, and the Courts, Speech to the
Association of the Bar of the City of New York (Apr. 14, 2003) (noting that liberty inter-
ests must be balanced with government responses to threats and crises) (transcript avail-
able at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-15-03.html).
85 Specifically, the Constitution provides that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in
a President,” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, that the President “shall be Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy,” id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, and that the President shall “take Care
that the Laws be faithfully executed,” id. art. II, § 3.
86 See, e.g., id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress power to “provide for the common
Defence”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress power to “define and punish Piracies
and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”); id.
art. I, § 8, cl. 11 (granting Congress power to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque and
Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12
(granting Congress power to “raise and support Armies”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13 (granting
Congress power to “provide and maintain a Navy”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14 (granting Congress
power to “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces”);
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 15 (granting Congress power to “provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions”); id. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18 (granting Congress power to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitu-
tion in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof”);
id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (granting Congress power to suspend writ of habeas corpus “when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”).
87 See, for example, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), in which the Court
held:
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise
of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has neces-
sarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and discretion in
determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in
the selection of the means for resisting it.  Where, as they did here, the condi-
tions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion and for the choice of
means by those branches of the Government on which the Constitution has\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 23 28-MAR-05 17:19
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modationists assert, from the fact that the elected branches, not the
courts, are best equipped to cope with the emergency at hand.  If the
Court failed to recognize this fact, if it failed to treat the Constitution
as a flexible document88—one that grants leniency to Congress and
the President in times of war—then it would be in danger of reading
the document as “a suicide pact,” a notion the justices have rejected
on more than one occasion.89
placed the responsibility of war-making, it is not for any court to sit in review
of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs.
Id. at 93 (citations omitted); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“Article III contains nothing analogous to the specific powers of war so carefully enumer-
ated in Articles I and II.”).
88 This notion of a flexible Constitution may be traced back to Justice John Marshall’s
observation that “it is a constitution we are expounding,” and it is “intended to endure for
ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407, 415 (1819) (emphasis omitted); see
also BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 81, 85–86 (1921)
(discussing “fluid and dynamic conception which underlies the modern notion of liberty”
and noting case of American Coal Mining Co. v. Special Coal & Food Commission, 268 F.
563 (D. Ind. 1920), for finding that regulatory power can be derived from emergency of
war); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN C ONSTITUTIONALISM 27–58 (1996) (discussing
notions of constitutional change and endorsing definition of Constitution as “a text-based
institutional practice in which authoritative interpreters can create new constitutional
norms” (quoting Stephen R. Munzer & James W. Nickel, Does the Constitution Mean What
It Always Meant?, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029, 1045 (1977))); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY
AND HISTORY 65–96 (1992) (discussing reaction of constitutional theory to curtailments of
rights during Civil War and shift towards evolutionary model of Constitution); Tushnet,
supra note 13, at 281–82 (distinguishing between balancing and categorical approaches R
towards interpreting civil liberties); Breyer, supra note 84 (noting that jurisprudence in R
times of crisis is characterized by “equilibrium that is right in principle” and “will yield
flexibility in practice”).
89 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).  Along similar
lines, the Court often invokes the dictum that the power to wage war is “the power to wage
war successfully.” Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93 (citation omitted).  Griffin makes the same
point:
The recurrence of serious constitutional problems each time the United States
fights a major war is a dramatic example of the difference between providing a
constitutional framework of government powers and building competent gov-
ernment institutions.  While there is no doubt that the Constitution gave the
federal government the power to wage war, the mere provision of constitu-
tional powers did not guarantee that the government would be able to use
those powers effectively.
GRIFFIN, supra note 88, at 60.  The Court has echoed this sentiment with respect to military R
tribunals:
An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of measures by the
military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and
subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart
or impede our military effort have violated the law of war.
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942).  On broad forms of general regulation, see
Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 141–42 (1948), finding that the war power
extended to a wide range of economic regulation and sustaining the war power as applied
to a rental regulation.  Consider also President Lincoln’s famous words:  “Must a govern-\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 24 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Adherents of the guardian view of the Constitution bring an
entirely different perspective to this line of cases, emphasizing the role
the Court has played in allocating war powers under the constitutional
separation of powers, rather than simply deferring to the govern-
ment.90  In support, they point to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer,91 in which the Court considered the constitutionality of
President Truman’s seizure of the steel mills—an action he took
during the Korean War to avert a nation-wide strike of steel workers.
Truman claimed that both the inherent constitutional powers of the
Executive and those incident to the President’s role as Commander-
in-Chief justified the seizure,92 explicitly asserting that the strike
would “jeopardize our national defense.”93  Yet, quite to the contrary
of exhibiting deference to the assertion of military power, the Court
found the seizure unconstitutional under either theory, asserting that
it constituted an act of law-making power vested in “Congress alone in
both good and bad times.”94
In Youngstown, then, the Court saw it as its duty to delineate the
boundaries of the “zone of twilight in which [the President] and
Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is
uncertain.”95  Supporters of the guardian view of the Constitution are
ment, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain
its own existence?”  Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4,
1861), in 4 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN, 1809–1865, at 421, 426 (Roy
P. Basler ed., 1953) (emphasis omitted).
90 See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40 (1957) (“We should not break faith with this
Nation’s tradition of keeping military power subservient to civilian authority, a tradition
which we believe is firmly embodied in the Constitution.”).
91 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
92 Id. at 587.
93 Id. at 583.  The connection between steel production, national defense, and the
ongoing Korean War are spelled out more explicitly in the preamble of Truman’s Executive
Order. See Exec. Order No. 10,233, 3 C.F.R. 425 (1951) (authorizing Secretary of
Commerce to seize steel plants).
94 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587–89 (emphasis added).  Similarly, Justice Douglas
warned that the Court could not “expand[ ] Article II of the Constitution” by “rewriting it
to suit the political conveniences of the present emergency.” Id. at 632 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
95 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Specifically, in Youngstown, Justice Jackson’s
concurrence sought to establish a tripartite scheme for review of presidential acts condi-
tional on congressional action and, in the case of inaction, intent.  Jackson posited that:  (a)
“[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress,”
the “widest latitude of judicial interpretation” applies, id. at 635, 637; (b) “[w]hen the
President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority” then “any
actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary
imponderables,” id. at 637; and (c) “[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible
with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb” and
“Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized
with caution,” id. at 637–38.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 25 28-MAR-05 17:19
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quick to note that when the Court undertakes this duty, the crisis
thesis’s prediction of extreme judicial deference becomes far weaker.
For, despite its lack of a specific constitutional role in war making, the
Court’s responsibility in times of crisis is to ensure that the govern-
ment’s use of its war powers follows constitutional principles.
In response, proponents of the crisis thesis claim that Youngstown
is an exception to a long string of cases in which the Court has
deferred to the President.  Some cases, such as Korematsu, pertain
directly to the war effort, but others have extended into the larger
realm of foreign affairs.96  For example, in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp.,97 the Court upheld President Roosevelt’s arms
ban, stressing the “very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of
international relations.”98  Since the conduct of warfare falls within
this field, supporters of the crisis thesis argue that the Court should be
willing to endorse repressive governmental action during times of war
on the grounds that such actions are within the Executive’s “plenary
and exclusive power.”99  The justices could achieve this end by laying
out a rationale, as they did in Curtiss-Wright, or by invoking the polit-
96 See THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL Q UESTIONS/JUDICIAL A NSWERS: D OES THE
RULE OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 58 (1992) (“[T]he midst of military hostilities
[is] the one circumstance in which some form of judicial reticence might seem war-
ranted.”). See generally MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL D IPLOMACY (1990)
(arguing for role of constitutionalism in foreign policy); LOUIS H ENKIN, CONSTITUTION-
ALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990) (arguing for more judicial interven-
tion in foreign affairs); LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972)
(delineating role of Constitution in U.S. foreign relations); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE
NATIONAL S ECURITY C ONSTITUTION (1990) (arguing that Iran-Contra was failure of
unchecked executive power and arguing for balanced institutional participation between
executive, legislative, and judiciary in foreign affairs).
97 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
98 Id. at 320.
99 Strict-view adherents take issue with such bold claims about general judicial defer-
ence in the realm of foreign affairs.  Henkin best summarizes this sentiment when he
writes:
“There is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress may
have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.”
Important foreign affairs powers lie in that twilight zone.  Indeed, in few
other respects is our constitutional system as troubled by uncertainty in prin-
ciple and by conflict in practice between Congress and the president.  The
effect is to raise intractable issues of constitutional jurisprudence and constitu-
tional politics.
Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 66 FOREIGN A FF. 284, 285 (1987)
(alterations in original) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637).  Given these “intractable”
issues of constitutional interpretation, it is not clear that the Court always should or, more
to the point, always does defer to the executive branch or legislature.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 26 28-MAR-05 17:19
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ical question doctrine.100  Under this doctrine, which the Court has
more than occasionally invoked in the general area of foreign affairs,
a finding of a “lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards” leads it to general deference to the President.101
2. Civil Rights and Liberties
In addition to the war powers doctrine, accommodationists argue
that the Court’s approach to civil rights and liberties during periods of
war contributes to a crisis jurisprudence.  Accommodationists note
that the Constitution explicitly allows Congress to suspend the writ of
habeas corpus in time of invasion or rebellion when “the public Safety
shall require it,”102 and the concern for public safety arises in a time of
war.  But some analysts say that even when the writ is not at issue, the
Court has read the Constitution as commending one of two
approaches to rights and liberties in times of war—both of which
would lead it to endorse government efforts to suppress those rights
and liberties.  First, the justices might “defer to emergency policy once
they determine that an emergency exists.”103  In other words, the gov-
ernment would need not justify its policy with reference to any
interest, compelling or otherwise.  Second, the justices may invoke
one of many standards of review to test the constitutionality of
security measures.  In such a case, the presence of a crisis would make
the standard easier to meet.  Take, for example, the case of equal pro-
tection.  In Korematsu, the Court justified curtailments based on racial
classifications as a “[p]ressing public necessity” of the military power
to prevent espionage and sabotage.104  Under modern equal protec-
tion doctrine, it could do much the same by deeming “national
security” an interest sufficiently compelling to justify discrimination
against “enemy” groups.
100 On the political question doctrine, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 365–85 (3d ed. 2000).
101 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).  Under the analysis in Baker, factors that
might indicate that a case involving international relations should fall under the political
question doctrine include:  (a) a “question decided, or to be decided, by a political branch
of government coequal with this Court,” namely the legislature and/or executive; and (b)
the “risk [of] embarrassment of [the] government abroad, or grave disturbance at home.”
Id. at 226.
102 The justification for suspension of habeas corpus may, for example, be based on the
need to maintain public safety in a time of “rebellion” or “invasion.” U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 2 (providing that “Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”); see also Tushnet, supra
note 13, at 301. R
103 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 606–07. R
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Equal protection is not the only example to which proponents of
the crisis thesis point.  The standard for what constitutes a reasonable
search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment, they say, might well
shift during times of perceived threats,105 as could the definition of a
“clear and present danger” in First Amendment litigation.106  Further
examples, though, would only serve to underscore the basic crisis
thesis point:  Since under most constitutional standards of review the
government may have an easier time meeting its burden during times
of war, it seems reasonable to believe that the outcomes of litigation
involving rights and liberties hinge on the presence of such a crisis.  At
the least, many justices have admitted the limitations of constitutional
safeguards when the security of the nation is at risk.107
Of course, proponents of a strict view of the Constitution claim
that the Court must not relax constitutional guarantees on the basis of
external circumstances, such as a war or other international crisis,
because the guarantees themselves do not change.  Taking this view to
its limit—as might a purely literalist or categorical approach to consti-
tutional interpretation—would lead the Court to protect liberties and
rights at levels no lower nor greater during wartime than during
periods of peace.  But even relaxing the strict view, as may be the case
when the justices force the government to supply a compelling justifi-
cation for its policy, would not lead to the near-certain deference the
crisis thesis anticipates.  Quite the opposite:  In light of the uphill
battle the government faces in order to supply a sufficiently compel-
ling reason to justify restrictions on fundamental liberties, the justices
almost always strike them down.108
105 Justice Breyer, in fact, has focused on the shifting interpretation of “reasonableness”
in times of crisis. See This Week with George Stephanopolous (ABC television broadcast,
July 6, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.transcripts.tv/search/
do_details.cfm?ShowDetailID=20454).
106 This test for First Amendment rights was pronounced during World War I, a clear
time of crisis.  Justice Holmes, delivering the opinion of the Court, found that the defen-
dants’ circulars calling upon individuals to resist the draft constituted such a danger, noting
that “[w]hen a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a
hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that
no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right.”  Schenck v. United
States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
107 See id.; see also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216 (“[A]ll legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.  That is not to say that all such
restrictions are unconstitutional. . . . Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the
existence of such restrictions . . . .”).  For another case that demonstrates more attenuated
reasoning, see Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595 (1940), ruling that a
mandatory flag salute was constitutional. But see West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 640–42 (1943) (overruling Gobitis because it overemphasized national unity).
108 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 608–09. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 28 28-MAR-05 17:19
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The response from the opposing camp is that the strict approach
is primarily normative in nature and fails to capture the realities of
Court decisionmaking.109  Very few justices, they say, have analyzed
the Constitution exclusively (or even nearly so) through a literalist
lens, and even those who have invoked this approach made exceptions
in the case of war or other threats to national security.  Hugo Black’s
opinion for the Court in Korematsu is a prime example.110  Moreover,
as Korematsu also may illustrate, even when the Court requires the
government to supply a compelling justification for its policies, the
government is not the automatic loser that some proponents of the
“strict” account make it out to be.111
It thus remains the case that constitutional mechanisms could cut
both ways:  to support the views of those advancing the crisis thesis
and of those articulating a role for the Court as a guardian of rights
during wartime.  Each side has a compelling theoretical argument, but
neither has the empirical data to end the debate.
B. Institutional Mechanisms
In addition to constitutional mechanisms, various institutional
mechanisms—especially the Court’s need for legitimacy and the role
of stare decisis in fulfilling that need—might explain the Court’s
response to crises.  Again, these explanations could cut both ways, and
proponents of the crisis thesis rely on the rejoinder that competing
views work largely in theory and not in fact.  We now elaborate,
beginning with the views of detractors of the crisis thesis and then
turning to its proponents.
1. Institutional Legitimacy and Learning Effects
Commentators advocating a view of the Court as a guardian of
rights assert that the Court builds and maintains its legitimacy by pro-
tecting the rights and liberties that the government attempts to
usurp.112  It is this view of the Court, they aver, that best reflects the
basic institutional design of the judiciary and, furthermore, that per-
109 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 83, at 3. R
110 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 40, at 24–25 (“Hugo Black is most closely R
associated with [literalism].  During his thirty-four-year tenure on the Court, Justice Black
reiterated the literalist philosophy.”).
111 See supra note 107. R
112 See, e.g., FORTAS, supra note 16, 35–44 (describing model where “courts have the R
ultimate responsibility of striking the balance between the state’s right to protect itself and
its citizens and the individual’s right to protest, dissent, and oppose”); Barak, supra note
16, at 149 (discussing judges’ responsibility during war time). R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 29 28-MAR-05 17:19
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meates decision after decision, with Milligan but one among many
prominent examples.113
Because the Court, on this account, remains a force for rights and
liberties when society “is disturbed by civil commotion,”114 it not only
protects rights, it also plays the role of “republican schoolmaster”
during times of war,115 educating the public and its leaders about the
importance of preserving rights and liberties.  Over time, these lessons
accumulate to the point where they trigger a “generally ameliorative
trend,”116 or what some call a “libertarian ratchet,”117 wherein the
government learns from its past attempts to suppress rights.118  As
Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein explain:  “[C]ompared to past
wars led by Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, the Bush administration
has, thus far, diminished relatively few civil liberties.  Even a con-
servative executive branch, it seems, is influenced by the general trend
towards civil liberty protections during wartime.”119
To supporters of the guardian view, the Court does not generate
suppressive doctrine during times of war.  Indeed, doing so would
undermine its legitimacy.  Moreover, with each passing war, the Court
becomes less likely to suppress rights because the government—per-
haps because it has learned from the Court and its own past mis-
takes—becomes less bent on curtailing them.
113 For other examples, see FORTAS, supra note 16, at 35–44, citing Vietnam War– and R
World War II–era incidents, as well as the protection of Communist speech rights; and
Stone, supra note 17, at 243–44, discussing cases during World War II. R
114 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 124 (1866).
115 As Franklin and Kosaki explain, “The conception of the Court as republican school-
master generally reflects the notion that the Court, through its explication of the law and
its high moral standing, may give the populace an example of the way good republicans
should behave.”  Charles H. Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster:  The
U.S. Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 752 (1989).
Some suggest that the justices themselves cultivated this role. See, e.g., Ralph Lerner, The
Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 127, 177–80.  And there is
some evidence that they have succeeded. See, e.g., Valerie J. Hoekstra & Jeffrey A. Segal,
The Shepherding of Local Public Opinion:  The Supreme Court and Lamb’s Chapel, 58 J.
POL. 1079, 1079, 1096–97 (1996) (demonstrating that Court can affect public opinion when
information is high but salience is low).
116 REHNQUIST, supra note 7, at 221. R
117 See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 622–25; see also Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. R
Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture:  What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19
CONST. COMMENT. 261, 285 (2002) (describing ratchet effect favoring “more expansive civil
liberties during wartime”).
118 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 13, at 294–95 (proposing social learning hypothesis that R
“[t]he threat to civil liberties posed by government actions has diminished in successive
wartime emergencies”).
119 Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 117, at 288. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 30 28-MAR-05 17:19
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2. Ratchets and Dosages
For proponents of the crisis thesis, libertarian ratchets, as well as
the more general view that the institutional design of the judiciary
frees it to stand above the political fray and protect rights and liberties
in wartime, are more theoretical concepts than practical ideas.  To
these commentators, the justices understand that, irrespective of their
lack of a direct electoral connection, they must bend to the prefer-
ences of members of Congress, the President, or public opinion120—
and, accordingly, suppress rights and liberties during crises even if
suppression is not their sincere desire.121  Should the Court fail to
accommodate these other actors, it likely would generate a whole host
of negative responses, ranging from noncompliance with (or even
downright defiance of) specific decisions, to efforts to remove its juris-
diction to hear particular classes of cases, to attempts to impeach jus-
tices.122  These responses would make it more difficult for the Court to
achieve its short-term policy or jurisprudential goals and would erode
the judiciary’s legitimacy in the long run.123  Grossman makes this
point with regard to Korematsu:
The Supreme Court’s adjudication of the Japanese internment cases
reflects the precarious situation in which it often finds itself in times
of national emergency.  In such situations there is a need for the
Court both to protect itself as an institution by supporting popular
government policies, and to avert a clash with a popular president
120 For a recent statement on public opinion and the Supreme Court, see Jeffrey Rosen,
How to Reignite the Culture Wars, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2003, Magazine at 48, claiming that
“[o]n those occasions when the Supreme Court ruled in favor of expanding rights, it was
typically reflecting a change in public opinion, not marching as an advance guard.” See
also Helmut Norpoth et al., Popular Influence on Supreme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 711 (1994) (debating Mishler and Sheehan’s claim that public opinion directly
influences Supreme Court).
121 See, e.g., Dorsen, supra note 14, at 844 (noting that judges may be reluctant to safe- R
guard rights in times of war because of “a blend of institutional insecurity and fear of the
consequences of error”); Tushnet, supra note 13, at 304 (“[C]ourts may well succumb to the R
understandable pressure to rationalize the inevitable with the constitution; judges . . . will
feel the need for emergency powers that other members of those elites do, and judges as
judges will feel some need to make what seems necessary be lawful as well.”).
122 See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 88, at 45 (“If the Court does take a hard line against R
changes that the elected branches think are necessary, the Court knows quite well that the
objecting justices can eventually be replaced by justices who are more compliant.”); see
also Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policy Maker, 50 EMORY
L.J. 583, 584–85 (2001) (describing institutional constraints to strategic Court); Gerald N.
Rosenberg, Judicial Independence and the Reality of Political Power, 54 REV. POL. 369,
376–78 (1992) (discussing ways Congress can strike at Court).
123 On legitimacy and constitutional theory, see generally KAHN, supra note 88, sur- R
veying the difficulty of resolving self-government within a constitutional framework. See
also 1 LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: C ONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES
69–82 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing constraints on judicial review).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 31 28-MAR-05 17:19
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who might decline to follow an adverse judicial ruling and thus
expose its institutional weakness.  What was the likelihood of
President Roosevelt complying with a Supreme Court decision
requiring the return of the Japanese Americans to their homes in
1943, or even after, as in 1944, the crisis had largely evaporated?124
Grossman suggests that the Justices in Korematsu were forced to
consider President Roosevelt’s response to an adverse decision.
Apparently, though, pressure from the same administration in the
Nazi saboteur case, Ex parte Quirin,125 avoided any need for Court
members to cull subtle and not-so-subtle historical signals.126
According to Turley:
[Roosevelt’s Attorney General Francis] Biddle warned that the
president would not accept anything but total support from the
court [in the Quirin case]. . . . Justice Owen J. Roberts [conveyed
this warning] to the whole court in its conference on July 29, 1942.
He informed his colleagues that FDR intended to have all eight
men shot if the Court did not acknowledge [his] authority, warning
that they had to avoid such a “dreadful” confrontation.127
In a similar vein, President George W. Bush’s Justice Department
leveled threats against appellate courts it believed to have contra-
vened anti-terrorism measures passed in the wake of September 11.
For example, after the Fourth Circuit ruled that Zacarias Moussaoui,
the defendant facing trial for the September 11 attacks, should be
allowed to interview a captured Al Qaeda member as a potential wit-
124 Grossman, supra note 7, at 682. R
125 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
126 On the other hand, many commentators at the time opined that the Supreme Court’s
decision to intervene in the Quirin case represented a victory for the rule of law and for the
view that the Constitution applies equally in war as in peace.  The Wall Street Journal noted
on the second day of oral argument of Quirin that
inter arma leges silent . . . is not true today. . . . [L]iberties are safe, even in a
state of total global war.  Nothing could more clearly prove that the Constitu-
tion stands than yesterday’s session of the Supreme Court.  If it can be invoked
in aid of enemy spies in time of war, no citizen should fear for his own free-
doms at any time.
A Constitution Still Governs, WALL S T. J., July 30, 1942, at 6.  Similarly, Arthur Krock
noted in the New York Times that the Supreme Court’s decision to intervene in Quirin
“will brighten the American history of a time when Cicero’s cynical apothegm—‘inter
arma silent leges’—is the rule in almost every other land” and asserted that “the laws are
not silent in wartime in the United States, but are open to formal question as in time of
peace.”  Arthur Krock, The Issues of Law and Fact in Sabotage Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
1942, at A20; see also Raymond Moley, Congress Alone Can Now Prevent an Alarming and
Dangerous Breach in the Constitution, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 1942, at 6 (“[L]et’s omit such
generalities as Cicero’s ‘inter arma silent leges.’  For laws are not silent in war—not in the
United States at any rate.”).
127 Jonathan Turley, Quirin Revisited:  The Dark History of a Military Tribunal, NAT’L
L.J., Oct. 28, 2002, at A17, available at http://www.nlj.com/oped/102802turley.shtml.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 32 28-MAR-05 17:19
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ness to his case,128 the Justice Department defied the order in the
name of national security.  It also threatened to move the prosecution
to a military tribunal.129
What these stories suggest is that when the political branches
credibly threaten to circumvent or ignore disliked outcomes, the
Supreme Court is well advised to exercise “passive virtues.”130  Rather
than squandering its resources on “ineffective judgments,”131 the
Court assumes a more deferential stance in these circumstances.  Insti-
tutional legitimacy thereby may become an implicit decision calculus
that leads justices to issue decidedly different opinions during times of
war.132
In addition, because concerns over institutional legitimacy are
constant, the Court must follow precedent established during wartime
even after the crisis dissipates.  If it does not, it once again may risk
undermining its fundamental efficacy.  That is so for several reasons,
not the least of which is that members of legal and political communi-
ties base their future expectations on the belief that others will follow
existing rules.  Should the Court make a radical change in those rules,
the communities may be unable to adapt, resulting in a decision that
does not produce a (new) efficacious rule.  If a sufficient number of
such decisions accumulate over time, the Court will undermine its
legitimacy.  Hence, the norm of stare decisis can constrain the deci-
sions of all justices, even those who do not believe they should be
constrained by past decisions or who dislike extant legal principles.133
From this logic, advocates of the crisis thesis assert that one of
two possibilities relating to precedent established during wartime
results:  (a) “statist ratchets,” sometimes termed “lingering effects,”134
or (b) “dosages.”135  The first seems to follow from Justice Jackson’s
dissent in Korematsu, which warns that:
128 United States v. Moussaoui, 333 F.3d 509, 513–14 (4th Cir. 2003).
129 See Philip Shenon, U.S. Will Defy Court’s Order in Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2003, at A1.
130 See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE L EAST D ANGEROUS B RANCH: T HE S UPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 111, 112–98 (2d ed. 1986).
131 Conference, The Proper Role of the United States Supreme Court in Civil Liberties
Cases, 10 WAYNE L. REV. 457, 477 (1964).
132 See, e.g., ROSSITER, supra note 14, at 1–10. R
133 See LEE E PSTEIN & JACK K NIGHT, THE C HOICES J USTICES M AKE 163–77 (1998);
Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1021–22
(1996).
134 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 612; see also JOHN E. FINN, CONSTITUTIONS IN R
CRISIS: P OLITICAL V IOLENCE AND THE R ULE OF L AW 54 (1991) (“Desperate measures
have a way of enduring beyond the life of the situations that give rise to them.”).
135 See Gross, supra note 4, at 1090–92 (discussing how each crisis may be accompanied R
by increasing dosages of emergency measures); cf. Cole, The New McCarthyism, supra\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 33 28-MAR-05 17:19
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[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes [a government] order to show
that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the
Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order,
the Court for all time has validated [a] principle . . . . [that] then lies
about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority that
can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent need.  Every repeti-
tion imbeds that principle more deeply in our law and thinking and
expands it to new purposes.136
In other words, once justices articulate doctrine “accommo-
dating” the crisis, that doctrine “become[s] entrenched over time and
thus normalized and made routine.”137  Future justices will stick to it,
regardless of whether a war is ongoing and regardless of whether they
agree with it.  This follows from the norm of stare decisis and its role
in helping the Court to establish and maintain its legitimacy.
Dosages too flow from the norm but take a slightly different
form.  The idea here—in direct contradistinction to “libertarian
ratchets”—is that with every passing war or other international crisis,
the government responds with ever-increasing “dosages” necessary to
fend off the threat.  Or, as Gross puts it:
What might have been seen as sufficient ‘emergency’ measures in
the past (judged against the ordinary situation) may not be deemed
enough for further crises as they arise.  Much like the need to grad-
ually increase the dosage of a heavily used medication in order to
experience the same level of relief, so too with respect to emergency
powers . . . .138
Given the extreme deference the Court must show to the govern-
ment to retain its legitimacy, it will approve of its ever-extreme mea-
sures and thereby generate even more extreme doctrine that future
Courts must follow.
Detractors of the crisis thesis would take issue with the notions of
statist ratchets and dosages as well as the entire assumption under-
lying them—namely that the Court must bend to the government’s
desires if it is to retain its legitimacy.  But many political actors, espe-
cially U.S. presidents, would concur with these ideas.  At the very
least, most presidents have operated under the belief that they had
little to fear—in the form of rebukes to their efforts to deal with
security threats to the nation—from the “weakest” branch of govern-
ment.139  When President Wilson predicted a “dire fate” for civil liber-
note 39, at 2 (“A historical comparison reveals not so much a repudiation as an evolution of R
political repression.”).
136 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
137 Gross, supra note 4, at 1090. R
138 Id. at 1091.
139 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 378 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terrence Ball ed., 2003).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 34 28-MAR-05 17:19
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ties on the eve of World War I, he also anticipated that “[t]he spirit of
ruthless brutality would enter into the very fiber of national life,
infecting Congress, the courts, administrative officers and the people
at large.  Freedom of speech and the press would go in spite of protec-
tive constitutional provisions.”140  Franklin D. Roosevelt also seemed
unconcerned with judicial rebuke when he issued his executive order
to exclude Japanese Americans from the West Coast, believing that
“the Constitution has not greatly bothered any wartime President.”141
Even today, while George W. Bush may be sufficiently mistrustful of
the nation’s courts to order that noncitizens suspected of terrorism
appear before military tribunals,142 he has expressed little doubt that
federal judges will support the war on terrorism.
The institutional version of the crisis thesis supports President
Bush in his beliefs about the judiciary.  At the same time, the views of
President Bush demonstrate why crisis-thesis detractors emphasize
the institutional importance of judicial vigilance.143  Each side thus has
a strong theoretical argument, and in Part V we will demonstrate
which has the stronger factual case.
C. Rallying Round the Flag
The final mechanism used to explain crisis jurisprudence stresses
the behavioral response of justices to wars and other national emer-
gencies.  To detractors of the crisis thesis, that response takes the form
of more, not less, scrutiny of repressive government actions because
the justices believe that during times of crisis they must exercise an
especially watchful care over rights and liberties.144  Supreme Court
Justice Abe Fortas expressed this view when he proclaimed, “It is the
courts—the independent judiciary—which have, time and again,
rebuked the legislatures and executive authorities when, under the
140 Swisher, supra note 41, at 321 (citation omitted). R
141 REHNQUIST, supra note 7, at 224. R
142 See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C.A. § 801
(West Supp. 2004).
143 But see SHEFFER, supra note 7, at 170–75 (discussing Congress); Dorsen, supra note R
14, at 840, 848–50 (suggesting that federal legislature might be in better position than judi- R
ciary to curb presidential efforts to repress rights); Levinson, supra note 13 (“If we cannot R
look to the Court to protect our civil liberties in the coming years, we can at least ask
Congress to do so.”); see also CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH, supra note 14, at 139 (“Congress R
alone can effectively safeguard minority opinion in times of excitement.”).
144 See Barak, supra note 16, at 149 (“The protection of every individual’s human rights R
is a much more formidable duty in times of war and terrorism than in times of peace and
security.  As a Justice . . . I must take human rights seriously during times of both peace
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stress of war, emergency, or fear of . . . revolution, they have sought to
suppress the rights of dissenters.”145
Adherents of the crisis thesis, however, deem these the views of a
few isolated judges who recount an idealized story about courts rather
than one that reveals realities of the bench.146  Those realities shore
up the existence of a behavioral mechanism, but one very different
from that which Fortas describes:  It takes the form of a patriotic
fervor on the part of justices, rather than a guardian impulse, and
manifests itself in a response to repress rights.  On this mechanism, it
is entirely possible that a justice, for much of his or her career, could
hold a preference supporting rights and liberties but that preference
could change in light of a national emergency.  Grossman again sug-
gests as much:  “When World War II broke out, feelings of patriotism
and concern about the success of the war effort affected Americans
nearly universally, including the Justices of the Supreme Court.”147
Other scholars have variously described this behavioral phenomenon
as one in which “domestic judicial institutions tend to ‘go to war’” or
“rally ’round the flag.”148  Whatever they deem it, though, the overall
message is the same:  In times of urgency, a justice’s underlying pref-
erences toward rights and liberties move to the right, resulting in
behavior that falls well in line with the crisis thesis.
D. Existing Empirical Support
Those advocating a guardian view of the Constitution would take
issue with this behavioral prediction,149 just as they have critiqued the
constitutional and institutional mechanisms that may lead to a crisis
jurisprudence.  Even those advancing the idea of a crisis jurisprudence
would find fault with various features of the three explanations we
have just reviewed.  An obvious one centers on the mixed expecta-
tions the explanations establish with regard to the reach and duration
of the crisis thesis—issues of considerable debate, as we mentioned
earlier, even among those who adhere to the thesis.  For example, if
justices become super-patriots during times of war, as the behavioral
explanation suggests, then it seems reasonable to observe them sup-
pressing rights while the war is ongoing but not thereafter.  “Statist
ratchets,” which flow from institutional accounts, however, seem to
145 FORTAS, supra note 16, at 38. R
146 See infra text accompanying notes 155–57. R
147 Grossman, supra note 7, at 672–73. R
148 Gross, supra note 26, at 491 (quotation marks omitted); see also CLINTON ROSSITER R
& RICHARD P. LONGAKER, THE S UPREME C OURT AND THE C OMMANDER IN C HIEF 91
(expanded ed. 1976).
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suggest quite a different expectation:  that curtailments of rights
would continue well after the duration of the crisis.  Similar concep-
tual confusion exists over questions concerning the scope of the thesis,
that is, does it cover all cases pertaining to rights and liberties; or is it
limited to particular types of disputes, to certain kinds of crises, or
even to specific classes of litigants?  Some explanations favor the
former, while others suggest a more limited effect.
Yet, even with these various problems, the crisis thesis is suffi-
ciently convincing to the vast majority of members of the legal com-
munity that one version or another has made its way into judicial
opinions150 and off-the-bench writings of Court members.151  It even
supplies a framework around which constitutional law casebooks
organize their discussions of rights and liberties.152
But what is the empirical basis underlying this support for the
idea that the Court rallies around the flag in times of war?  Scores of
studies have examined the crisis thesis, with many concluding in favor
of some version of it.153  In fact, in deflecting various challenges to the
thesis, as we noted throughout Parts III.A–C, supporters point to the
observational veracity of their position:  Their account, they say,
reflects reality on the Court, while the guardian view is but wishful
thinking on the part of a small group of “civil libertarians and law
professors.”154
On the other hand, empirical support for the crisis thesis in any
one study is flimsy.  It consists not of systematically derived data and
carefully designed and executed analyses, but rather of anecdotal evi-
dence from a handful of highly selected Court decisions.
In an effort to show that Court members get swept up in the
patriotic fervor surrounding them, scholars tell stories of justices who,
at the request of presidents, spoke to lay audiences on the importance
of supporting military efforts;155 of some who were “active propo-
nent[s] of [governmental] war policies;”156 and of others who chastised
colleagues inclined to support individual liberties, rights, or justice
150 See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (“History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of
urgency, when constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure.”).
151 See  REHNQUIST, supra note 7, at 224–25 (noting validity of version of inter arma R
silent leges); Brennan, supra note 14, at 1 (noting “shabby treatment” of civil liberties R
during war).
152 See, e.g., WILLIAM COHEN & JONATHAN D. VARAT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: C ASES
AND M ATERIALS (11th ed. 2001); WILLIAM C OHEN & DAVID J. DANELSKI, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW: C IVIL LIBERTY AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS (4th ed. 1997).
153 See sources cited supra notes 13–14. R
154 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 83, at 3. R
155 Grossman, supra note 7, at 672. R
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claims.  Capturing the flavor of this form of evidence is the often-told
story of Chief Justice White’s response to an attorney, who, at oral
argument, claimed that the military draft lacked public support:  “I
don’t think your statement has a thing to do with legal arguments and
should not have been said in this Court.  It is a very unpatriotic state-
ment to make.”157
The strength of the second form of evidence, the jurisprudential
analysis of a handful of selected Court cases, is more apparent than
real.158  In many instances, commentators consider a handful of suits
resolved during times of emergency to make inferences about all cases
decided during such times, without explaining their selection rules and
with the selected cases inevitably supportive of the perspective they
advance.  Garvin’s analysis is illustrative.159  After reviewing a few
“crises” decisions, the study concludes that “Korematsu is the rule, not
the exception:  courts finding themselves at the mercy of executive
characterizations of war often accept those characterizations.”160  In
other instances, the investigator matches cases decided before and
after the crisis to explore differences in the Court’s jurisprudence.161
For those advancing the crisis thesis, those pairings typically involve
four cases that fit the thesis well: Ex parte Quirin162 and Korematsu v.
United States163 on the one side (both decided during crises and both
repressive of rights),164 and Ex parte Milligan165 and Duncan v.
Kahanamoku166 on the other (both decided after the crisis subsided
157 EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 40, at 210. R
158 See generally REHNQUIST, supra note 7 (conducting historical review of select cases R
involving civil liberties during wartime); Michal R. Belknap, The Warren Court and the
Vietnam War:  The Limits of Legal Liberalism, 33 GA. L. REV. 65 (1998) (comparing
Warren Court’s general liberalism with less activist approach to Vietnam-related cases);
Chafee, Speech in War Time, supra note 14, at 960–71 (analyzing string of lower court and R
Supreme Court decisions in connection with Espionage Act of 1917); Dorsen, supra note
14 (conducting historical review of select cases involving civil liberties during wartime); R
Emerson, Freedom of Expression, supra note 14 (discussing periods of history marked by R
serious infringements on freedom of expression as result of war); Developments in the Law,
supra note 34 (discussing judicial checks on use of speech restrictions, executive secrecy, R
government surveillance, and emergency powers); Swisher, supra note 41 (providing R
survey of civil liberty restrictions during World War I).
159 Garvin, supra note 14, at 693–706. R
160 Id. at 706.
161 See, e.g., Currie, supra note 34, at 37. R
162 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
163 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
164 See, e.g., Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War:  The Meaning and
Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 61 (1980) (noting that Supreme
Court justices “enlisted in the national military effort, embracing attitudes which would
render constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties vulnerable”).
165 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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and both supportive of rights).  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s analysis of
civil liberties in wartime provides an example:
[T]he maxim [inter arma silent leges] speaks to the timing of a judi-
cial decision on a question of civil liberty in wartime.  If the decision
is made after hostilities have ceased, it is more likely to favor civil
liberty than if made while hostilities continue.  The contrast
between the Quirin and the Japanese internment decisions on the
one hand and the Milligan and Duncan decisions on the other show
that this, too, is a historically accurate observation about the
American system.167
Focusing research and analysis on Quirin, Korematsu, and
Milligan may seem sensible:  They are landmark rulings of acute his-
torical, legal, and cultural importance.  It is also true, as Garvin168 and
Rehnquist169 explain, that analyses of particular cases can be useful
vehicles for developing more general explanations of phenomena—
here, of the effect of crises on Court decisions.  At the same time,
though, the ability to draw reliable inferences from a handful of ran-
domly selected cases hinges on whether researchers have conducted
their analyses in accord with a set of the rules of inference.170
Unfortunately, the vast majority of work of relevance here (that
is, work which makes inferences about the pervasive effect of crises on
Court decisions from a handful of cases) violates at least three of
these rules.  First, since virtually all existing studies draw their
“sample” of cases on the basis of some private, undisclosed selection
rule, we do not know if the authors of the research avoid the inadver-
tent introduction of selection bias.  We thus have no information that
the cases included in the studies are comparable to those to which
they are inferring.  For example, was the Court’s deference to the
executive order in Korematsu the rule or an aberration in the history
of Supreme Court decisionmaking?  Without systematic evidence
about the rules of selection, this question remains unanswered and the
veracity of the research remains unknown.  More to the point, it is
possible—as our discussion of constitutional mechanisms foreshad-
owed—that the disagreement over the empirical validity of the crisis
thesis stems from the distinct cases that proponents and detractors
choose to support their claims.
167 REHNQUIST, supra note 7, at 224. R
168 Garvin, supra note 14, at 706. R
169 REHNQUIST, supra note 7, at 224. R
170 GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: S CIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALI-
TATIVE RESEARCH 49–50 (1994) (showing how principles of valid research design apply
equally to qualitative as well as quantitative research). See generally Lee Epstein & Gary
King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002) (delineating rules for drawing
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To understand the severity of potential bias, consider the views of
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who finds the crisis thesis to be descriptively
valid,171 and of Justice Fortas, who espouses the contrary view of the
Court as a guardian of rights.172  Chief Justice Rehnquist focuses pri-
marily on landmark cases decided during the Civil War, and World
Wars I and II.  Yet to the degree that he infers generally that laws in a
time of war “will speak with a somewhat different voice,” he extrapo-
lates to other war periods.173  Similarly, Justice Fortas infers, by incor-
porating the Korean and Vietnam War periods into his analysis, that
courts “rebuke” the legislature and the Executive when they curtail
rights in times of war.174  Perhaps these diametrically opposed conclu-
sions about Court behavior may be reconciled on the basis of sample
selection:  namely, whether the study included decisions from the
rather liberal Court that served during most of the Vietnam War
period.175
This is not the only area into which selection bias creeps.
Another comes in the way that commentators define—or more point-
edly, do not define—a “crisis.”  Without being explicit about what
constitutes a crisis, scholars fall prey to defining those cases consistent
with the crisis thesis as having been decided by the Court during a
time of crisis and those inconsistent with the crisis thesis as not.  This
may be why detractors of the thesis invariably point to Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,176 whereas proponents simply discount
the Korean War (from which Youngstown flows) as falling under the
rubric of a “crisis.”
Perhaps the worst form of this bias would manifest itself if the
justices invoked jurisprudential doctrines of emergency power only
when they decided ex ante to rule against a rights claim.  In that situa-
tion, a jurisprudential analysis is susceptible to being endogenous,177
and the inference of a crisis effect could be spurious.  This would be
akin to studying the effectiveness of a drug by selecting only individ-
uals who promoted the drug treatment to their friends.  We may find
171 REHNQUIST, supra note 7, at 224. R
172 FORTAS, supra note 16, at 38 (“It is the courts—the independent judiciary—which R
have, time and time again, rebuked the legislatures and executive authorities when, under
the stress of war, emergency, or fear of Communism or revolution, they have sought to
suppress the rights of dissidents.”).
173 REHNQUIST, supra note 7, at 225. R
174 See FORTAS,  supra note 16, at 39 (“Time and again, the Court has rebuked and R
rejected efforts to deprive people of their jobs in state and federal governments for their
mere beliefs or mere membership in unpopular or even essentially subversive groups.”).
175 For more on this point, see infra Part III.C.2.
176 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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that the drug was effective for those individuals, but that would tell us
very little about the drug’s effectiveness overall.  Similarly here, if jus-
tices only invoke the crisis thesis to curtail rights, we can learn little
about the crisis thesis in general by examining only those particular
cases.
Selection bias constitutes one violation of the rules of inference.
Another occurs in those studies that consider only the effect of the
particular crisis under analysis and fail to take into account other fac-
tors that may affect judicial decisions, even though they consciously
seek to make causal claims (e.g., a war causes the courts to repress
rights and liberties).  To the extent that studies ignore various com-
peting explanations, they suffer from “omitted variable bias,” making
inferences reached therein suspect.178  For example, if politics plays a
role in explaining Supreme Court decisions, then failure to attend to
the Court’s changing ideological and political composition could lead
to an incorrect assessment of the true jurisprudential effect of wars.179
Seen in this way, scholars asserting that Korematsu was an aberration
and that more typically the Court safeguards rights during wartime
ought to take into account the relatively left-leaning composition of
the Court in 1944, which would suggest that the impact of crises is, if
anything, underestimated.  By the same token, perhaps Justice
Fortas’s conclusions are biased because they fail to consider the
Warren Court’s “rights revolution,” which coincided with the Vietnam
War.
A third and final problem centers on the literature’s emphasis on
(typically landmark) cases decided during times of crisis.  This
emphasis makes much more difficult the implicit counterfactual anal-
ysis of how the Supreme Court would rule in the absence of a war
since it relies on large invariance assumptions about how the justices
178 KING ET AL., supra note 170, at 168–74; Epstein & King, supra note 170, at 76–80. R
Omitted variable bias occurs when the estimation technique excludes variables that (a)
affect the outcome and (b) are correlated with the explanatory covariate of interest.  For a
simple example in a linear regression context, suppose we are interested in the effect of
war, X1, on some dependent variable Y, but we omit some other relevant variable X2,
where the data are generated such that E(Y) = X1b1 + X2b2.  Our estimate of the effect of
war on the outcome, when excluding X2, would be E(b1) = b1 + ϕb2, where ϕ represents the
linear projection of war X1 on the omitted covariate X2.  In other words, there is no
omitted variable bias if X2 is uncorrelated with the outcome (i.e., if b2 = 0) or if X1 is
uncorrelated with X2 (i.e., ϕ = 0).
179 Political scientists and legal academics have long documented the effect of the polit-
ical preferences of the justices on the decisions they reach.  For recent examples, see Lee
Epstein et al., The Political (Science) Context of Judging, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 783 (2003);
and Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project:  Legal and Political
Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
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would have decided similar cases in a time of peace.  In fact, some
studies, while making causal claims, fail to make any comparisons
between cases decided during times of war and peace.  This is akin to
studying the causal effect of smoking on cancer by examining only
smokers.  An appropriate investigation requires a control group.180
Commentators focus on landmark cases because they are the
cases of interest.  So, for instance, because President George W. Bush
invoked Ex parte Quirin and a handful of other decisions181 to justify
his order establishing military commissions,182 scholars assert that
they are justified in examining only those decisions.  Cases such as
Quirin, Korematsu, and Milligan, the argument goes, are of far more
historical and jurisprudential consequence than the vast majority the
Court produces.  Yet to the degree that previous analyses have
focused on a small number of decisions, we have no understanding of
the magnitude of the impact of war (in other words, we cannot assess
the relative accuracy of the crisis thesis); nor can we examine whether
the landmark disputes are the result of factors unrelated to the crisis
at hand, such as the political ideology of the justices, the relative sali-
ence of the dispute, or even the resolution reached in the lower
courts—factors that many scholars suggest affect Court
decisionmaking.
III
IDENTIFYING THE CRISES, CASES, AND
CONFOUNDING FACTORS
Judged on the basis of its supporting evidence and credible chal-
lenges to its validity, the crisis thesis falls short of being a well-sup-
ported theory about the Court’s role in wartime.  It is rather a
hypothesis necessitating systematic evaluation.  Undertaking that task
could move us in several directions.  For example, we could carry out
a detailed analysis of free speech doctrine articulated by the justices
180 On the fundamental notion of the counterfactual in assessing causal inferences, see
Michael E. Sobel, Causal Inference in the Social and Behavioral Sciences, in HANDBOOK OF
STATISTICAL M ODELING FOR THE S OCIAL AND B EHAVIORAL S CIENCES 1 (Gerhard
Arminger et al. eds., 1995); and Christopher Winship & Stephen L. Morgan, The
Estimation of Causal Effects from Observational Data, 25 ANN. REV. SOC. 659 (1999). See
also Gregory Mitchell, Case Studies, Counterfactuals, and Causal Explanations, 152 U.
PENN. L. REV. 1517 (2004) (discussing counterfactual inference in context of single
observation).
181 See A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 309,
311–17.
182 See Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-
Citizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2001), reprinted in 10 U.S.C.A. § 801
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during periods of war and peace.  We could conduct a study of the
case-selection decisions made by the Court in times of urgency and
tranquility.  We could even compare the justices’ treatment of partic-
ular classes of litigants when the nation’s security is at risk and when it
is not.
These and other approaches to the crisis thesis are plausible, fea-
sible, and commendable of undertaking.  But since our interest lies in
determining the breadth and depth of the thesis—specifically, the
extent to which it accurately captures Court responses to national
security threats across a range of disputes and litigants—we focus on
the outcomes of cases (a) in which parties claimed a deprivation of
their rights or liberties, (b) which the Supreme Court resolved on the
merits, (c) whether in times of international urgency or not, and (d)
whether directly related to the crisis or not, over the last six decades
(1941–2001 terms).
Such a focus enables us to scrutinize the key observable implica-
tion of the crisis thesis:  When the nation’s security or its soldiers are
at risk, the justices should be less likely to rule in favor of criminal
defendants, war protestors, and other litigants who allege violations of
their rights.  Likewise, a focus on outcomes not only allows us to
assess the competing view of the Court as a guardian of rights in war-
time, but also permits the exploration of more nuanced versions of the
crisis thesis itself, including whether international emergencies affect
only cases that are especially salient, that are directly connected to the
emergency, or in which the federal government participates.  Finally,
we also consider numerous other factors that may explain decisions
beyond the presence (or absence) of a crisis.  Some of these contem-
plate the politics of the justices and changing dynamics across time,
while others focus on features of the cases themselves, such as their
relative importance and their resolution in the lower courts.
Determining the importance of these factors and, more generally,
conducting all the various explorations of case outcomes necessitate
the acquisition of data on the Court’s treatment of claims centering on
rights and liberties (the chief dependent variable of our study) and the
relative state of urgency with regard to threats to America’s national
security (the explanatory variable of primary interest).183  With these
183 In most empirical research, the investigator asks whether a particular “event” caused
a particular “outcome.”  We can characterize the events and outcomes as “variables” that
take on different values.  That is, they vary.  For example, in our study, an “event”—an
international crisis—exists or it does not; and the “outcome”—a Court decision—can be in
favor of the rights claim or against it.  We typically term the outcomes “dependent vari-
ables” and the events a type of “independent variable” known as a “key causal variable.”
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data in hand, we proceed with our investigation of whether the Court
is more likely to repress rights during times of crisis than it is during
times of relative tranquility, as the crisis thesis suggests, or whether it
moves in the opposite direction, rebuffing the government’s efforts to
repress those same rights.
A. The Cases
The existence of Harold J. Spaeth’s U.S. Supreme Court
Database makes amassing data on Court decisions straightforward.184
This database, which many scholars have used to study law and judi-
cial politics,185 contains information on over two hundred attributes of
Court decisions—including whether the justices ruled in favor of or
against individuals claiming a violation of their civil rights or liber-
ties—in all cases decided by the Court with an opinion since the 1953
term.
As the Appendix shows, Spaeth classifies civil rights and liberties
cases into six broad categories:  criminal procedure, civil rights, First
Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorney rights.186  For
As is commonly known, “correlation is not causation,” and so even if we find an asso-
ciation between the key causal variable (crises) and the dependent variable (Court deci-
sions), we must “control” for other factors that may affect Court treatment of rights,
liberties, and justice claims to provide anything close to a causal interpretation.  These
“other factors” constitute a second type of independent variable (known as “control vari-
ables”), and only by incorporating them into analysis would we be able to support fully the
causal claim suggested by the crisis thesis; namely, that crises lead the Court to repress
rights and liberties. See Epstein & King, supra note 170, at 76–80.  We undertake this R
challenge in Part V.
184 The database and the documentation necessary to use it are available at http://
www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/supremecourt.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004).
185 See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL.,  supra note 73, at 253 (relying on Spaeth database); R
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED 253, 279–356 (2002) (assessing different models of Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking relying on Spaeth database); Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?:
Invalidation of State Action During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301, 1305 n.8,
1324–45 (2002) (relying on Spaeth database to assess theories of federalism in Rehnquist
Court); Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court
Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1483–91 (2001) (relying on Spaeth database to
investigate institutional context of Court); Youngsik Lim, An Empirical Analysis of
Supreme Court Justices’ Decision Making, 29 J. LEGAL S TUD. 721, 733–48 (2000)
(employing Spaeth database to assess stare decisis); Keith E. Whittington, Taking What
They Give Us:  Explaining the Court’s Federalism Offensive, 51 DUKE L.J. 477, 506 & n.139
(2001) (using Spaeth dataset to assess voting proximity between justices); cf. Ernest A.
Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1188–91
(2002) (criticizing aspects of Spaeth database).
186 Spaeth further clarifies the basis of these issue areas:
[C]riminal procedure encompasses the rights of persons accused of crime,
except for the due process rights of prisoners (issue 504).  Civil rights includes
non-First Amendment freedom cases which pertain to classifications based on
race (including American Indians), age, indigency, voting, residency, military\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 44 28-MAR-05 17:19
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example, he identifies Korematsu187 as a civil rights case, Ex parte
Quirin188 as a criminal procedure case, and Dennis v. United States,189
another suit prominent in the literature on the Court’s crisis jurispru-
dence, as a First Amendment dispute.  The specification of whether
the Court resolved a dispute in favor of the party claiming a depriva-
tion of his or her rights (that is, in the “liberal” direction) “comports
with conventional usage.”190  In issues pertaining to criminal proce-
dure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process,191 privacy, and attor-
neys, a case is classified as liberal if the outcome favored:  the person
accused or convicted of a crime, or denied a jury trial; the civil liber-
ties or civil rights claimant; the indigent; Native American claims;
affirmative action; neutrality-in-religion cases; the choice stance in
abortion; the underdog; claims against the government in the context
of due process; disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act and
related federal statutes, except for employment and student records;
or attorney rights.192
Following Spaeth’s coding rules and with his guidance, we
backdated the dataset to include the 1941–52 terms and updated it to
include the 2001–02 term.193  With these additional data we were able
or handicapped status, gender, and alienage. . . . First Amendment encom-
passes the scope of this constitutional provision, but do note that not every
case in the First Amendment group directly involves the interpretation and
application of a provision of the First Amendment.  Some, for example, may
only construe a precedent, or the reviewability of a claim based on the First
Amendment, or the scope of an administrative rule or regulation that impacts
the exercise of First Amendment freedoms.  In other words, not every record
that displays a First Amendment issue will correspondingly display a provision
of the First Amendment in its legal provision variable (variable 24). . . . Due
process is limited to non-criminal guarantees . . . .
HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE O RIGINAL U NITED S TATES S UPREME C OURT J UDICIAL
DATABASE 1953–2002 TERMS: D OCUMENTATION 41, http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~polisci/
epstein/courses/supctU/sctcode.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
187 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
188 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
189 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
190 SPAETH, supra note 186, at 51. R
191 One exception that might be relevant in our context is the fact that the outcomes in
due process cases are coded as liberal when the ruling goes against the government, except
for Takings Clause cases, where such outcomes are scored as liberal when pro-government.
This might not make much sense in the context of war-related military takings, and so we
explored the robustness of our findings to recoding the takings cases, with no substantive
changes.
192 SPAETH, supra note 186, at 51–52. R
193 Using Spaeth’s terms, the analu (the unit of analysis) for this study equals zero (case
citation) and dec_type (the type of decision) equals one or seven (cases that were orally
argued and decided with a signed opinion).  Civil rights, liberties, and justice cases are
criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, privacy, and attorneys
(values 1–6 of Spaeth’s value variable).  The Appendix provides more details on the types
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to incorporate into our analyses terms coinciding with World War II
and the Korean War, as well as the recent military conflict in
Afghanistan.194
Our strategy of adapting and extending a prominent database to
suit our purposes has several advantages.  First, while scholars long
have recognized the difficulty of defining the range of civil rights and
liberties disputes, and the ideological direction of a Court decision,195
many now have converged on the definitions offered by Spaeth—so
much so that it is difficult to identify a contemporary empirical study
of the Court that fails to employ them.196  Second, while previous
studies have focused on particular cases, ours is an effort to analyze
the breadth of the effect of war and other threats to the nation’s
security.  Third, if the data lend support to the crisis thesis (or to the
guardian view) as it pertains to all cases of rights and liberties, we
should investigate whether that basic finding holds across various
types of disputes falling under the general rubric of “rights and liber-
ties.”  Because the database categorizes cases into particular issues,197
we can determine whether the war effect might exist in all cases or
only in a particular subset.
B. The Crises
Defining what constitutes an international crisis or a war is cru-
cial.198  Is a “crisis” solely a “constitutional war,” that is, a war fought
pursuant to a congressional declaration of war,199 or is that term broad
enough to encompass a long-term military effort or a prolonged state
of crisis?  The literature’s emphasis on cases such as Milligan200 and
Korematsu201 suggests a long-term military effort, but an exclusive
194 The data cover the 1941 through 2001 terms, such that the first case in the database
was argued on October 10, 1941, and the last case on April 24, 2002.  All data and docu-
mentation are available on our web site:  http://GKing.Harvard.edu/data.shtml#crisis.
195 See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 88, at 76–80. R
196 See supra note 185. R
197 See infra Appendix.
198 Even the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2000)), provides no definition of what constitutes “hostilities.” See
Henkin, supra note 99, at 300 (“Above all, the [War Powers R]esolution suffers gravely R
from a lack of any definition of ‘hostilities’ . . . .”).
199 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.  Strictly speaking, this definition of constitutional
war would exclude the Korean War (1950–53), the Vietnam War (1965–73), the Gulf War
(1991), the War in Afghanistan (2001–02), and the Iraq War (2003).  Then again, we might
consider intermediate expressions of support for war, such as the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution of 1964, which was used to justify executive power during the Vietnam War,
and the Congressional Resolution expressing support for the deployment of troops in the
Gulf War.  This approach would entail weighing the impact of the War Powers Resolution.
200 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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focus on “war,” whether formally declared or otherwise, would elimi-
nate what many specialists in international law view as major interna-
tional crises, such as the Berlin Blockade—and, of course, September
11.
Because these definitional distinctions represent normative
choices rather than verifiable fact,202 we develop three explicit defini-
tions of crisis.203  The first is the absence or presence of war204 (with
wars defined as World War II, the Korean, Vietnam, and Gulf Wars,
and the recent war in Afghanistan).205  The second is four other inter-
national conflicts that specialists have labeled as “major” (the Berlin
Blockade, the Cuban Missile and the Iran-Hostage crises, and
September 11).  The third measure—the presence or absence of a
“rally effect” in the form of a ten-point (or greater) surge in presiden-
tial popularity caused by an international event—may be less obvious,
but it taps a “crisis” as social scientists have employed that term.206
202 See, e.g., Gross, supra note 4, at 1089–96 (noting five reasons for blurring distinction R
between emergency and normalcy).  One strand of classical realist international relations
theory views war as merely a continuation of politics by force, so a clear definition of crises
may simply not be possible. See, e.g., CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 78, 87 (Michael
Howard & Peter Paret eds. & trans., 1976) (asserting that “war is never an isolated act”
and that war is “a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means”). But
cf. JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE 3–12 (1993) (asserting that “[w]ar is not the
continuation of policy by other means” and proposing cultural theory of war).  Even
Keegan’s framework, however, does not help to clarify a definition of crises for our pur-
pose here.
203 We do not, however, explicitly consider the notion of a strict constitutional war, since
this would exclude, in light of the time frame of our study, all wars save World War II from
investigation.  Nonetheless, since our analysis estimates causal effects for each individual
war case and includes restrictions on terms, we could easily compare the estimated causal
effects specific to each war, which would in turn enable us to determine whether the only
constitutional war, World War II, exhibited distinct effects on Supreme Court decision-
making.  For more on this point, see infra Part V.
204 Following the vast majority of literature in this area, war periods do not include the
Cold War, the War on Drugs under the Reagan administration, or the War on Poverty
under the Johnson administration. But cf. Edwards, supra note 5, at 844–48 (considering R
Cold War and War on Drugs).  At the same time, it is possible that our third measure of a
crisis, a rally effect, may capture periods of particular intensity during the Cold War.
205 Since it remains unclear whether we should code the entire period after September
11 as war, we pursue both coding schemes here. See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 13, at 279–80 R
(arguing that “we ought not think of [the war on terrorism] as a war in the sense that
World War II was a war” and that it is “a condition rather than a more traditional war”).
But cf. Downs & Kinnunen, supra note 12, at 399–402 (arguing that acts of terrorism R
“unmistakably bear the characteristics of war”).
206 Beginning with World War II, rally effects have occurred sixteen times, fourteen of
which (not surprisingly) involved international events.  (The two that did not centered on
the Lewinsky scandal and President Clinton’s impeachment.)  In each case, the President’s
popularity jumped at least ten points, with George W. Bush receiving the biggest boost
(thirty-five points), and the surges endured anywhere between five and forty-one weeks.
For this study, we include only the fourteen international events.  For a complete list, see\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 47 28-MAR-05 17:19
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After all, it is during those periods when the public rallies around a
president (typically the catalyst for efforts to suppress rights and liber-
ties) that we might expect the Court to do the same.207
Gathering data on the three measures of crisis requires knowing
when each crisis began and ended.  Since that information is readily
available,208 we were left with only one task:  determining whether the
Supreme Court made its decision during a crisis period (for each mea-
sure of crisis).  We could peg the existence of the crisis to the date the
Court handed down its decision or to the date it heard oral arguments
in the case.  We opted for the latter because we are studying the effect
of a crisis on the direction of the Court’s decision for or against the
rights, liberties, or justice claim.  This decision is typically determined
by an initial vote taken within a few days of oral arguments in a
case,209 unlike the rationale of the opinion.210  Of course, individual
justices do change their votes between the conference following oral
arguments and publication of the final decision.  Yet those vote shifts
rarely produce alterations in the direction (i.e., for or against the
claim) of the Court’s decision.211
David W. Moore, Bush Job Reflects Record “Rally” Effect (Sept. 18, 2001), at http://
www.gallup.com/poll/content/?ci=4912 (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).
207 In research seeking to identify the public opinion consequences of crises, the key
threat to inference is endogenously defining the explanatory variable on the basis of shifts
in the dependent variable (usually presidential approval).  As such, all lists of “rally points”
are by definition problematic for that sort of research.  For our study, if we take the combi-
nation of the crisis and any possible public opinion changes as our explanatory variable, we
have no such definitional problems.
208 The dates for wars are:  World War II:  12/7/41–8/14/45; Korea:  6/27/50–7/27/53;
Vietnam:  2/7/65–1/27/73; Gulf:  1/16/91–4/11/91; Afghanistan:  10/7/01–3/14/02.  With the
exception of September 11, the dates for the major crises are from the International Crisis
Behavior Project.  Michael Brecher & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, International Crisis Behavior
Project, 1918–2001 (ICPSR Study No. 9286, 2004), at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
September 11 began on 9/11/01 and continues through the 2001 term, the last in our
database.  Dates for rally events are derived from Moore, supra note 206. R
209 See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 133, at 118–35 (including information on Court’s R
internal decisionmaking procedures).
210 To see the logic behind our choice, consider September 11 and assume (even though
the Court’s term does not begin until October) that the Court heard arguments in, say, a
First Amendment case on September 1, 2001, took its initial vote on September 2, and
handed down its decision on September 13.  Had we pegged the existence of a crisis to
September 13, rather than to September 2, we would have coded this as a decision made
during a crisis despite the fact that September 11 had yet to occur at the time the Court
took a vote in the case.  And while this is an initial vote, and therefore theoretically subject
to change, alterations in Court disposition (e.g., from an affirmance to a reversal), as we
note in the text, are quite rare.
211 Saul Brenner, Fluidity on the United States Supreme Court:  A Reexamination, in
AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS 479, 482 (Sheldon Goldman & Austin Sarat eds., 2d ed. 1989);
Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Documenting Strategic Interaction on the U.S. Supreme Court
8–22 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.artsci.wustl.edu/~polisci/
lawcourt/archive (last visited Jan. 26, 2005)).  For some exceptions to this general rule, see\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 48 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Lastly, we also sought to measure whether each case in our
dataset was related to a conflict.  While less consensus exists in the
literature about how related to the war the case needs to be for deci-
sions to become more conservative; whether this effect applies to all
cases, even unrelated to the war, during wartime; and how long past
the end of the war the effect persists, all supporters of the crisis thesis
seem to believe that the effect is stronger for cases more related to the
war, compared to ordinary cases.
That said, we might be skeptical of the susceptibility of measuring
“war-relatedness.”  Determining ex ante whether a case is crisis
related is not always obvious.212  At the least, we could not make that
determination on the basis of whether the Court found the ongoing
crisis relevant to the case.  That is because justices may very well point
to the existence of a crisis in order to justify a particular decision.  This
might be tantamount to deciding dispositively whether the claim at
stake falls within the Executive’s war power that as “Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy”213 he shall “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”214  If this is so, then determining whether a case
is crisis related or not on the basis of what the Court says would be the
equivalent of defining a crisis to exist whenever the outcome of the
case fit the crisis thesis.215
Bearing these caveats in mind, we designed a bright-line coding
scheme that was randomly cross-checked by our research team to
assess whether a case was directly related to war or not, based on the
facts of the case.  Focusing on the facts of the case partially addresses
the fear that in some cases the Court might invoke the war-powers
doctrine only when providing a rationale for deciding against parties
alleging a violation of rights.  We reviewed all 3344 cases in our
dataset.  A case was coded as related to the war if (a) the controversy
EDWARD L AZARUS, CLOSED C HAMBERS 470–78 (1998), describing Justice Kennedy’s
switch in Casey.
212 See, e.g., Gross supra note 4, at 1095 (“[W]hen judges decide ‘ordinary’ criminal R
cases, they will take into consideration the impact of their rulings on the fight against
terrorism.”).
213 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
214 Id. art. II, § 3.
215 A possible approach to circumventing this drastic problem of endogeneity would be
to examine systematically briefs filed by the parties to the cases as they arrive at the Court
before the justices make their decisions.  Unfortunately, the most comprehensive elec-
tronic database housing Supreme Court briefs covers only terms since 1979.  Archival
research would of course be possible, and we commend it to others to undertake.  Another
possibility would be to examine decisions of the lower courts.  This would do little, how-
ever, to circumvent the endogeneity problem with respect to the lower courts, nor would it
enable us to examine the broader quantity of interest as to the general war effect in which
courts may not explicitly justify their decisions in terms of the ongoing crisis.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 49 28-MAR-05 17:19
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began during the war and (b) the genesis of the case was the war itself.
For example, war-related cases include wartime draft cases, war pro-
test cases, military takings, courts martial for activity occurring during
a war in a war zone,216 deportation, citizenship, and relocation cases
resulting from the war, and war-related suits under the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942 and the Alien Property Custodian Act.217
This coding yields 134 war-related cases.  While imperfect, we believe
this coding scheme captures the more fine-grained category of cases of
particular interest to scholars of the crisis jurisprudence.
Percentage of Cases
Measure of Crisis All Related to War Unrelated to War
War 23 2 21
War, Plus Major Conflicts 28 2 26
Rally Effect 9 0 9
Total 32 2 30
Table 2: Proportion of U.S. Supreme Court cases involving rights, liberties, and
justice (1941–2001 Terms) that occur during crises and are related to the war
(N = 3344).218
Table 2 documents the results of these research decisions, sum-
marizing our measures on the 3344 civil rights, liberties, and justice
cases in which the Court heard arguments between the 1941 and 2001
terms, along with the three measures of crisis (i.e., war, war and inter-
national crisis, and a rally effect).  As we can observe, decisionmaking
in times of international urgency is not the norm for the Court.  A
majority of cases fall into none of our measures, and combining the
indicators does not change the picture.  Overall, the justices decided
thirty-two percent (n = 1067) of the 3344 cases while a war, major
conflict, or rally event was in place.  On the other hand, crisis deci-
sionmaking is hardly a rare event.  The first two measures—“War”
and “War, Plus Major Conflicts”—were present during roughly a
quarter of the cases.  As for “Rally Effects,” nine percent may be
small but the number of cases (n = 292) is sufficiently large to enable
216 For example, this might include crimes by servicemen in England during World War
II, but not crimes by servicemen in Oklahoma during the Vietnam War.
217 McCarthy-era cases were not coded as war-related cases unless there was a direct
link to a war.
218 The data on Supreme Court cases come from the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial
Database, backdated by the authors, with analu = 0, dec_type = 1 or 7, and values = 1–6.
See supra notes 184, 193.  “War” includes World War II and the Korean, Vietnam, Gulf, R
and Afghan Wars. See supra note 204.  “War, Plus Major Conflicts” includes Wars and the R
Berlin Blockade, Cuban Missile Crisis, and Iran-Hostage Crisis. See supra notes 204–05. R
“Rally Effects” are periods during which the President’s popularity rises by ten points or
more as a result of an international event. See supra notes 206–07. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 50 28-MAR-05 17:19
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meaningful analysis and, thus, to explore the potential effect of rallies
on the Court.  Breaking these cases up by war-related and unrelated
cases in the far-right columns, we see that only a small proportion of
all cases are a direct result of the war.  Only two percent of all the
cases (n = 62) are decided during war and related to the war.  In fact,
out of all the cases arising out of the war (n = 134), over half are
decided during peace.
C. Confounding Factors
In order to conduct a systematic analysis of the crisis thesis, we
must take into account (that is, “control for” or “hold constant”)
other factors that may affect case outcomes (and that are causally
prior to the chief explanatory variable, crisis).219  Simple comparisons
might assume that if the Court ruled against the litigant claiming a
rights violation during a war (or ruled in favor of the litigant during
peace) it was the presence (or absence) of the war alone that led the
Court to reach the outcome that it did.  But all factors that might
affect case outcomes (other than the presence or absence of a crisis)
may not be the same (i.e., constant) during periods of war and peace.
If the cases the Court decides during war and peace differ, then the
direction of its decisions can also differ in the two times for reasons
completely unrelated to the existence of a crisis.
In what follows, we consider the most prominent potentially
“confounding” factors according to the extant literature.  These
include the characteristics of cases that come to the Court during times
of war and peace,220 the political composition of the Court hearing
those cases,221 salience of the case, the ruling and composition of lower
courts, and time effects.
1. The Characteristics of Cases
A primary potential confounding factor suggested by several con-
temporary essays on the effect of war on judicial decisions222 relates to
219 See supra note 183. R
220 For articles discussing the effect of war on the legal environment and on the kinds of
cases reaching the Supreme Court, see, for example, Robert S. Chang, (Racial) Profiles in
Courage, or Can We Be Heroes Too?, 66 ALB. L. REV. 349, 352–64 (2003), discussing dif-
ferential Americanization during war; Cover, supra note 60, at 1234–35, noting changes to R
the rules governing attorney-client communications with the war on terror; Joo, supra note
13, at 32–42, discussing the racial dimension of law enforcement induced by terrorism; R
David Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 749, 831–32 (2003), noting a change in enforcement priorities due to the war on
terror; and Sidak, supra note 39, at 1416–19, discussing detentions under the Alien Enemy R
Act during World War II.
221 See supra note 179. R
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the well-known selection effects of litigation,223 presenting itself here
in the form of distinctions in the characteristics of cases that come to
the Court during times of crisis and periods of tranquility.  Specifi-
cally, scholars have argued that when the nation is at war, the govern-
ment becomes increasingly bent on curtailing individual rights.
Accordingly, it undertakes prosecutions in which the facts are so
“severe” (or “extreme”) that even a sympathetic (that is, right-of-
center) Court would have difficulty simultaneously ruling in the gov-
ernment’s favor and following extant legal principles.224  If the types
of cases are related to our measures of crisis, then it could confound
simple analyses.
To see why, think about the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee
against unreasonable searches and seizures—an oft-cited exemplar of
constitutional protection that governments attempt to skirt during war
times.225  From various statistical analyses, we know a great deal about
the particular features of cases that lead the Court to interpret this
guarantee in a way that favors defendants (typically when it strikes
down the challenged search) or the government (typically when it
upholds the search).226  From those same studies, we also have a rea-
sonably good sense of how the various features affect the probability
of the Court striking down or upholding a search.227
Figure 2 lists these features—eleven critical facts pertaining to
search and seizure cases, along with the impact empirical investiga-
tions228 have shown them to have on the Court (when compared to a
0.5 baseline probability of a decision favoring the defendant).229  Con-
223 See Priest & Klein, supra note 23, at 4–5 (arguing that parties only proceed to litiga- R
tion when chance of winning is at least fifty percent).
224 For supporting literature, see supra note 220. R
225 See, e.g., Dorsen, supra note 14, at 847–48 (discussing steel mill seizure in R
Youngstown); Michael P. O’Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone:  Sealing the
Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1234, 1234–35 (2003) (discussing
investigation powers granted to Executive after September 11 that intrude upon Fourth
Amendment rights); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137,
2138–42 (2002) (discussing implications for Fourth Amendment of greater post–September
11 police powers).
226 See, e.g., SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 185, at 316–18; Jeffrey A. Segal, Predicting R
Supreme Court Decisions Probabilistically:  The Search and Seizure Cases, 1962–1981, 78
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 891, 895–98 (1984).
227 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 185, at 318. R
228 Id.
229 Note that since impact calculations are not additive in a logistic probability model,
these impact findings should not be interpreted as constant or additive.  The impact
depends on which other facts are present; the predicted probability is of course always
bounded between 0 and 1. See, e.g., GARY KING, UNIFIYING POLITICAL METHODOLOGY:
THE L IKELIHOOD T HEORY OF S TATISTICAL I NFERENCE 97–110 (1989); WOOLDRIDGE,
supra note 25, at 453–69; Gary King et al., Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: R
Improving Interpretation and Presentation, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 347, 355 (2000).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 52 28-MAR-05 17:19
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sider, for example, the three types of searches that can occur when law
enforcement officials make an arrest:  searches incident to a valid
arrest, searches after lawful arrests, and searches after unlawful
arrests.  The figure is consistent with existing legal principles sug-
gesting that searches incident to arrest are the most likely to receive
Court validation (such a search has a 0.46 greater predicted
probability of being upheld than a search that was not incident to an
arrest230); searches after lawful arrests receive less favorable treat-
ment from the justices; and searches after unlawful arrests are the
least likely of all “arrest” searches to be upheld.
Impact on Probability of Upholding Search
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
Search of a Home
Search of a Business
Search of a Person
Search of a Car
Full Search
Search with Probable Cause
Search after Unlawful Arrest
Search after Arrest
Exceptions to the Warrant Requirement
Search with a Warrant
Search Incident to Arrest
−0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.4
Figure 2:  Facts relevant to the Supreme Court’s adjudication of Fourth Amendment
cases and the impact of the facts on the predicated probability of the Court upholding
the search.  Grey circles indicate statistically insignificant impacts.  For example, a
search incident to arrest increases the probability by 0.46 that a search will be upheld,
compared to a baseline probability of 0.5.231
Now suppose it is the case that the government acts in a more
repressive fashion during times of war.  Such overzealous prosecution
might in turn generate more extreme cases—for example, a dispropor-
tionate number of cases that involve searches incident to unlawful
arrests, which the justices, on average, are less likely to uphold than
searches incident to a lawful arrest (see Figure 2).  As the Court
begins to adjudicate these “unlawful arrest” cases,232 rather than, say,
230 See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 185, at 318. R
231 This is a graphical depiction of data in SEGAL & SPAETH, supra  note 185, at 318, R
which contains the statistical model from which they derived these predictions.  The
probabilities for Person, Home, Car, and Business are all compared to a baseline where the
defendant does not have a property interest.  The probability for Full Search is compared
to the baseline of a limited intrusion such as a stop-and-frisk.
232 This category applies to cases in which the facts are such that the justices typically
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“incident to arrest” cases,233 we might expect to find more and more
holdings in favor of the defendant, even if the justices did not alter
existing legal doctrine whatsoever.  To put it more generally, the facts,
in response to overzealous government efforts, may move sufficiently
far to the right during times of war as to compel the Court—in the
face of extant legal principles—to articulate a position that favors the
defendants.
Average Per-Year Severity of Search & Seizure Cases
Explanatory Variables Dynamic Specification—
Partial Adjustment
War −.330 (.340) — —
War & Major Conflicts — −.146 (.333) —
Rally Effect — — .460 (.359)
Average Severityt − 1 .360 (1.88) .415 (.188)* .476 (.156)*
Constant −1.26  (.393)* −1.18  (.395)* −1.17 (.367)*
Adj. R
2 .20 .17 .22
N3 2 3 2 3 2
Table 3: Time series assessments of the impact effect of international crises on the
severity of case characteristics.  * indicates p = .01.234
To investigate this possibility, we computed the average degree of
severity (or extremeness) in the facts of Fourth Amendment cases for
each term in our database,235 hypothesizing that this average should
increase during times of war if, in fact, the government is overzealous
in its prosecution efforts.236  We then ran time-series models to assess
the hypothesis, with Table 3 depicting one specification of an ordinary
233 This category applies to cases in which the facts are such that the justices typically
uphold the search.
234 The database used to conduct this analysis is available on our web site at http://
GKing.Harvard.edu/data.shtml#crisis.  For the crisis measures, “War” includes World War
II and the Korean, Vietnam, Gulf, and Afghan Wars; “War, Plus Major Conflicts” includes
Wars and the Berlin Blockade, Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Iran-Hostage Crisis; “Rally
Effects” are periods during which the President’s popularity rises by ten points or more as
a result of an international event. See supra notes 206–08.  We calculated the severity R
levels of searches from the same coefficients used to calculate the probabilities in Figure 2.
Because negative values are associated with more extreme searches, the case-severity
account predicts significantly negative coefficients on our crisis measures.
235 Figure 2 illustrates the facts we included.
236 We also estimated a series of models that assessed the effect of international crises
on the severity of case facts at the case (rather than term) level.  After controlling for the
political ideology of the Court—a crucial variable, as we explain in Part III.C.2—we cannot
uncover statistically significant differences between cases decided during times of war and
peace.  In other words, the results (available from the authors) confirm the analyses
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least squares with a variable representing the lag of “case severity” on
the right-hand side.237
We can draw several conclusions from this table,238 but only one
is relevant here.  All the models depicted in the table, along with
every plausible alternative time-series specification we tested,
returned the same substantive result:  There is a lack of any detectable
impact of the crises variables on the extremity of cases on the Court’s
docket.
War War & Crises Rally
Effect Bias Mean Mean Mean
Fact on Y Direction Diff. OLS Diff. OLS Diff. OLS
Search with a warrant 0.36 Pos. 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.01 −0.16 −0.17
Search with probable cause −0.02 Pos. −0.13 −0.14 −0.14 −0.14 −0.11 −0.09
Search of a person −0.36 Pos. −0.02 0.02 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.11
Search of a home −0.45 Neg. 0.07 0.05 0.02 −0.05 −0.16 −0.18
Search of a car −0.35 Pos. −0.14 −0.10 −0.14 −0.09 0.16 0.18
Search of a business −0.42 Neg. 0.02 −0.08 −0.02 −0.10 −0.08 −0.09
Search after unlawful arrest 0.11 Neg. −0.15 −0.13 −0.09 −0.03 0.01 0.05
Search incident to arrest 0.46 Neg. −0.04 −0.11 −0.00 −0.00 0.02 0.02
Search after arrest 0.18 Pos. 0.01 −0.18 −0.03 −0.14 −0.02 −0.04
Full search −0.28 Pos. −0.02 −0.19 −0.03 −0.14 0.09 0.09
Table 4. This table presents mean differences along crises measures as well as least
squares regression coefficients controlling for political ideology of the Court
and lower court decisions.  A statistically positive figure indicates that cases
containing the fact occur more often during crises than tranquility.  (Means
test for “Exception to the warrant requirement” is not calculated because
the variable is not binary.)  The “Effect on Y” refers to the estimated effect
of the fact on the probability of a liberal decision given a baseline
probability of .5 as graphically presented in Figure 2.  The “Bias Direction”
indicates the direction of omitted-variable bias of propensity score matching
due to excluding covariates of these search and seizure facts, using the mean
difference for War.  “Pos.” refers to a positive bias of the estimated impact
of war, meaning that an estimate ignoring these case facts underestimates
the negative effect of war on the probability of a liberal decision, while
“Neg.” refers to a negative bias on war.  Bold indicates that an estimate is
twice as large as its standard error.
More evidence against the characteristics of cases as confounding
factors can be gleaned from Table 4, which presents mean differences
of all relevant facts for all Fourth Amendment cases.  In order for
these facts to represent confounding variables, they must be corre-
lated with our measure of crisis, indicated by the bold figures in the
237 We are not able to separate our analyses by war-related and ordinary cases here
because the number of war-related search and seizure cases in this subset of the data is too
low.
238 One interesting conclusion is that the case facts heard by the Court are generally not
random, as judged by the lagged severity coefficients.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 55 28-MAR-05 17:19
April 2005] THE SUPREME COURT DURING CRISIS 55
right panel of the table.  Recall, however, that even when the data is
random, we still expect a statistically significant relationship to occur
one in ten times, for a significance level of 0.10.  This appears to be the
case here, providing little evidence that the correlation is more than
random.  Moreover, even if we take those facts that appear to differ
across war and peace cases, they do not systematically point toward
more or less severe fact patterns.
From these analyses, it appears that wartime cases had fact pat-
terns with about the same level of severity as peacetime cases, even
after controlling for the history of severity on the Court.
2. The Political Composition of the Court
Unlike case severity, the political composition of the Supreme
Court has differed substantially in times of war and peace.239  Specifi-
cally, owing to the confluence of several historical phenomena—the
dominance of the Democratic Party during long periods of the 20th
century and the resulting appointment of relatively liberal justices,240
coupled with a greater frequency of wars during those periods—
Courts deciding cases during times of crisis were composed of consid-
erably more left-of-center (i.e., liberal) justices than those deciding
cases during times of peace.
To see this point, we first assessed the extent to which Courts
sitting between the 1941 and 2001 terms were “liberal” or “conserva-
tive.”  While social scientists and legal academics have proposed sev-
eral operational approaches to these terms,241 we rely here on the
239 For the importance of this factor, see supra note 179. R
240 See infra Figure 3.
241 For a review of many of these measures, see generally Lee Epstein & Carol
Mershon, Measuring Political Preferences, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 261 (1996).  The simplest one
is the use of party affiliation, but this fails to capture nuances along the ideological spec-
trum, which are so vital to controlling for policy preferences. See, e.g., Epstein & King,
supra note 170, at 74–75 (discussing relation between theory and operationalization of R
policy preferences).  Accordingly, political scientists have proposed much more sophisti-
cated models using item-response theory. See, e.g., Simon Jackman, Estimation and Infer-
ence Are Missing Data Problems:  Unifying Social Science Statistics via Bayesian
Simulation, 8 POL. ANALYSIS 307 (2000); Simon Jackman, Multidimensional Analysis of
Roll Call Data via Bayesian Simulation:  Identification, Estimation, Inference and Model
Checking, 9 POL. ANALYSIS 227 (2002).  For a particularly sophisticated estimation of
Supreme Court ideal points using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, see Andrew D.
Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002); and ANDREW D.
MARTIN & KEVIN M. QUINN, PATTERNS OF S UPREME C OURT D ECISION-MAKING,
1937–2000 (Ctr. for Statistics & Soc. Scis., Working Paper No. 26, 2002), available at http://
www.csss.washington.edu/Papers/wp26.pdf.  This measure is not well suited for our pur-
poses, however, since Martin and Quinn estimate the ideal points by using actual votes,
thus endogenously defining them with respect to our main causal variable of interest.  But
an alternative Martin-Quinn measure—one that used votes from all Supreme Court cases\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 56 28-MAR-05 17:19
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most widely used one:  the ideology scores that Jeffrey A. Segal and
Albert Cover have assigned to each justice serving since the 1930s.242
Segal-Cover scores have proven to be highly accurate predictors
of judicial votes, especially in the areas of civil liberties and rights243
and in the 1941–2001 terms.244  They are exogenous to the vote, since
Segal and Cover developed them not from examining the decisions
reached by justices but rather by analyzing newspaper editorials
written between the time of the justices’ nominations to the Court and
their confirmations.245
except those involving civil rights and liberties—could provide an alternative to the Segal-
Cover scores, assuming that (a) war does not affect non–civil rights and liberties cases and
(b) ideal points are nonseparable and therefore correlated among issue areas.  We make
these assumptions in Part VII, where we employ these alternative measures (provided by
Martin and Quinn) to analyze the robustness of our results.
242 Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme
Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 559–60 (1989).  Indeed, these scores figure
prominently into many studies of judicial decisions. See, e.g., Epstein et al., supra note 122, R
at 602–04 (testing institutional-constraint account of strategic voting using Segal-Cover
scores); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History?  Playing the Court/Congress/Presi-
dent Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613, 624 n.61, 629 n.102, 633 n.130, 665 & n.255
(1991) (examining influence of congressional preferences on Supreme Court statutory
decisions); Barry Friedman & Anna L. Harvey, Electing the Supreme Court, 78 IND. L.J.
123, 135 (2003) (examining congruence between Supreme Court and congressional prefer-
ences).  One commentator, though, has criticized the method employed in the Segal-Cover
scores as “reflect[ing] rather general opinions about the political orientation of a justice”
and not being a “good guide[ ] to the views of justices in specific areas of constitutional
controversy.” GRIFFIN, supra note 88, at 132–33.  Yet capturing the general “political ori- R
entation” is precisely the purpose of the Segal-Cover scores.  As we employ them, they are
not meant to provide predictive power for one particular case, but rather to control for
long-term changes in judicial ideology of the Court.  Moreover, we use them to study deci-
sions in the areas of civil rights and liberties, where they work well as general predictors of
trends in decisionmaking. See, e.g., Epstein & Mershon, supra note 241, at 261–70 (exam- R
ining utility of Segal-Cover scores).
243 Epstein & Mershon, supra note 241, at 272. R
244 Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices
Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 817–22 (1995) (discussing strong predictive power of Segal-Cover
scores for cases involving civil liberties and economic issues).
245 Specifically, as Segal and Cover tell it:
We trained three students to code each paragraph [in the editorial] for political
ideology.  Paragraphs were coded as liberal, moderate, conservative, or not
applicable.  Liberal statements include (but are not limited to) those ascribing
support for the rights of defendants in criminal cases, women and racial minor-
ities in equality cases, and the individual against the government in privacy and
First Amendment cases.  Conservative statements are those with an opposite
direction.  Moderate statements include those that explicitly ascribe modera-
tion to the nominees or those that ascribe both liberal and conservative values.
Segal & Cover, supra note 242, at 559.  They arrived at their measure by subtracting the R
fraction of paragraphs coded conservative from the fraction of paragraphs coded liberal
and dividing by the total number of paragraphs coded liberal, conservative, and moderate.
Id.  The fact that this measure is exogenous to the judicial vote is crucial to the analysis.
See supra note 241.  Since the entire question of this study is the causal effect of war on the R
outcome of opinions, we cannot very well use outcomes to derive a control variable.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 57 28-MAR-05 17:19
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From these analyses, Segal and Cover devised a scale of judicial
political ideology, which ranges from -1.0 (the most conservative) to 0
(moderate) to +1.0 (the most liberal),246 such that each justice receives
a score within this range.  For example, William J. Brennan received a
score +1.0; Scalia’s is -1.0, while O’Connor’s is a more moderate
-0.17.247  But, because we are interested in examining the political
composition of the Court as a whole, rather than the policy prefer-
ences of particular justices, we used the Segal-Cover scores to calcu-
late the ideology of the median justice serving on each Court248 for
each year in our analysis.249  This technique is consistent with public-
choice and jurisprudential theories emphasizing the importance of the
swing vote,250 as well as contemporary commentary stressing the crit-
ical role Justice O’Connor (and, to a lesser extent, Justice Kennedy)
has played on the Court by casting key votes in many consequential
cases.251
246 Segal & Cover, supra note 242, at 559.  In subsequent analyses in which we employ R
propensity score matching, see supra Part V, we rescale this by adding the minimum of the
score of the median justice to the scores, so that the ordering of the Segal-Cover score is
invariant to a square transformation.
247 For a list of the Segal-Cover scores for all justices, see EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 73, R
at 485 tbl.6-1.
248 We define median as the middle justice, such that four justices are more liberal and
four are more conservative.
249 The reason for choosing the median justice has a clear and obvious grounding in the
public-choice literature on strategic decisionmaking. See DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY
OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS 18 (1958) (demonstrating that median voter controls out-
come of any majority vote); Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making,
56 J. POL. ECON. 23, 26–27 (1948) (further demonstrating importance of median voter);
Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the U.S. Supreme Court, N.C. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2005) (proposing systematic approach for identifying median justice), avail-
able at http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/medianjustice.pdf.
250 See, e.g., Mario Bergara et al., Modeling Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making:
The Congressional Context, 28 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 247, 249, 253 (2003) (employing median-
justice theory in analyzing effects of institutional constraints on Supreme Court decision-
making); Epstein & Mershon, supra note 241, at 276 (noting general inability of Segal- R
Cover scores to identify median justice); R. Randall Kelso & Charles D. Kelso, Swing
Votes on the Current Supreme Court:  The Joint Opinion in Casey and Its Progeny, 29 PEPP.
L. REV. 637, 638–39 (2002) (discussing role of swing Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter in 5–4 Supreme Court decisions between 1997 and 2000); Jeffrey A. Segal, Separa-
tion-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 28, 41–42 (1997) (testing separation-of-powers model with data on median justice’s
position).  The role of the pivotal justice is deeply rooted in the theory of the median voter.
See also Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41, 53–57 (1929) (dis-
cussing general tendency for “excessive conglomeration” near median position).
251 See, e.g., Associated Press, Affirmative Action Case Puts Judges in Spotlight, CHI.
TRIB. REDEYE EDITION, Apr. 1, 2003, at 36 (describing Justices O’Connor and Kennedy as
“perennial swing voters”); Editorial, A Moderate Term on the Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 29,
2003, Week in Review, at 12 (noting Justice O’Connor’s status as “court’s critical swing
vote”); Charles Lane, Supreme Court:  On the Sidelines, for Now, WASH. POST, Sept. 30,
2001, at A5 (describing Justice O’Connor as “perennial swing voter”).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 58 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Figure 3 depicts these Court “swings” with years on the hori-
zontal axis and the median liberalness on the vertical axis.  These data
are also consistent with commonly held intuitions about particular
Court eras.252  Note, for example, the high level of liberalism during
the Warren Court years (1953–1968 terms) and the decrease that
occurs thereafter as an increasing number of justices appointed by
Republican Presidents Richard M. Nixon, Ronald Reagan, and
George H.W. Bush ascended to the bench.
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Figure 3:  The political ideology of the median justice on the U.S. Supreme Court,
1941–2003.  The line depicts the Segal-Cover score of the median justice for each
term.  The scores indicated on the vertical axis measure liberalness, ranging from 1.0
(most liberal) to -1.0 (most conservative).253  The grey shading depicts terms during
which the Court heard disputes during a war period.
Note the grey shading in Figure 3, indicating terms during which
wars were ongoing.254  The vast majority of wartime Courts were dis-
252 For ideological characterizations of particular Courts, see, for example, HOWARD
GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT COUNTED 185–89 (2001), discussing the ideological composi-
tion of the Court in the context of the disputed 2000 presidential election; William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J.
331, 374–77 (1991), discussing the Court’s ideological position relative to Congress in the
years 1967–90; and Thomas W. Merrill, Childress Lecture, The Making of the Second Rehn-
quist Court:  A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 590–601 (2003), discussing
the “attitudinal model” of the first and second Rehnquist Courts.
253 The Segal-Cover scores are available in EPSTEIN ET AL., supra  note 73, at 242–43 R
tbl.3-12.
254 From this point on, we focus our analyses exclusively on times of war.  We do so
primarily because it would be cumbersome to present data on all three measures of crisis.
Unless we indicate otherwise, though, our claims also apply to other crisis periods and rally
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proportionately liberal.  We confirm these results with Figure 4, which
depicts the actual distribution of the data such that the higher the cir-
cles (which represent the terms included in our dataset), the greater
the proportion of decisions supporting rights, and the further left the
circles, the more “liberal” the Court (again, on the Segal-Cover scale).
Note that while right-of-center justices dominated during many terms,
as indicated by the grey circles, a crisis was in effect during only two
(the Gulf and Afghan Wars), as indicated by the white circles.  Signifi-
cantly for our study, liberal justices controlled during all others.
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Figure 4:  The preponderance of left-of-center Courts during times of war:  the empir-
ical distribution of the data.  N=3344.  The diameter of each circle is sealed by the
number of cases decided in the Term, with an average of roughly fifty-five cases
decided each term.255
The conclusion we reach from Figures 3 and 4—that the political
composition of the Court during times of war and peace has varied
rather dramatically—damages any analysis that assumes that relevant
features of the judicial decisionmaking environment remained con-
stant over the past six decades and during periods of crisis and tran-
quility and invalidates any analysis of the effect of war that fails to
control for ideology.
255 We obtained data on the Supreme Court’s decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court
Judicial Database (backdated by the authors) with analu = 0, dec_type = 1 or 7, values =
1–6. See supra notes 184, 193–94.  War includes World War II and the Korean, Vietnam, R
Gulf, and Afghan Wars. See supra notes 204–05, 208 and accompanying text.  The political R
ideology of the Court is based on the Segal-Cover score of the median justice. See supra
text accompanying notes 248–49. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 60 28-MAR-05 17:19
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3. Case Salience
Another possible confounding factor is that the crisis effect might
manifest itself only in particularly salient cases.256  Indeed, this may be
the lesson of our discussion of public opinion effects.257  It further
reflects the view in the literature that the Court feels the impact of
international emergencies not in “routine” cases of rights, liberties,
and justice but only in those cases that are particularly salient or
important to decisionmakers of the day.258
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Figure 5:  Proportion of U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the areas of rights, liberties,
or justice that are salient, 1941–2001 Terms.  711 of the 3344 cases of rights, liberties,
and justice decided during the period under analysis are salient.  The white bars indi-
cate the absence of a crisis (e.g., the country was not at war) at the time the Court
heard oral arguments in the cases; darker bars indicate the presence of a crisis.259
256 See supra note 19. R
257 See supra Part I.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 78–81. R
259 We obtained data on the Supreme Court’s decisions from the U.S. Supreme Court
Judicial Database (backdated by the authors) with analu = 0, dec_type = 1 or 7, values =
1–6. See supra notes 184, 193–94.  War includes World War II and the Korean, Vietnam, R
Gulf, and Afghan Wars. See supra notes 204–05, 208, and accompanying text.  Salient R
cases are those that were covered on the front page of the New York Times on the day
after the Court handed down its decision. See Lee Epstein & Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring
Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 66–67 (2000).  For a listing of these cases, see Mea-
suring Issue Salience:  List of Salient U.S. Supreme Court Cases, at http://epstein.wustl.edu/
research/saliencecase.pdf.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 61 28-MAR-05 17:19
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To incorporate this into our analysis, we adopted Epstein and
Segal’s approach to case importance.  These analysts identify a case as
“salient” if it received front-page coverage in the New York Times on
the day after the Court announced its decision.260  Because Epstein
and Segal sought to assess contemporaneous salience (as does this
study), this measure is suited ideally to our purposes.261  Moreover, as
Figure 5 shows, there appears to be a sufficient number of salient
cases to enable a systematic analysis on this dimension.  Overall, 711
of the 3344 civil liberties cases (roughly 21%) were covered on the
front page of the Times, with 199 of the 711 (roughly 28%) occurring
in the midst of war and the remaining 512 (72%), reported in times of
peace.
4. Lower Courts
An additional possible confounding factor is the changing
dynamics in the lower courts.  This is especially true in light of the
well-documented propensity of the justices to accept cases in order to
reverse the holding of the tribunal directly below.262  The presence of
a war or other international crisis may very well affect lower court
judges, too, and we ought to consider this possibility by including and
then excluding their decisions in our analyses.
We therefore incorporated into our model the outcome reached
in the lower court (i.e., whether it reached a liberal or conservative
outcome).263  The logic behind this choice is simple.  Suppose we were
seeking to explain the decisions of a liberal Supreme Court, such as
the Court that sat in 1965.264  Without controlling for the justices’ pro-
pensity to reverse the disposition reached in the court below, we
would predict that this group of justices would rule in favor of a party
260 Epstein & Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, supra note 259, at 66–67, 72 (2000).  For a R
list of the salient cases, see Measuring Issue Salience:  List of Salient U.S. Supreme Court
Cases, supra note 259. R
261 By contemporaneous salience, we mean that the actors (justices) thought the issue
(case) was salient at the time they were resolving it, regardless of whether analysts now
view it as salient. See DAVID R. MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN 8–33 (1991) (measuring
contemporary issue salience for congressional committee “exposure probes” by examining
whether issue received front-page coverage in the New York Times); Epstein & Segal,
supra note 259, at 67 (arguing contemporaneous media coverage provides “reproducible, R
valid, and transparent method of assessing whether the particular actors under investiga-
tion view an issue as salient or not”).
262 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 185, at 253–55.  During only four terms since 1946 R
(1946, 1951, 1953, 1993) has the Court affirmed a greater proportion of cases than it
reversed.  For term-by-term data on the proportion of cases reversed, see EPSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 73, at 228–29, tbl.3-6. R
263 We obtained this information from the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database. See
supra note 184.  The variable is coded as lctdir. R
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claiming a deprivation of his or her rights regardless of whether that
party was the appellant or the appellee.  However, in light of that pro-
pensity, we would expect even a left-of-center Court occasionally to
reverse left-of-center lower court decisions.265
5. Time Effects
Finally, broad time effects, including ideological shifts in the exec-
utive and legislative branches,266 as well as in legal culture,267 may also
be confounding factors.  To control for these, we take into account the
term in which the Court made its decision and draw comparisons
between peace and wartime cases that are as close in time as can be
found.
IV
STATISTICAL METHODS
We now address how to incorporate these factors in our analysis.
We do so by introducing nonparametric matching, a statistical frame-
work for causal inference that is now fairly standard in a variety of
scholarly disciplines268 but does not appear to be well known in law
schools or in the broader legal community.
265 We also consider an alternative hypothesis that the crisis thesis may not readily
admit, namely that war may similarly affect the lower courts. See infra Part V.
266 See, e.g., Bergara et al., supra note 250, at 248 (finding that justices adjust their deci- R
sions to presidential and congressional preferences); Eskridge, supra note 252, at 334 (sug- R
gesting that Court subjugates preferences of enacting Congress in favor of current
Congress); Eskridge, supra note 242, at 617 (same); Merrill, supra note 252, at 573 (dis- R
cussing thesis that Court is subject to resistance from or modification by Congress and
Executive).
267 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 117, at 281–84. R
268 See, e.g., CHARLES F. MANSKI, IDENTIFICATION PROBLEMS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
(1995); Donald B. Rubin, Statistical Issues in the Estimation of the Causal Effects of
Smoking Due to the Conduct of the Tobacco Industry, in S TATISTICAL S CIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 321–46 (Joseph L. Gastwirth ed., 2000); Rajeev H. Dehejia & Sadek Wahba,
Causal Effects in Nonexperimental Studies:  Re-Evaluating the Evaluation of Training Pro-
grams, 94 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N  1053 (1999); Constantine Frangakis & Donald B. Rubin,
Principal Stratication in Causal Inference, 58 BIOMETRICS 21 (2002); James J. Heckman et
al.,  Characterizing Selection Bias Using Experimental Data, 66 ECONOMETRICA 1017
(1998); James J. Heckman et al., Matching as an Econometric Evaluation Estimator, 64
REV. ECON. STUD. 605 (1997); Kosuke Imai, Do Get-Out-The-Vote Calls Reduce Turnout?
The Importance of Statistical Methods for Field Experiments, AM. POL. SCI. REV. (forth-
coming 2005), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~kimai/research/index.html; Paul R.
Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, Reducing Bias in Observational Studies Using Subclassifi-
cation on the Propensity Score, 79 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 516 (1984); Donald B. Rubin, Esti-
mating Causal Effects of Treatments in Randomized and Nonrandomized Studies, 66 J.
EDUC. PSYCHOL. 688 (1974); Daniel E. Ho, Kosuke Imai, Gary King & Elizabeth A.
Stuart, Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Improving Parametric Causal Infer-
ence (Oct. 13, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.princeton.edu/
~kimai/research/index.html) [hereinafter Ho et al., Improving Parametric Causal Infer-\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 63 28-MAR-05 17:19
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A. A Definition of the Causal Effect of War
Our inferential goal is to estimate the degree to which wars cause
the Court to suppress rights and liberties in ways it would not during
times of peace.  Estimating this causal effect is inherently about
counterfactual inference:  We care about what the outcomes of cases
decided during a war would be but for the presence of the war.269  We
are not interested in whether the Court has made more liberal deci-
sions during times of war than the Court did in times of peace, since
this might be due to the coincidence that liberal justices have tended
to be on the Court more often during wartime.  We instead need to
determine the effect of war for any given Court composition, set of
case facts, time period, and other relevant factors.  This is what distin-
guishes a causal statement from a descriptive one.
In a research environment without any constraints, generating an
estimate would be simple enough:  We would create a world without a
war and ask the U.S. Supreme Court to decide a case; then we would
rerun history, holding everything constant other than the absence of a
war, and ask the Court to decide the same case.  If in the version of
our history without a war we observed support for civil liberties, but in
the version with a war we observed a lack of support, then we might
conclude that that the war had an effect on the Court with respect to
that case in the direction anticipated by the crisis thesis.270
To state it more formally, denote the decision of the Court for
case i by a binary variable Y, such that Yi = 1 if the Court decided case
i in the liberal direction and Yi = 0 if the Court decided case i in the
conservative direction i(i = 1, . . . , n).271  Now denote the presence or
ence]; Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai, The Impact of Partisan Electoral Regulation:  Evi-
dence on Ballot Effects from the California Alphabet Lottery, 1978–2002 (Oct. 28, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~kimai/research/
index.html); Daniel E. Ho & Kosuke Imai, Nonparametric Randomization Inference with
Natural Experiments:  An Analysis of Ballot Effects in the 2003 California Recall Election
(Sept. 18, 2004) (unpublished manuscript, available at http://www.princeton.edu/~kimai/
research/index.html).
269 This conception of causation is closely related to the notion of but-for causation in
other areas of the law. See H.L.A. HART & TONY H ONORE, CAUSATION IN THE L AW
109–29 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing sine qua non causation).  One key to our investigation is
that we view causation as probabilistic.  For more on this distinction, see David H. Kaye &
David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FED. JUDICIAL C TR., REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 83, 90–97 (2d ed. 2000), discussing statistical methods
of determining causation.
270 For more on this point, see KING ET AL., supra note 170, at 75–97, describing causal R
inference in social science; Epstein & King, supra note 170, at 36–37, describing R
counterfactual inference; and Holland, supra note 25, at 949–53, connecting philosophical R
and statistical frameworks of causal inference.
271 This notation is standard in the literature on causal inference and program evalua-
tion.  See supra note 270 for examples of this literature. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 64 28-MAR-05 17:19
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absence of war by another binary variable T, where Ti = 1 denotes
that a war occurred for case i and Ti = 0 denotes that no war occurred
for case i.  Finally, let Yi(1) and Yi(0) signify the potential outcomes
for case i under war T = 1 and T = 0, respectively.  In other words,
Yi(1) represents the outcome of case i if war had occurred, whereas
Yi(0) represents the outcome of case i if war had not occurred.  Note
that this notation is in terms of potential outcomes.  That is, the case
could potentially have occurred under war or peace, and the Court
could have decided for (“liberal”) or against (“conservative”) the
party alleging a violation of his or her rights.  But we always observe
only one of the potential outcomes.
This type of counterfactual inference in crisis jurisprudence was
evident to Justice Jackson in Korematsu.272  In a dissenting opinion, he
noted:  “If Congress in peace-time legislation should enact such a crim-
inal law, I should suppose this Court would refuse to enforce it.”273  In
other words, in the counterfactual world in which President
Roosevelt’s exclusion order274 came before the Supreme Court during
a time of peace, the Court would not have upheld the order.  That is,
Jackson’s belief was that YKorematsu(1) = 0 while YKorematsu(0) = 1.275
Formally, we define the causal effect for each case as the differ-
ence between potential outcomes:
ti = Yi(1) – Yi(0)
Within this framework, we explicitly incorporate the counterfac-
tual state of the world, or the “treatment effect”276—with the average
treatment effect (ATE) providing one way of summarizing the causal
effect of war:
t  = E(Yi(1)) − E(Yi(0)),
which is simply the average across case-specific treatment effects ti.
272 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242–48 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
273 Id. at 243–44 (emphasis added).
274 Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34, 7 Fed. Reg. 3967 (May 28, 1942).
275 Another example of counterfactual inference is from Schenck v. United States, in
which Justice Holmes noted that there are “things that might be said [and endured] in time
of peace,” i.e., YSchenck(0) = 1, that “when a nation is at war . . . will not be endured,” i.e.,
YSchenck(0) = 0.  249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  In other words, had Schenck printed similar leaflets
to assert his rights against conscription during a time of peace, he likely would have pre-
vailed.  An objection to this counterfactual is that we would be unlikely to observe it since
conscription occurs only in a war effort.  This is precisely the estimation problem that
causal inference presents, but it does not bar an estimate of Justice Holmes’s notion that a
comparable act of speech in a time of peace would not have been censored.  Indeed, this is
what our framework addresses.
276 This term stems from the biomedical literature examining the causal effect of treat-
ment as opposed to control. See, e.g., Donald B. Rubin, Estimating Causal Effects from
Large Data Sets Using Propensity Scores, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 757 (1997).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 65 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Of course it is impossible to rerun history to estimate the
counterfactual and obtain ti—the causal effect for each particular
case.  This impossibility is known as the “fundamental problem of
causal inference,”277 which, in concrete terms, means that we cannot
observe the counterfactual, such as the Korematsu decision during
peacetime.  In fact, for each case i we only observe Yi(1) if T = 1 and
Yi(0) if T = 0.
The predominant approach to causal inference is the use of
parametric methods, such as regression analysis, to estimate the
counterfactual.278  Unfortunately, though, because regression analysis
often makes assumptions that are unjustified in a legal setting,279 it is
not well-suited for the problem we confront.  So we employ
nonparametric matching, which uses the insights of random
assignment to draw causal inferences in observational studies, while
decreasing the role of onerous assumptions of conventional
parametric estimates.280  This technique was developed in statistics
and has been applied widely in other disciplines,281 but it does not yet
enjoy much of a following in law; indeed, we know of not a single
published study in a law review that has formally employed it.
Accordingly, we provide a brief explanation of matching
techniques.
B. Matching
The intuition behind matching is simple.  While we may not be
able to rerun history to see if the Court would decide the same case
differently in times of war versus peace, we can match cases that are
as similar as possible on all relevant dimensions (except whether the
Court decided them during a war) to make that same causal assess-
ment.  In fact, obtaining a balance of covariates across “war” and
“peace” cases is precisely the purpose of the hypothetical experiment
we described above.
While legal academics have yet to invoke this precise approach,
the idea of “matching” should be familiar to legal scholars.  For
277 KING ET AL., supra note 170, at 79; Holland, supra note 25, at 947. R
278 For a review of the state of experimental and empirical legal studies, see Symposium,
Empirical and Experimental Methods in Law, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 789.
279 For example, traditional ordinary least squares regression analysis makes
assumptions of a constant additive treatment effect (that war affects all cases similarly) and
linearity in the covariates (that all variables affect the outcome in a linear fashion).  These
assumptions often remain unjustified in the analysis of social and legal phenomena.
280 See Ho et al., Improving Parametric Causal Inference, supra note 268 (discussing R
matching as nonparametric preprocessing to make parametric assumptions more
believable and to reduce model sensitivity).
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example, to investigate whether the participation of interest groups
affects litigation outcomes, Epstein and Rowland paired similar cases
decided by the same judge.  The only relevant point of distinction
between the two was whether an interest group participated or not.282
Likewise, Walker and Barrow matched male and female judges of
similar backgrounds to determine whether women speak “in a dif-
ferent voice.”283  In each of these studies, the researchers attempted to
control for relevant differences (whether judges or backgrounds) so
that they could examine the effect of a causal factor (whether interest
group participation or the sex of the judge).
That too is our objective.  We seek to match cases that are analo-
gous on all pertinent dimensions, except the key causal variable (here
crisis), so that we can assess the effect of that key variable on Court
outcomes.  The intuition is that once we have conditioned on all rele-
vant confounding factors, we can infer that the remaining difference in
proportions of cases decided in favor of the party alleging an abridg-
ment of rights and against that party is due to war.
In Part III.C, we explicated general theoretical concerns associ-
ated with confounding factors, which we call Xi.  From this discussion
emerge several guidelines that informed our selection of the factors
on which to match cases.  Most important, the factors must be corre-
lated with our measure of crisis and must be causally prior to war. S o
while the extant literature has proposed as many as a dozen or more
explanations for Court outcomes,284 the crises themselves are likely to
affect many of these (such as whether the Court’s opinion discussed
war powers).  Since these factors are not causally prior to war, we
should not match on them.  Moreover, if factors are not correlated
with our measures of crises—which, for example, appears to be the
282 Lee Epstein & C.K. Rowland, Debunking the Myth of Interest Group Invincibility in
the Courts, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 205, 209–10 (1991).
283 Thomas G. Walker & Deborah J. Barrow, The Diversification of the Federal Bench:
Policy and Process Ramifications, 47 J. POL. 596, 601–03 (1985).  Note, though, that the
literature on causal inference has largely eschewed inferences stemming from treatments
that are not at least in theory subject to manipulation.  In a rejoinder to Holland, supra
note 25, Donald Rubin discusses this mantra of “no causation without manipulation.” R
Donald B. Rubin, Which Ifs Have Causal Answers, 81 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 961, 962 (1986).
284 See, e.g., EPSTEIN & WALKER, supra note 40, at 22–48 (legal and extralegal influ- R
ences); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 185, at 288–89 (precedent), 310 (text and intent), R
312–20 (fact patterns), 320–24 (judges’ attitudes), 326–49 (political environment), 410–11
(solicitor general), 416–24 (judicial restraint), 424–28 (public opinion); Eskridge, supra
note 242, at 664; Merrill, supra note 252, at 572–74 (judicial ideology, need to obtain five- R
justice majority, resistance from or modification by Congress or Executive, changes in
Court personnel); Pablo T. Spiller & Rafael Gely, Congressional Control or Judicial Inde-
pendence:  The Determinants of U.S. Supreme Court Labor-Relation Decisions, 23 RAND
J. ECON. 463, 463 (1992) (suggesting that Court makes decisions to maximize judges’ ideo-
logical preferences and responds to pressure from interest groups).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 67 28-MAR-05 17:19
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case for characteristics of the disputes285—excluding them from the
analysis will not bias our estimates.
Having identified relevant confounding factors, we next needed
to match the cases on those variables so that we could estimate the
causal effect of war.  This task would be easy if exact matches existed
for all cases decided during wars.  But that is not the case.  To get a
sense of the problem, suppose we begin with the first case in our
database, which, say, was a salient case decided in favor of the rights
litigant by the court below and was heard by a U.S. Supreme Court
with a median ideology of .605 in 1941 during peacetime.  To find an
exact match for this case, we would need to locate a dispute that had
the same values on the potentially confounding variables—a salient
dispute resolved by a rights-oriented lower court that a U.S. Supreme
Court with an ideological score of .605 reviewed in 1941—but that was
decided during a war.  In this way, matching would literally hold con-
stant the effects of the potential confounding variable.
Since such an exact match might not exist in our database, this
approach is insufficient:  If it were the only one on which we relied, we
would be unable to make use of the vast majority of our cases.286
To avoid wasting valuable data, we must then create matches that
are not “exact” but as close to “exact” as possible.  To do this we use a
recent program, co-written by two of the present authors (Ho and
King) along with Kosuke Imai and Elizabeth A. Stuart, that auto-
mates this process of balancing the covariates (with relevant options
and diagnostic techniques).287  To portray the results, we first summa-
rize all the covariates in Figure 6 with a single variable called the “esti-
mated propensity score.”288  Estimated propensity scores constitute a
one-variable summary of all the potential confounding covariates.  It
is calculated as the predicted values from a logistic regression of T on
X.  (If the logistic is the right form, then matching on the propensity
285 See supra Part III.C.
286 This is not to say that this approach to matching is impossible to implement.  And, in
fact, we do use it to assess the robustness of our results. See infra Table 7.  The number of
cases we were able to incorporate under exact matching, as the table indicates, ranged
from 140 to 170, depending on the approach we used.
287 Daniel E. Ho, Kosuke Imai, Gary King & Elizabeth Stuart, MatchIt:  Nonparametric
Preprocessing for Parametric Causal Inference (2004) (unpublished manuscript, available
at http://gking.harvard.edu/matchit/).  For examples of alternative matching models for this
study (some of which do not rely on propensity scores), see infra Table 7.  See also Ho et
al., Improving Parametric Causal Inference, supra note 268. R
288 See Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, The Central Role of the Propensity
Score in Observational Studies for Causal Effects, 70 BIOMETRIKA 41, 41–49 (1983)
(defining propensity score and deriving seminal result of propensity score as balancing
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score is sufficient to balance all the covariates.289) Figure 6 plots pro-
pensity scores horizontally for cases decided during war on the top
and those decided during times of peace on the bottom.  The simplest
matching approach picks for each “war” case the “nearest neighbor,”
that is, the “peace” case that has the closest propensity score, and dis-
cards unmatched peace cases, as can be seen visually in the figure with
grey and black dots.  Other approaches drop fewer cases and still
others discard more.290
Despite these sorts of differences, the general aim of the
matching approach is the same:  to compare cases within the match to
generate an unbiased estimate of the causal effect of war.  Since this
too is our overarching goal, we invoked a number of different
approaches to generate the actual matches (including matching
methods that do not use propensity scores).291  Following this track
enables us to determine, across a range of possibilities, the degree to
which our results remain robust across different methods.
289 More formally, assuming strong ignorability of treatment assignment:
(Y(1), Y(0))⊥T  X
0 < P(T = 1  X) < 1
which is akin to the assumption of no omitted variables conditional on asserted in any
regression analysis, Rosenbaum and Rubin have shown in a seminal result that matching
on the propensity score is as bias-reducing as matching on the covariates themselves.  In
other words,
E(Y(1)) – E(Y(0)) = Ee(X) {E(Y(1)  T = 1,e(X)) – E(Y(0)  T = 0,e(X))}
where e(X) = P(T = 1  X) represented the propensity score. See id. at 49 (proving sem-
inal result).
290 See infra note 295 and Table 7. R
291 For the range of our estimates of the causal effect of war, see infra Table 7.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 69 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Propensity Score
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War Cases
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Figure 6:  Sample jitter plot of “propensity scores,” a one-variable summary of all the
covariates.  Dark points indicate that cases were matched, while grey points indicate
that cases were discarded.292
As we report in Part V, the various matching methods lead to dif-
ferent estimates of the causal effect of war, but what they have in
common is more important:  All show that the presence of a war sig-
nificantly lowers the probability of the Court rendering decisions in
favor of parties who allege an infringement of their rights.
V
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Clearly, the cases decided during war are far more likely to have
been resolved by a left-leaning Court.  They are also substantially (a)
less likely to have been decided in the liberal direction in the lower
courts, (b) more likely to have been decided in earlier terms (which of
course follows naturally from the fact that most wars occurred during
the first half of the years which our data span), and (c) more likely to
have been prominent in the media.  We summarize these basic differ-
ences in Table 5, and then create our own matched dataset where the
war and non-war cases are comparable and re-compute the same
statistics.
292 This figure presents a jitter plot of propensity scores, using propensity scores
matching Table 7, infra.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 70 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Mean Under Mean Under Standard
War Peace Deviation t-stat
Lower Court 0.30 0.46 0.49 8.79
Politics 1.01 0.37 0.49 −48.84
Term 1964.21 1976.94 15.71 21.48
Salience 0.26 0.20 0.41 −3.54
Pre-1975 0.92 0.33 0.50 −44.55
Table 5: Summary statistics of overall sample.  “Lower court” is coded as 1 if the
lower court ruled in favor of a liberal outcome and 0 if conservative.
“Politics” is the rescaled Segal-Cover score where a high score indicates a
liberal judicial ideology.  “Term” simply codes the term in which a case was
decided.  “Salience” is coded as 1 if a case was nationally prominent and 0
otherwise.  “Pre-1975” is an indicator variable for whether the case was
decided before 1975.
As the statistics on the matched data in Table 6 indicate, the war
and non-war cases in our matched dataset have means that are very
close for all variables:  As shown in the last column, reduction in bias
occurs uniformly across all covariates, ranging from 34% to 99%. (A
100% bias reduction would indicate that we have matched exactly on
all covariates, which we also report below.)
A. The Causal Effect of War
We now calculate the causal effect of war in several ways.  The
simplest is to compute the difference, across matched pairs, in the
Court’s average support for rights and liberties claims during times of
war and times of peace.  In various ways, we also compute the differ-
ence after adjusting the slight imbalances remaining in the matched
dataset, as shown in Table 6, with a traditional parametric approach
based on a logistic model.
In all calculations of the causal effect of war, we used matching
for the effect of war on ordinary cases and on cases related to the war,
as discussed in Part III.  We also pursued a large array of possible
investigations into the joint effects of war and war-related cases, with
the same substantive findings that we report here.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 71 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Mean Under Mean Under Standard Bias
War Peace Deviation t-stat Reduction
Lower Court 0.32 0.30 0.46 0.76 91.4%
Politics 0.86 0.87 0.29 −0.28 99.4%
Term 1967.64 1967.66 15.10 −0.02 99.9%
Salience 0.25 0.28 0.44 −0.96 72.9%
Pre-1975 0.85 0.86 0.35 −0.10 99.8%
Table 6: Summary statistics of matched cases for Model 4 of Table 7 for non-war
cases, where “lower court” is coded as 1 if the lower court ruled in favor of a
liberal outcome and 0 if conservative, “Politics” is the rescaled Segal-Cover
score where a high score indicates a liberal judicial ideology, “Term” simply
codes the term in which a case was decided, “Salience” is coded as 1 if a case
was nationally prominent and 0 otherwise, and “Pre-1975” is an indicator
variable for whether the case was decided before 1975.293
As the first set of columns in Table 7 demonstrates, for cases
unrelated to any ongoing war, the probability of the Supreme Court
deciding a case in favor of the litigant claiming an infringement of his
or her rights decreases by about ten percentage points when a war is in
progress.  Even if we match exactly on all covariates except for the
term, thereby dropping a substantial number of cases (primarily from
the World War II and the Vietnam War periods), the estimated
average treatment effect (ATE) is still a substantial percentage.294  On
the other hand, matching on all covariates exactly, including term—
meaning that we only consider cases decided during terms in which a
war either ended or began (i.e., 1941, 1964, 1972 and 1991)—results in
an even larger ATE of -16%.295
293 In both cases, the estimated bias reduction R is calculated by
ta−tm
R =,
ta
where ta represents the absolute value of the means test statistic from the overall sample,
and tm represents the absolute value of the means test statistic for the matched sample.
294 This fails to take into account the smoothness of the Segal-Cover score and the rele-
vance of time dynamics.
295 The closer matches we require, the fewer cases are left in the analysis.  Given, how-
ever, the difficulty of dropping cases from World War II and the Vietnam War, we provide
matching estimates both dropping and keeping these cases.  Other matching parameters
include:  (a) whether we match with replacement (thereby not forcing us to match largely
incomparable cases, but increasing the variance of the average treatment effect (ATE));
(b) whether we want to match exactly on particular covariates (thereby dropping more
cases but obtaining better matches); and (c) whether we include a parametric logistic
adjustment for remaining imbalances in the matched samples (thereby relying on a model-
based analysis but potentially further reducing remaining biases of inexact matches).
Regardless of specification here, we find the same robust estimate of the ATE.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 72 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Non-War Cases War Cases
Method ATE SE N ATE SE N
Logistic Model −0.07 0.03 3210 0.09 0.09 134
Exact Matching Except for Term −0.07 0.03 1549 0.08 0.11 88
Exact Matching −0.16 0.07 209
Propensity Score Matching −0.11 0.04 814 −0.02 0.13 62
Propensity Score Matching −0.10 0.03 814 −0.01 0.12 62
(Logistic Adjustment)
Table 7: Estimated causal effects of war.  ATE is the average treatment effect, the
causal effect of war on the probability of a liberal decision in civil liberties
and rights cases.  Model 1 presents estimated ATE from logistic regression
of direction of judicial ideology, judicial ideology
2, lower court direction,
war, and an indicator variable for pre-1975 term, where the Segal-Cover
score is rescaled such that the minimum score is 0.  Model 2 matches cases
exactly on all covariates except for term.  Model 3 matches cases exactly on
all covariates including term.  Model 4 matches on the propensity score,
where the assignment model is estimated by a logistic regression of war on
the lower court decision, judicial ideology, term, salience, and pre-1975
indicator.  Model 5 additionally adjusts matched cases with a logistic
regression.
Since war has such a substantial effect on ordinary non-war cases,
we might think that the effect of crises on war cases would be even
more substantial.  Indeed, most strands of the crisis thesis in the litera-
ture would predict that the effect of war should be largest for the cru-
cial subset of cases that are a direct result of the war, and no published
work we have found claims that effects are large for non-war cases but
nonexistent for war cases.  Yet the seemingly paradoxical finding of
our analysis is that war does not have an effect on war-related cases.
Indeed, as two of the models in the second set of columns in Table 7
show, the ATE is in the opposite direction, and in none of the models
is the ATE statistically significant.  Overall, for cases directly related to
an ongoing war, war has no detectable effect on Supreme Court deci-
sionmaking.  In these cases, the Supreme Court is no more likely to
support an infringement of an individual’s civil liberties when a war is
ongoing than when the country is at peace.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 73 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Effect of War on Probability of Supporting the Rights Claim
D e n s i t y
0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4
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Non-war Cases
War Cases
Figure 7:  Histogram of the effect of war on civil rights and liberties cases for war
cases and non-war cases.  The vertical lines represent 90% and 95% confidence inter-
vals of the effect on non-war cases.  This figure shows that war affects non-war cases,
but that the effect is negligible for war cases.296
Figure 7 summarizes our results by plotting a histogram in grey
bars (with the vertical lines representing confidence intervals) of the
posterior distribution of the ATE of war using ordinary (i.e., non-war)
cases from the final model in Table 7.297  Note that the distribution of
the causal effect of war is clearly below zero (meaning that the effect
of war on ordinary cases is to make the Court’s decisions more con-
servative), easily surpassing conventional statistical significance levels.
Figure 7 also plots results for war cases by overlaying a histogram of
estimated effects in this subset of the data.  Compared to the grey
histogram of non-war cases, which is shifted to the left of the origin,
the histogram for war cases is indistinguishable from zero.  The
number of war-related cases is small, but this result still counters con-
ventional wisdom, which predicts more robust effects than for non-
war cases.  If such large effects were there, our analysis would have
found them.  In addition, we conducted numerous verification checks
by examining random samples of cases, comparing a random selection
296 The distribution is simulated from models in the last row of Table 7.  We obtained
the data on the Supreme Court’s decisions and outcomes from U.S. Supreme Court Judi-
cial Database (backdated by the authors) with analu = 0, dec_type = 1 or 7, values = 1–6.
See supra notes 184, 193–94.  War includes World War II and the Korean, Vietnam, Gulf, R
and Afghan Wars.  See supra notes 204–05 and accompanying text for more details. R
297 The posterior distribution of quantities of interest is a standard way to summarize
inferences from a dataset from a Bayesian paradigm. See ANDREW G ELMAN ET AL.,
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of briefs, and conducting other quantitative and qualitative checks.
Given any version of either the crisis or the Milligan theses, this is a
deeply puzzling result, challenging essentially all prior literature.
B. Why War Does Not Affect War-Related Cases:  A Conjecture
Here, we offer a conjecture designed to explain why war would
have a large effect on cases unrelated to the war but no effect on those
related to the war.  Our conjecture is based on an alternative theory
that when cases are directly related to the war, the traditional liberal-
conservative (or collective rights vs. individual rights, or security vs.
liberty) dimension, inherent in the crisis and Milligan theses and oper-
ative in most of American politics, becomes less meaningful.  For
cases that are directly related to the war or conflict, the Court seeks to
shift responsibility towards Congress and the Executive.
These results lead to an important jurisprudential conclusion,
namely that, in the crisis context, the Supreme Court decides war-
related cases on a different dimension than proponents of the crisis or
Milligan theses would suggest.  The Court does not decide cases on a
rigid liberal-conservative dimension, but instead engages in a process-
oriented mode of decisionmaking.  Indeed, crisis decisionmaking
involves a process-institutional framework of ensuring authorization
from the democratic branches of government.298  This idea coheres
with the constitutional silence on the role of the courts in war, in con-
trast with explicit Article I and II grants of power to the legislature
and Executive.  Politically, this may be desirable for the justices, pre-
cisely because war-related cases present potentially severe threats to
the judiciary’s legitimacy.299  Focusing on congressional authorization
ensures the political legitimacy of a ruling.
As we noted in Part II.A, detractors of the crisis thesis emphasize
that the Court has historically played the role of allocating war powers
under the constitutional separation of powers, as it did in
Youngstown.300  Instead of exhibiting deference to the assertion of
military power, the Youngstown Court found the seizure unconstitu-
tional, inferring that the seizure constituted an act of lawmaking
power vested in Congress alone.301  As Justice Jackson noted:
“Presidential powers are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.”302  This would
298 We developed this theory from our data, so its consistency with our empirical results
cannot be considered an independent test.
299 See Part III.B.1.
300 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
301 Id. at 587–89.
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seem to question both the predictions of the crisis and Milligan theses.
The Court defines its responsibility in times of crisis and for cases
most closely related to the crises as ensuring that the allocation of
power abides by constitutional principles.
This theory is also consistent with strands of the extant political
science and law literatures.303  Issacharoff and Pildes, who term the
normative sides of the crisis and Milligan theses as “executive uni-
lateralism” and “civil libertarianism” respectively, survey the most
pivotal war-related cases and find that “the judicial approach to
[security threats] has been, on the whole, more complex, and oriented
toward different questions, than either executive unilateralists or civil
libertarian idealists recognize.”304  Instead of a pure dimension of
security versus liberty, Issacharoff and Pildes suggest that “the courts
have developed a process-based, institutionally-oriented (as opposed
to rights-oriented) framework for examining the legality of govern-
mental action in extreme security contexts.”305  The extant theories
that we test focus on the idea that the “debate over liberty versus
security misses the most essential structure of [the crisis
jurisprudence].”306
This dynamic can be seen in war-related cases that are central in
the literature, such as Ex parte Endo307 and Youngstown.  In fact, as
Issacharoff and Pildes note, Endo and Korematsu may be distin-
guished precisely on the degree of congressional authorization of
executive actions, showing that the dimension may be separate and
orthogonal to a more conventional liberal-conservative dimension.308
Recent cases, such as Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,309 Rumsfeld v. Padilla,310
and Rasul v. Bush,311 also demonstrate the Court’s interest in these
process-based questions.312
303 For a strategic approach focusing on the interactions of political institutions, see, for
example, Bergara et al., supra note 250. R
304 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and Executive
Unilateralism:  An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime,5  T HEORET-
ICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2004).
305 Id. at 5.
306 Id. at 7.
307 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
308 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 304, at 19–25. R
309 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
310 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
311 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
312 For further discussion of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Padilla, Hamdi,
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Direct Effect SE N1 N0
Lower court, non-war case −0.23 0.02 1377 1793
Lower court, war case −0.17 0.12 23 51
Salient, non-war case 0.09 0.02 679 2474
Salient, war case −0.11 0.13 25 45
Ideology, non-war case 0.15 0.03 202 3008
Ideology, war case 0.06 0.12 22 91
Table 8: Direct effects of other binary case variables for war cases and non-war cases,
matching exactly on all other covariates.  Ideology here is dichotomized by
whether it takes on the highest observed value of the Segal-Cover score or
not. N1 and N0 represent the number of observations matched.
If our alternative theory is true, we should find evidence that
traditional determinants of judicial behavior, such as ideology, case
salience, and lower court reversal, do not provide leverage over the
subset of war cases.  Table 8, which provides rough estimates consis-
tent with this story, is a somewhat independent test of our theory.
The table shows that while the Court decides cases that are salient and
unrelated to the war more liberally, salience has no effect on war
cases.  Similarly, while the most liberal Court exhibits an increase of
roughly fifteen percent for the probability of a liberal decision for
ordinary cases, this effect is substantively small and statistically insig-
nificant for war cases.  This extraordinarily unusual finding for ide-
ology, which is traditionally the most robust predictor of judicial
behavior, strongly supports our notion that war cases may be of a dif-
ferent breed than almost all other cases that the Court decides.
A more direct way of assessing this alternative theory would be to
measure the degree of institutional support for a particular decision of
the Court.  Two direct challenges present themselves here.  First, to
the degree that congressional authorization in areas of civil liberties
and rights is greater during times of war because of war, controlling
for this variable might lead to post-treatment bias.  For example, if we
only matched cases arising out of the Espionage Act of 1917,313 an act
passed largely because of a war, we would have incorrectly controlled
for a result of the war.  Congressional intent itself is shaped by war,
and to the extent that judicial deference is a function of congressional
intent, this constitutes a causal effect of war.314  Second, it would be
hard to measure variation from case to case in the “implied will” of
Congress.  Its sentiment rather is much more likely to affect cases in
313 Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 2388 (2000)).
314 We could change the quantity of interest here to the causal effect of war on the
Supreme Court, excluding any effect of war on congressional intent.  It is not clear, how-
ever, that this is a more meaningful quantity of interest, since it would be difficult to
observe.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 77 28-MAR-05 17:19
April 2005] THE SUPREME COURT DURING CRISIS 77
the same way as public opinion:  as a reservoir of good or bad will
with respect to the particular conflict.315
Despite these measurement challenges, our conjecture may be
the only theory that resolves the seeming paradox in a way that is
consistent with the case law and academic literatures.  That said, if our
conjecture is right, it suggests that large strands of scholarship are
incomplete on two fronts.  First, war affects cases that may appear to
be entirely unrelated to the war.  Second, war does not affect the cases
talked about most extensively in this scholarship.
C. Other Possible Causal Effects of War
To the extent that war has no apparent causal impact on cases
that deal directly with war, our evidence refutes both the crisis thesis
(the effect should be larger in war cases than ordinary cases) and the
Milligan thesis (the Supreme Court protects rights during war).  Yet
some support for the crisis thesis still exists in the finding that war has
a significant impact on “ordinary” Supreme Court cases.  In the fol-
lowing section, we consider the breadth and depth of this finding.
1. The Effect on Particular Areas of the Law
Recall that several scholars have argued that the effect of war
would not be felt in all cases of rights and liberties, but rather would
be limited to particular areas of the law.  In this section, we decom-
pose our findings for ordinary cases unrelated to the war into four
areas:  criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, and due pro-
cess. (In our search for some effect of war on war-related cases, we
also tried similar decompositions, but the noneffect was highly
robust.)
Figure 8 presents boxplots, in which the boxes represent the
spread of the estimated treatment effect, and the large dot represents
the median treatment effect.  Note the uniform decrease in the
probability of a liberal decision in the areas of First Amendment,
criminal procedure, and civil rights—with all of the boxes squarely to
the left of the vertical line (which indicates no war effect).
315 A possible exception here is the Vietnam War, which brought dramatic shifts in
public as well as congressional opinion.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 78 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Figure 8:  The effect of wars on the outcomes of Supreme Court cases that are unre-
lated to the war in four areas of rights, liberties, and justice.  The large circle repre-
sents the median effect, and the box represents 25th and 75th percentiles of the
treatment effect, where box “whiskers” represent coverage 1.5 times the length of the
box, and dots represent rare outliers.316
These results are consistent with the substantial effect of war
across all ordinary civil rights and liberties cases, demonstrated in
Table 7.  On the other hand, the effect varies considerably by the par-
ticular area under analysis.  It is virtually nonexistent in due process
cases, while it is quite large in those implicating the First Amendment.
Indeed, in these cases, war decreases the probability of a liberal deci-
sion by roughly thirteen percent.  This is an interesting finding and
one that may explain why the crisis thesis has found such a comfort-
able home in the legal academy since the World War I era:  Most of
those early analyses focused on the First Amendment.317  The result is
also unsurprising in light of the litigation falling under the rubric of
316 This is a boxplot of posterior distribution of 1000 simulated ATEs in each issue area,
using a one-to-one matching model, discarding common support, without replacement.
Simulated ATEs for each issue area are:
Issue ATE(%) SE P-value N
Criminal Procedure −0.08 0.03 0.00 354
Civil Rights −0.10 0.03 0.00 256
First Amendment −0.13 0.04 0.00 154
Due Process 0.03 0.06 0.69 68
On simulation techniques for presenting results, see King et al., supra note 229.  On box- R
plot techniques, see JOHN W. TUKEY, EXPLORATORY DATA ANALYSIS 39–41 (1977); and
Robert McGill et al., Variations of Box Plots, 32 AM. STATISTICIAN 12 (1978).
317 See, e.g., Chafee, Speech in War Time, supra note 14 (discussing war-time Court deci- R
sions in connection with Espionage Act of 1917, most restricting free speech).  Subsequent
studies focusing on the First Amendment include Emerson’s classic works. See supra note
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the First Amendment:  suits involving the Alien Registration Act,318
loyalty oaths, conscientious objectors, and protest demonstrations.319
Due process cases, on the other hand, are primarily confined to proce-
dural due process cases relating, for example, to jurisdiction over non-
resident litigants, the Takings Clause, and prisoners’ rights.
As Figure 8 also shows, war decreases the probability that the
Court will find a violation of a litigant’s civil rights (including claims of
race and gender discrimination).  This calls into question the asser-
tions of some scholars that international crises lead to enhanced pro-
tection for minorities.320  The effect of war on criminal procedure is
slightly smaller, though still significant such that the likelihood of the
Court ruling in favor of defendants drops by eight percent.
2. The Effect over Time
In our discussion of the institutional explanations for the pres-
ence (or absence) of a crisis effect,321 we noted scholarly assertions of
various kinds of time effects.  One, the “libertarian ratchet” or
“learning effect” suggests that the impact of each successive war on
the Court should dissipate with time,322 so that with each passing crisis
the justices should become less and less likely to engage in a crisis
jurisprudence.  In direct contrast comes the idea of “dosages,”323
which predicts that the Court becomes increasingly more repressive of
rights over time in response to the government’s increasingly extreme
measures.  Finally, following from Justice Jackson’s dissent in
Korematsu, some scholars have asserted the existence of “statist”
ratchets, leading to the expectation that wartime jurisprudence lingers
318 The Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 2, 54 Stat. 670, 671 (current version at
18 U.S.C. §§ 2385, 2387 (2000)), made it a crime to “knowingly or willfully advocate, abet,
advise, or teach the duty, necessity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing or destroying
any government in the United States by force or violence.”  The Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of the Act in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), in
which the appellants, leaders of the Communist Party, had been charged by the Truman
administration of conspiracy to overthrow the U.S. government.  Dennis and his co-defen-
dants challenged the constitutionality of the Smith Act under the First Amendment, but
the Court ruled against them.  Legal historian Lawrence M. Friedman attributes their
defeat, at least in part, to a war effect, asserting that “the outbreak of the Korean War
undoubtedly hurt their cause and their case.” FRIEDMAN,  supra note 45, at 333.  Our R
results lend general support to Friedman’s speculation.
319 See infra Appendix.
320 See PHILIP A. KLINKNER, THE U NSTEADY M ARCH: T HE R ISE AND D ECLINE OF
RACIAL E QUALITY IN A MERICA 4–6, 353 n.4 (1999); Dudziak, supra note 17, at 36–37; R
Scheppele, supra note 17, at 317–19. R
321 See supra Part II.
322 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 117, at 284–89; Tushnet, supra note 13, at R
294–98.
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on, affecting the Court’s resolution of suits in times of peace.324
Learning, dosages, and statist ratchets are different effects, but they
all implicate time:  Over time, we should observe distinct patterns in
the impact of war and other threats to the national security.
To explore these possibilities, we depict in Figure 9 the estimated
causal effect of war on ordinary cases for each term in which a war
occurred.325  The circles represent matched pairs of cases (with the
size of the circle drawn in proportion to the number of cases), with
those in white indicating all the “war” mates in the pair and those in
grey, all the “peace” matched cases; the arrows specify the direction of
the outcomes of the cases, whether they were more (an up, dashed
arrow) or less (a down, solid arrow) favorable toward rights and
liberties.
From this figure we can observe interesting variations in the
causal effect of war on Court outcomes.  Note, for example, the rela-
tively small impact of the conflict in Vietnam (in the 1960s).  Taking
the nine Vietnam War terms collectively, the Justices became neither
distinctly more nor less likely to support rights.  In stark contrast
comes the consistent impact of World War II.  In each of the four
terms encompassed by the war, the (relatively left-of-center) Court
supported curtailments of rights and liberties that it otherwise would
not have tolerated—with, of course, the internment at issue in
Korematsu among them.  Likewise, the Justices who sat during the
Gulf War appear to have become more willing to rule against litigants
claiming a deprivation of their rights, though the sample size of these
cases obviously is smaller.  Indeed, however conservative were the
majorities on these Courts toward individual rights and liberties in the
absence of conflict, the presence of war intensified those ideological
predilections.
These patterns are intriguing and certainly worthy of further con-
sideration.  What they fail to do is lend support to any of the time
effects scholars have posited.  In fact, Figure 9 provides no evidence of
324 See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 20, at 610–22 (describing literature on R
statist ratchets).
325 This figure is for illustrative purposes only, depicting results from one reasonable
model that does not discard cases outside the range of the propensity scores (estimated by
the logistic model) and regressing war on X, where X is comprised of the direction of the
lower court’s decision (“lower court”), the political ideology of the Court’s median justice
(“politics”), term, politics
2, case salience (“salience”), a pre-1975 indicator (“bef75”),
bef75*salience, term*salience, term*politics
2, term
2, lower court*salience, politics*salience,
politics*lower court, lower court*term
2, salience*term
2.  For information on these vari-
ables, see infra Part III.C.  Other methods that we present drop certain terms of the Court
due to common support and also correct for inexact matches by parametric adjustment, but
nonetheless the substantive point of this Figure remains.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 81 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Figure 9:  The effect of wars on the outcomes of Supreme Court cases in the areas of
rights, liberties, and justice among cases unrelated to war:  a comparison of matched
pairs.  Note how the effect for almost all matched pairs is to reduce the probability of
a liberal decision in wartime.
any patterns of the effect of war, thereby casting large doubt onto the
contradictory theories of learning and dosages.326  While it is true that
the effect appears to have been more robust in World War II, the
Vietnam War also appears to have affected the Court’s decisions.  The
data also question the existence of statist ratchets:  Contrary to wide-
spread fear and speculation that doctrine created during wartime “lin-
gers” on in peace time, the rights jurisprudence appears to “bounce
back” during peacetime.327
3. The Effect on the Government’s Claims
Earlier, we discussed the claims of some commentators that the
crisis thesis is more about deference to the federal government when
it is a party to the litigation (or even an amicus curiae) than it is about
Court treatment of alleged infringements of rights and liberties made
by all parties.328  Using the same matching methods, we examined (a)
326 Granted, there may be changing baselines of decisional standards, but to the degree
that a decisional standard changes across time, we have taken this into account by
matching on term.  So even relative to this changing baseline, it does not appear that any
time effects exist.
327 Given this empirical regularity, it may be no surprise that presidents have often
attempted to make analogies between domestic issues in peacetime and crisis situations so
as to bolster executive powers. See, e.g., GRIFFIN, supra note 88, at 83–84 (noting need for R
presidents to sell domestic agendas on foreign policy crisis metaphors).
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whether the Court was in fact more likely to support the
Government’s position during war, and (b) whether this deference
might be particularly acute for federalism cases, as some legal aca-
demics have suggested.329  Our results show that the Court is not espe-
cially deferential to the United States in the specific area of federalism
or, for that matter, in other types of suits.
Contrary to claims of increasing support for federal interests (as
opposed to the states) in war periods, we find that war actually
decreases the probability of a pro-federal claim succeeding in feder-
alism litigation.  In other words, it appears that the Court is more
likely to sustain states’ rights during times of war.  Given the small
total number of cases in the federalism category and substantial
remaining differences in background covariates,330 however, we are
hesitant to rely on this finding.  Nonetheless, these findings call into
question the commonly held notion that “whenever you see a national
emergency, federalism disappears.”331
Other approaches to assessing support for the U.S. government
also turn up empty.  For example, the Court is no more nor less likely
to defer to the government during times of war, regardless of whether
it participates as amicus curiae or is a party to the litigation.  Also
noteworthy is that while the results we have reported throughout—on
the overall causal effect of crises on the Court’s jurisprudence—hold
for periods of war and for war plus other major crises, they do not for
presidential rallies.  That is, conducting the same analysis for our crisis
indicators, we find little impact of rallies on case outcomes.  What this
finding, taken with our other results, suggests is that the crisis thesis
applies most directly to civil rights and liberties cases and that no def-
erence is granted to the government.
VI
THREATS TO VALIDITY
While we have attempted to validate the crisis thesis in many
ways, we have not explored all the possibilities, nor could we do so in
a single article.332  In what follows, we consider six potential critiques
329 See Linda Greenhouse, Will the Court Reassert National Authority?, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2001, § 4, at 14 (noting opinion of academics that federalism conflicts at base with
desire for strong national leadership to fight terrorism).
330 Discarding incomparable cases from the sample of 295 federalism cases yields only
sixty-eight matched cases.
331 See Greenhouse, supra note 329 (quoting University of California at Berkeley Pro- R
fessor Robert C. Post, who has analyzed rise of nationalism during World War I).
332 We outline some of the research possibilities in Part VI.  We especially commend
studies of lower courts since they are playing an extremely consequential role (at least in
the short term) in evaluating federal measures to deal with terrorism.  For war-related\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 83 28-MAR-05 17:19
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of our study:  (a) the scope of cases considered; (b) the possibility of
omitted variables; (c) the potential of post-treatment bias; (d) the
measure of the Court’s politics; (e) the relative importance (or, more
pointedly, unimportance) of the causal effect of war; and (f) the neg-
lect of the lower federal courts.
A. Scope of Civil Rights and Liberties Cases
First, we consider how the scope of cases we analyze affects our
findings.  Conventional wisdom implies that a crisis effect manifests
itself only, mainly, or most strongly in cases that pertain directly to
that crisis.333  Hence, the inclusion of all ordinary civil rights and liber-
ties cases might be seen as overinclusive, while the measure of war-
related civil rights and liberties cases might be seen as underinclusive.
Similarly, one might question any analysis that treats all cases alike,
and fails to give extra weight to landmark disputes, such as Korematsu
and Quirin (aside from deeming them “salient” or not).334
We have offered several measures and a host of robustness
checks to validate the crisis thesis, all yielding the same findings.  In
terms of overinclusiveness, the general effect of war on ordinary civil
rights and liberties cases is a crucial quantity of interest in our study.
And to that effect our finding is substantial:  War has a causal effect
across the board, even when the outward characteristics of a case may
not be directly related to the war effort.
This result in ordinary cases is consistent with results from adher-
ents of the crisis thesis, such as Thomas Emerson, who mapped the
effect of wars onto a series of legal areas, some related to the crisis
and some not.335  It is also consistent with the published views of con-
temporary writers, such as William Stuntz, who argues that “[j]ustices
are likely to think about the effect of their decisions on the fight
against terrorism even when the underlying cases involve more ordi-
nary sorts of policing.”336  Oren Gross, as we noted earlier, concurs:
“[W]hen judges decide ‘ordinary’ criminal cases, they will take into
consideration the impact of their rulings on the fight against ter-
rorism.”337  Our findings bolster these ideas:  The effects of war hold
across wide areas of constitutional law, even beyond “ordinary crim-
cases, see http://www.lchr.org/us_law/loss/cases/court_cases.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2004)
and http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/us/terrorism/cases/index.html (last visited Oct. 30,
2004).
333 See, e.g., Tushnet, supra note 13, at 276–78. R
334 Id. at 277.
335 See EMERSON, SYSTEM OF F REEDOM, supra note 14, at 55–56 (dealing with main R
problem areas concerning freedom of expression as it related to war and defense).
336 Stuntz, supra note 225, at 2140 (emphasis added). R
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inal cases,” perhaps because the justices take into consideration the
indirect effects of their rulings on the war effort.
The Court’s recent decision in Grutter v. Bollinger,338 in which it
considered the constitutionality of the University of Michigan Law
School’s affirmative action program, may provide an example of this
dynamic at work.  While Grutter seems wholly unrelated to events
ensuing in the wake of September 11 and of domestic consequence
only, consider the question Justice Ginsburg asked of the petitioner
during oral arguments in the case:
May I call your attention in that regard to the brief that was filed on
behalf of some retired military officers who said that to have an
officer corps that includes minority members in any number, there
is no way to do it other than to give not an overriding preference,
but a plus for race.  It cannot be done through a percentage plan,
because of the importance of having people who are highly quali-
fied.  What is your answer to the argument made in that brief that
there simply is no other way to have Armed Forces in which minori-
ties will be represented not only largely among the enlisted mem-
bers, but also among the officer cadre?339
In so raising this point, Justice Ginsburg highlighted the implica-
tions of the case—again, a domestic rights dispute—for national
defense and security.340  Justice O’Connor, in her opinion for the
Court in Grutter, also emphasized these implications, focusing, in part,
on the case’s potential effect on the armed forces.341  Indeed, these
concerns ultimately played an important, if not pivotal, role in
O’Connor’s disposition of the case.342
338 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
339 Oral Argument at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02–241).
340 The apparent role that the military played fits comfortably in the extensive literature
exploring the role of amicus briefs and interest groups in Supreme Court decisionmaking.
See Kevin T. McGuire & Gregory A. Caldeira, Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law
of Obscenity:  Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 717, 722–24
(1993) (demonstrating influence of amicus curiae briefs on certiorari grants); see also Lee
Epstein, Courts and Interest Groups, in THE A MERICAN C OURTS:  A CRITICAL A SSESS-
MENT 335, 345–49 (John B. Gates & Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991) (discussing interest-
group use of amicus curiae briefs to influence Court).
341 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 331 (noting that “high-ranking retired officers and civilian
leaders of the United States military assert that[ ] . . . a ‘highly qualified, racially diverse
officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principle mission to provide
national security’” (quoting Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr., et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 5, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-
516)).
342 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Context and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2003, at A1
(noting that “[t]he context provided by the briefs from Fortune 500 companies, senior mili-
tary officers, and colleges and universities big and small, public and private, quite clearly
won the day for Michigan”); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Back Affirmative Action by 5 to 4,
but Wider Vote Bans a Racial Point System, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A1 (noting that\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 85 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Our investigation examines precisely these types of effects:  In a
counterfactual world without war, how would the Court decide a
broad range of cases, which may or may not have “obvious” implica-
tions for national security?  In light of our results, the response to the
question of whether our definition of civil liberties and rights is overly
broad is that, in fact, it is the causal effect that is surprisingly broad.
B. Omitted Variables
In Part III.C, we explained that tests of the crisis thesis must take
into account (that is, “control for” or “hold constant”) factors other
than the presence of war that may affect case outcomes and that are
related to and causally prior to the chief explanatory variable, war.
We thus controlled for factors such as the political composition of the
Court and the relative salience of a case.  But there are four others
that some may think we ought to have incorporated:  the severity of
war, public opinion and Congress, the groups targeted by the govern-
ment, and selection effects.  We consider each here.
1. The Severity of War
The measure we used to capture “war” is crude:  A war existed or
it did not.  It is possible that we have oversimplified the concept, that
we should have measured gradients of war—from full peace to total
war—as they may have differential effects on the Court’s treatment of
civil rights and liberties.343  The Persian Gulf War, for example,
arguably presented less of a security threat to the United States than
World War II, and concordantly, the case for curtailing rights and lib-
erties was more compelling during World War II.  Another distinction
along these lines may be whether Congress formally declared war (a
Justice O’Connor’s opinion “cited a number of briefs from businesses, colleges and, with
particular emphasis, two dozen retired senior military officers and former commandants of
the service academies”); Charles Lane, Affirmative Action for Diversity Is Upheld, WASH.
POST, June 24, 2003, at A1 (“Seemingly more influential than the Bush administration’s
views were briefs filed . . . by former military officials . . . . The military leaders, including
Desert Storm commander Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, told the court that military cohe-
sion, and, hence, national security hinged on an integrated officer corps produced by
diverse military academies and ROTC programs.”); What Do U-M Court Rulings Mean?,
DETROIT N EWS, June 24, 2003, at 11A (quoting Dennis Archer, President-Elect of
American Bar Association as stating that Grutter decision “serves to strengthen the mili-
tary academies”).
343 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 117, at 280 (distinguishing World War II R
as “total war” whereas war on terror or Afghanistan War has “seen none of the mobiliza-
tion and sacrifice (or call to sacrifice) that characterized World War II”).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 86 28-MAR-05 17:19
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“constitutional” war).344  Perhaps the Supreme Court is more deferen-
tial to the government when the legislature has explicitly authorized
the battle.  Indeed, Justice Douglas suggested as much in New York
Times Co. v. United States,345 in which he specifically denounced the
government’s national security claims on the ground that “[n]owhere
are presidential wars authorized.”346
Yet recall that we explicitly matched cases on Supreme Court
terms, enabling us to generate individual causal estimates for every
war—constitutional or not—undertaken since 1941.347  The quantity
we estimated was the average causal effect, and our methodology
would be unbiased even if the actual effect varied over different types
of war.  Moreover, since our original definitions of crises include gra-
dations of war,348 we were able to explore the degree to which dif-
ferent types of threats affected the Court.  As it turns out, we find that
the crisis thesis holds most robustly for the common and incontrovert-
ible definition of war as a large-scale militarized dispute, but not for
simple rally effects.  Finally, even within that category of “war,” we
are able to observe differences among wars perhaps based on their
severity.  As Figure 9 shows, for example, the effect of World War II
on the Justices appears to have been more consistent and stronger
than the effect of the Korean War.  In short, our matching models
already address this concern, rendering unnecessary the inclusion of a
separate variable to capture war-specific distinctions.
2. Public Opinion
The relative support that the public lends to the war effort consti-
tutes another covariate of Court decisions for which we did not explic-
itly account.  It is possible that the more uniform and enthusiastic its
support, the more likely the justices would be to defer to the govern-
ment.  In Ex parte Quirin, for example, the Court faced tremendous
pressure from the public and the elected branches of government to
clear the way for the execution of the eight Nazi saboteurs; the
Justices, perhaps succumbing to this pressure, issued their per curiam
order within twenty-four hours of oral argument.349  In contrast comes
344 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11; N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 722
(1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]he war power stems from a declaration of war. . . .
Nowhere are presidential wars authorized.”).
345 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
346 Id. at 722 (Douglas, J., concurring).
347 See supra Figure 9.
348 See supra Part III.B.
349 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 117, at 264 (noting that politicians, R
media, and most of public insisted on capital punishment for saboteurs).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 87 28-MAR-05 17:19
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New York Times Co. v. United States,350 in which Justice Douglas
noted in dicta that a “debate of large proportions goes on in the
Nation over our posture in Vietnam” and that the documents
obtained by the New York Times were “highly relevant to the
debate.”351
For three reasons, however, it is unlikely that the inclusion of a
variable designed to capture public support for the war would alter
our findings.  First, we already, to some degree, have taken this factor
into account via our measure of case salience, which provides informa-
tion about the degree of public scrutiny over the case.  Second, in Part
I, we presented evidence of the “rally effect” that has accompanied
the outset of virtually every modern war.  While such rallies affect the
public, investigating the rally effect by matching, we find that they do
not influence the Court.  Furthermore, since a rally effect could itself
be a causal effect of war, it may even introduce post-treatment bias to
condition on it.352  Finally, by matching cases that are close in time, we
arguably have accounted for some shifts in public opinion, such as the
widespread skepticism of the presidency following Watergate and the
Vietnam War.
3. The Us-Them Dichotomy
Another omitted covariate from our analysis may be the degree
to which the government aims its emergency provisions at “out-
siders.”353  If restrictions on civil rights and liberties affect a distinct
group (e.g., the German spies in Quirin), the Court may be more
inclined to uphold the restrictions.  If, however, the government takes
aim at a less readily identifiable group (e.g., individuals that provide
material support to terrorist organizations354), the Court may be more
inclined to strike down its provisions.  To the degree that executive
actions since September 11 have not specified clearly the violations
and the violators, our findings may overestimate the degree to which
the Rehnquist Court will suppress rights.
350 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
351 Id. at 724 (Douglas, J., concurring).
352 See infra Part VI.C for a discussion of post-treatment bias.
353 See, e.g., Cole, Enemy Aliens, supra note 39, at 955 (noting that war threatens liber- R
ties of noncitizens first); Cole, The New McCarthyism, supra note 39, at 16–18 (describing R
immigration law in war on terrorism); Downs & Kinnunen, supra note 12, at 404 (“It is R
easier to play loose with civil liberties when only the most unpopular are affected.”);
Gross, supra note 4, at 1082–89 (discussing “us-them” dialectic of emergency powers and R
noting that emergency powers are more likely to be conferred when “other” is well
defined).
354 See Cole, The New McCarthyism, supra note 39, at 8–15.  Whether this characteristic R
is readily identifiable may be contested.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 88 28-MAR-05 17:19
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4. Other Selection Effects
It is well known that cases reaching litigation (rather than settling
out of court) are biased samples.  In particular, the Priest-Klein model
of litigation predicts that plaintiffs only will go into litigation if they
believe that they have roughly a fifty percent chance of winning.355
Translating this finding to our study, if parties understand that they
are unlikely to prevail in particular civil rights and liberties suits
because of the crisis effect, different cases will reach the Supreme
Court in wartime than during peacetime.356  If this is so, then we
should have incorporated variables designed to control for this selec-
tion process.  However, as we found in Part III.C, the facts of Fourth
Amendment search and seizure cases do not differ systematically
across war and peace cases, indicating that no selection bias results
from the presence of war.
Furthermore, from Table 4 we may conduct a rough sensitivity
analysis to omitted covariates, which is often conducted to examine
how robust the statistical model is to other covariates.357  Our analysis
might suggest that we have even underestimated the effect of war.
The only case fact that is clearly correlated with war and affects the
probability of a liberal decision appears to be the search of a car.  And
while a case that includes the search of a car is 0.35 less likely to be
upheld by the Court, such cases are also 0.14 less likely to appear
before the Court during times of war.  The inclusion of this covariate
or one like it if available would, if anything, lead to a greater effect of
war.
Another issue is the relative severity or extremeness of cases
which we omit.  If cases grow more and more extreme owing to over-
zealous prosecution efforts on the government’s part during wars, and
the Court is still far more likely to decide them against the rights
355 Priest & Klein, supra note 23, at 4–5.  This prediction is contingent on the decision R
standard, the parties’ uncertainty of estimating case quality, and the degree of stake asym-
metry across the parties.
356 This possible selection effect may be further exacerbated in a study of Supreme
Court decisions because the certiorari process is a formal institution by which the justices
select cases, exerting greater control over their agenda than in any other appellate court.
So even if the selection effect does not manifest itself at the stage of a party’s decision to
appeal, a similar effect could influence the justices’ decision to grant certiorari.  We could
argue that the justices are relatively constrained in the decision to grant certiorari, but
much of constitutional theory and public choice theory would suggest that this is not the
case.
357 See, e.g., Charles F. Manski et al., Alternative Estimates of the Effect of Family Struc-
ture During Adolescence on High School Graduation, 87 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 25 (1992);
Paul R. Rosenbaum & Donald B. Rubin, Assessing Sensitivity to an Unobserved Binary
Covariate in an Observational Study with Binary Outcome, 45 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y 212,
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claimant—as our results show that it is—then the causal effect is prob-
ably larger than our estimates.  Only by demonstrating that cases are
less severe during times of war would this critique have merit.  But, to
our knowledge, no commentator has advanced this claim and, even if
one did, our empirical analysis casts serious doubt on it.
Of course, we have only assessed the importance of case charac-
teristics in detail in one issue area (albeit perhaps one more likely
than most to have manifest distinctions during war and peace), and
the effect may be stronger in other areas of the law.  Moreover, any
case facts, such as whether a First Amendment case involved commer-
cial or political speech, could constitute important omitted covariates
leading to a spurious causal effect.358
C. Post-Treatment Bias
Omitted variable bias is always a worry in empirical research.
Another concern is controlling for variables that are themselves
effects of the war, thereby controlling away and thus biasing our esti-
mate of the causal effect.  If war affects lower court decisionmaking,
for example, we should not match on how lower courts decided the
case.  Or alternatively, if a war affects newspapers by decreasing the
probability that they will cover Supreme Court decisions, we should
not match on the relative salience of the cases.359
These arguments are not without merit.  In order for the first
problem to have an effect, we would need to show that the lower
courts are affected by the presence of a war, which of course suggests
that the crisis thesis cuts far deeper into the federal court system than
has been proposed.  It is worth additional research to find out.
358 For example, the famous Baldus study on capital punishment included some 354
variables designed to tap case facts, such as the religion of the defendant and whether the
defendant committed the offense for retribution against a police officer. See DAVID C.
BALDUS ET AL., CHARGING AND S ENTENCING OF M URDER AND V OLUNTARY M AN-
SLAUGHTER CASES IN GEORGIA, 1973–1979 (Inter-Univ. Consortium for Political & Soc.
Research, No. 9264, 2001); DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH
PENALTY:  A LEGAL AND E MPIRICAL A NALYSIS (1990).  We applaud such proposed
approaches of matching on further case facts as another way to assess the robustness of our
findings.  More generally, while we have presented estimates that we believe take into
account the most prominent confounding covariates, it certainly would be a worthwhile
and laudable venture to subject these findings to further tests.  The crucial point is that in
order to do so scholars should employ a method that does not inadvertently introduce bias
and takes seriously the identification of causal effects.  On bias, see supra note 170 and R
accompanying text.  Matching is a general approach to drawing causal inferences that may
prove fruitful and well suited for additional investigations of the crisis thesis, as well as for
the analysis of other legal phenomena.
359 See Tushnet, supra note 13, at 277–78.  On the other hand, Figure 5 does not appear R
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For now, though, it is worth noting that whether we include or
exclude lower court decisions, case salience, or both from our
matching models, the causal effect of war remains substantial and sta-
tistically significant at all conventional levels.360
D. The Measurement of the Court’s Politics
Some scholars have criticized Segal-Cover ideology scores since,
because they were coded from newspaper editorials written before a
justice ascended to the bench, the scores ignore changes in judicial
ideology over time (such as occurred with Justice Harry Blackmun).361
Segal-Cover scores are indeed measured once and then fixed, but
even if a measure of ideology that changed over time were available
including any changes that occurred after, and possibly as a result of,
war would result in post-treatment bias.
In addition, our analysis depends on a measure of the ideology of
the entire Court.  The Segal-Cover scores could be improved upon,
but at least random measurement errors in the scores of individual
justices will have small effects on our measure of the Court’s ideolog-
ical position.
Although we have no better measure available, we were able to
evaluate the robustness of our results in part.  Whether we (a) exclude
the scores and match on term indicators,362 (b) match on ideology esti-
mates derived from decisions in areas other than civil rights and liber-
ties,363 or (c) match on Martin and Quinn’s moving ideal points,364 our
results appear to persist.
360 For example, with one-to-one matching on common support, without replacement,
we find an average treatment effect (ATE) of -9% (SE = 3%) by excluding salience, an
ATE of -8% (SE = 3%) by excluding lower court decisions, and an ATE of -7% (SE = 3%)
by excluding both salience and lower court decisions, compared to the baseline ATE of
-11% (SE = 3%) when all covariates are included.  These estimates are for models that
pool war cases and non-war cases, but substantially the same results remain when ana-
lyzing the cases separately.
361 For a critique of the Segal-Cover scores, see Epstein & Mershon, supra note 241, at R
281–84.  For documentation of Justice Blackmun’s changing views, see Lee Epstein et al.,
Do Political Preferences Change?  A Longitudinal Study of U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60
J. POL. 801, 810 (1998), noting Blackmun’s shifting jurisdprudence.
362 See supra Table 7.
363 We thank Andrew Martin and Kevin Quinn for estimating these scores for us.  On
the assumptions that (a) war does not affect non-civil rights and liberties cases, and that (b)
ideal points are non-separable and therefore correlated among issue areas, these measures
would be an alternative measure of political ideology.  These “but-for scores” are corre-
lated with the Segal-Cover scores by 0.43.
364 As we suggested earlier, these scores are ill-suited for our purposes since they are
defined endogenously by using judicial votes to derive ideal points. See supra note 241.  To R
investigate this, we estimated the propensity score by a logit model with the Martin-Quinn
score, term, Martin-Quinn, term, term*Martin-Quinn as predictors.  We then matched on\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 91 28-MAR-05 17:19
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E. The Relative Importance of the Causal Effect of War
While there is a clear difference in Court treatment of rights and
liberties on non-war cases during times of war and peace, just how
substantial is the effect?  The answer, in some sense, depends on the
Court itself.  To see this, assume that it is replete with ultra left-of-
center justices, such that the majority always supports litigants
claiming a deprivation of their rights.  For that Court, the effect of war
would be small, though not zero.  Rather than rule in favor of such
litigants in 100 out of 100 cases, we would anticipate the proportion to
drop to .95 (or ninety-five out of 100 cases).  Now consider a set of
extremely conservative justices—one that never rules in favor of the
criminally accused, alleged victims of discrimination, war protestors,
and other rights litigants.  If such a Court ever existed, then the causal
effect of war would be nearly zero:  The presence of a war would have
little effect on case outcomes as the justices would simply continue to
rule against rights claimants in each and every case.
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Figure 10:  The proportion of U.S. Supreme Court decisions supporting rights, liber-
ties, or justice claims, 1953–2001 terms.  The line depicts the proportion of support.
The grey shading depicts terms during which the Court heard disputes during a war
period.365
But this sort of extreme right-of-center Court never has existed,
or, at least, never existed in modern-day America.  Figure 3, which
the estimated propensity score, with exact restrictions on lower court decisions and sali-
ence, imposing on common support by discarding outliers, with replacement.
365 We derived the proportion of support from the U.S. Supreme Court Database, with
analu = 0 or 1; dec_type = 1, 6, or 7; value = 1–6; dir = 0 or 1. See supra notes 184, 193–94. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 92 28-MAR-05 17:19
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depicts the political ideology of the median justice, suggests as much.
The data in Figure 10, which illustrate the actual proportion of U.S.
Supreme Court decisions supporting a rights, liberties, or justice
claim, lends more support.  The proportion varies a lot—note, for
example, unparalleled levels of liberalism in the 1960s (in the .80
range, or eighty of 100 cases in support of the rights claimant).  But
never has the Court been so dominated by conservatives that the pro-
portion dipped below .30 (or thirty of 100 cases decided in favor of the
party alleging a rights infringement).  Rather (and, on average), that
figure has hovered around a moderate .49 since the 1953 term.
It is in light of the contemporary, rather temperate patterns in
decisionmaking depicted in Figure 10 that the importance of our find-
ings moves into relief:  Assuming that the past is the best indicator of
the future, the causal effect of war on non-war cases of ten percent is
substantial.
F. The Neglect of Lower Courts, and Some Preliminary Evidence
in the Wake of September 11
But what of the rest of the federal judiciary?  Is the effect of war
as substantial on, say, the U.S. Court of Appeals as it is on the
Supreme Court?  In the wake of September 11, have we overly
restricted our analysis by assessing the crisis thesis against Supreme
Court decisions only?
Our goal is to explore the crisis thesis as it pertains to the court
for which it was developed, the U.S. Supreme Court.  Prior to
September 11 there was little, if any, discussion of the effect of wars
and other threats to the national security on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals—and probably for good reason:  At least some of the expla-
nations for the existence of a crisis effect in the Supreme Court do not
transport easily to the other tribunals.366  For example, perhaps the
institutional mechanisms we detailed in Part II.B are far more severe
for the politically visible apex of the American judiciary than they are
for the (relatively) politically insulated appellate courts.
In addition, at least in the contemporary context, the federal
appellate courts are overwhelmingly Republican in composition:  In
eight of the twelve circuits, as Table 9 shows, judges appointed by
Republican presidents outnumber Democratic appointees.  What this
may suggest, if we believe the literature indicating that Republican
judges tend to be to the ideological right of their Democratic counter-
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parts,367 is that the effect of the current crisis will be more muted at
the appellate level.  After all, the majority of judges on these courts
already are oriented toward the government in cases involving rights,
liberties, and justice—and presumably will continue to rule in this
manner regardless of the existence of a crisis.  By the same token, in
circuits in which Democrats dominate, we also might expect a more
muted reaction to threats to the nation’s security, though not an
entirely negligible one.  For even if these judges always rule in favor of
rights litigants when peace prevails, they too occasionally hold for the
government (perhaps as often as one in ten cases rather than zero in
100) should our results for the Supreme Court generalize to the fed-
eral circuits.
Probability of a Panel of:
Three Three Two Two
Circuit (Partisan Composition) Republicans Democrats Republicans Democrats
1st (4 Republicans; 2 Democrats) 0.20 0.00 0.60 0.20
2d (5 Republicans; 8 Democrats) 0.03 0.20 0.28 0.49
3d (6 Republicans; 6 Democrats) 0.09 0.09 0.41 0.41
4th (8 Republicans; 6 Democrats) 0.25 0.02 0.51 0.22
5th (11 Republicans; 4 Democrats) 0.36 0.01 0.48 0.15
6th (6 Republicans; 6 Democrats) 0.09 0.09 0.41 0.41
7th (8 Republicans; 3 Democrats) 0.34 0.01 0.51 0.15
8th (7 Republicans; 3 Democrats) 0.29 0.01 0.53 0.18
9th (9 Republicans; 17 Democrats) 0.03 0.26 0.24 0.47
10th (7 Republicans; 5 Democrats) 0.16 0.05 0.48 0.32
11th (6 Republicans; 5 Democrats) 0.12 0.06 0.45 0.36
D.C. (5 Republicans; 4 Democrats) 0.12 0.05 0.48 0.36
(Mean) 0.17 0.07 0.45 0.31
Table 9: The partisan composition of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.  The partisanship is
based on the political party of the appointing president.  Each cell represents
the probability of a panel composed of a particular combination of
Democratic and Republican judges across the appellate courts, assuming
random assignment of three-judge panels.368
367 See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to
Legal Doctrine:  Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,
2156–57 (1998); Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, in
CONTEMPLATING COURTS 227, 231–32 (Lee Epstein ed., 1995); Ronald Stidham et al., The
Voting Behavior of President Clinton’s Judicial Appointees, 80 JUDICATURE 16, 19 (1996).
368 The data on partisan composition are as of June 20, 2003 (derived from http://
www.allianceforjustice.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2004)).  Assuming random assignment of
federal appellate judges to panels, we calculated the probabilities by simple probability
rules.
The probability of pi of a panel composition i of three judges =
NR + ND
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Even though some of the justifications offered in support of the
crisis thesis may not apply to the lower courts, others—such as juris-
prudential factors and notions of judicial patriotism—could influence
decisionmaking on the appellate bench.  Also, even though
Republicans dominate the circuit courts, the probability, as Table 9
shows, of a panel consisting exclusively of Republican (or Demo-
cratic) appointees is relatively low.  Hence, the causal effect of war
may be greater than simplistic counts of the numbers of Republicans
and Democrats might suggest.  To see this we need only assume, as the
scholarly literature suggests, that panels with a partisan mix of judges
are less reflexive, ideologically speaking, in their decisionmaking.369  If
this is so, we might expect to observe federal appellate panels com-
posed of Republicans and Democrats (that is, the vast majority of
panels, as Table 9 shows) producing substantially fewer decisions sup-
porting rights than they would in the absence of a crisis.
VII
IMPLICATIONS
That American judges vote in accordance with their political ide-
ologies is not news:  For over six decades, scholars have emphasized
the role that partisanship plays in decisionmaking.370  How war affects
judicial decisionmaking, however, is news.  While commentators long
have speculated that various mechanisms lead judges to suppress
rights and liberties during times of crisis,371 a smaller but equally vocal
group has countered that the Court acts to the contrary, by serving as
a guardian of those rights and liberties.372  In between these two
camps sit many others who have offered variants of one view or the
other.373
Our study puts this debate on firmer empirical ground:  We find
that neither side has it quite right.  We find no effect of war on cases
where NR represents the total number of Republican judges in that circuit; ND represents
the total number of Democratic judges in that circuit; kr represents the number of
Republican judges on the ith panel; and kd represents the number of Democratic judges on
the ith panel. See SHELDON ROSS, A FIRST COURSE IN PROBABILITY 24–63 (6th ed. 2002).
369 Indeed, Cross and Tiller found that “a partisan split . . . clearly moderates [partisan]
influences and makes doctrine more likely to be followed.”  Cross & Tiller, supra note 367, R
at 2176.
370 See, e.g., GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: T HE ATTITUDES AND IDEOLO-
GIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946–1963 (1965); SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 185; R
C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, 35
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 890 (1941).
371 For these works, see supra note 14; for the mechanisms, see supra Part II. R
372 For supporting works, see supra notes 16–17. R
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dealing directly with war.  Yet, in ordinary cases, the effect of war and
other international crises is substantial.
Our investigation also suggests that as long as the war on terror
continues in a severity comparable to previous wars, we should see a
sharp turn to the right in ordinary civil rights and liberties decisions of
the Court.374  Evidence supporting this proposition already is begin-
ning to mount.  Anecdotal support comes from the justices them-
selves.  In separate speeches delivered after September 11, Justices
Scalia, O’Connor and Breyer openly admitted the potential repercus-
sions of the crisis on the Court’s rights jurisprudence.  As Justice
Scalia put it, “The Constitution just sets minimums.  Most of the rights
that you enjoy go way beyond what the Constitution requires,” and in
times of war “the protections will be ratcheted right down to the con-
stitutional minimum.”375  Justice O’Connor concurred with this gen-
eral sentiment, claiming that the war on terrorism “will cause us to re-
examine some of our laws pertaining to criminal surveillance, wiretap-
ping, immigration and so on.”376  And while Justice Breyer noted that
“the Constitution does apply ‘in time of war as in time of peace,’” he
conceded that in wartime “circumstances change, thereby shifting the
point at which a proper balance is struck.”377
With these sentiments in mind, and the present war on terror, we
discuss two implications from our study.  First, given the extent to
which the justices curtail ordinary rights during periods of threat to
the nation’s security, federal judges ought to give less weight to legal
principles established while a war is ongoing, and attorneys should see
it as their responsibility to distinguish ordinary cases along these lines.
Second, our theory challenges scholars to rethink normative assess-
ments based on the simplifications of the crisis and Milligan theses.378
Scholars and practitioners may gain by accounting for the institu-
tional-process dimension in research and advocacy.
A. Stare Decisis of Ordinary Cases
We first develop implications on stare decisis from our finding of
the pervasive effects of war on ordinary civil rights and liberties cases.
374 On forecasting the Rehnquist Court’s reaction to the war on terror, see Lewis, Civil
Liberties, supra note 13, at 271, noting that “[w]e may all try to guess where a headstrong R
Supreme Court will come down on the Bush administration’s attempt to brush constitu-
tional rights aside in the war on terrorism.”
375 Associated Press, Justice Scalia Addresses Wartime Constitutional Rights (Mar. 19,
2003), available at http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/03/19/scalia.speech.ap/index.html.
376 For a summary of O’Connor’s speech, see Linda Greenhouse, In New York Visit,
O’Connor Foresees Limits on Freedom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2001, at B5.
377 Breyer, supra note 84 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866)). R
378 See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 304, at 6–9. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 96 28-MAR-05 17:19
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In  The Nature of the Judicial Process, Justice Benjamin Cardozo
described the importance of stare decisis in this way:
If a group of cases involves the same point, the parties expect the
same decision.  It would be a gross injustice to decide alternate
cases on opposite principles.  If a case was decided against me yes-
terday when I was a defendant, I shall look for the same judgment
today if I am plaintiff.  To decide differently would raise a feeling of
resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an infringement,
material and moral, of my rights.379
Our investigation suggests that Cardozo’s general conception of
stare decisis does not always hold.  In fact, an ordinary case decided
yesterday when peace prevailed has a substantial probability of being
decided differently today when a state of crisis exists.380
If this is so, our results point to an important implication for stare
decisis:  Members of the legal community should hold an ongoing
crisis as a material distinguishing fact in determining the authority of
an ordinary case.  Specifically, during times of peace, judges ought to
bestow less precedential authority on cases decided during times of
war.  Further, attorneys should see it as their responsibility to distin-
guish cases along these lines.381
This recommendation resolves the problem that “[t]he circum-
stances of war are something like an elephant in the living room. . . .
[T]ry as they might, judges are quite unlikely to be able to ignore the
elephant’s presence.”382  In other words, our prescription provides a
framework for balancing security and liberty interests under different
crisis-related contexts without relying on the judges themselves to
“refrain from giving in to an understandable urge to make exercises of
emergency powers compatible with constitutional norms.”383
379 CARDOZO,  supra note 88, at 33–34 (quoting WILLIAM G ALBRAITH M ILLER, THE R
DATA OF JURISPRUDENCE 335 (photo. reprint 1998) (1903)).
380 This suggests that the ebb-and-flow model of accommodation delineated by Gross, in
which “in times of crisis, we can expect expansive judicial interpretations of the scope of
police powers, with the concomitant contraction of individual rights,” Gross, supra note 4, R
at 1060, may be an accurate description of empirical reality.
381 This is not a recommendation, we hasten to note, with which Cardozo himself prob-
ably would have taken much issue.  Even though he pointed to the important role stare
decisis plays in establishing expectations, he argued that precedent should be relaxed when
“it was the product of institutions or conditions which have gained a new significance or
development with the progress of the years.” CARDOZO, supra note 88, at 151.  A condi- R
tion of severe crisis may constitute grounds for relaxing or downgrading the authority of a
case in times of tranquility.  Moreover, acknowledging the difference between cases
decided during war and peace resolves potential inconsistencies in the case law, dispelling
the danger that Justice Cardozo described as “the tendency of a principle to expand itself
to the limit of its logic.” CARDOZO, supra note 88, at 51. R
382 Tushnet, supra note 13, at 283. R
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On the other hand, because our approach does not entail “nor-
malizing the exception,” but rather recognizing it explicitly for its
precedential value, it is distinct from proposals commending a return
to “first principles”384 and use of the “prerogative power”385 during
times of crisis and necessity.
Along these lines, Gross has proposed a model of extralegal mea-
sures, in which the government “go[es] outside the legal order, at
times even violating otherwise accepted constitutional principles.”386
We see serious problems with such an extralegal approach.  First, it
risks a lack of accountability of the Executive for the duration of a
crisis.387  Our approach, in contrast, while providing the Executive
with some leeway during times of war, eliminates the potential
problems of authoritarianism and lawlessness inherent in the extra-
legal model.  It also ensures that the Executive is accountable even in
times of crisis.388
384 NICCOLO M ACHIAVELLI, THE D ISCOURSES (Bernard Crick ed., Leslie J. Walker
trans., Penguin Books 1998) (n.d.); NICCOLO M ACHIAVELLI, THE P RINCE (Harvey C.
Mansfield trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2d ed. 1998) (n.d.).  Machiavelli spoke of the role
of virt´ u in establishing and maintaining the state, arguing that by the necessity of fortune,
great rulers must in times of crisis bring the state back to its first principles.  MACHIAVELLI,
THE D ISCOURSES, supra, at 385–90 (claiming that “return to . . . original principles” or
reconstitution of government meant “instilling men with that terror and that fear with
which they had instilled them when instituting it”).  He notes that:
The principal foundations that all states have, new ones as well as old or
mixed, are good laws and good arms.  And because there cannot be good laws
where there are not good arms, and where there are good arms there must be
good laws, I shall leave out the reasoning on laws and shall speak of arms.
MACHIAVELLI, THE P RINCE,  supra, at 48.  In other words, for Machiavelli, necessity
trumps law.
385 JOHN L OCKE, SECOND T REATISE OF G OVERNMENT 83–88 (C.B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1980) (1690).  Locke echoes Machiavelli’s conception of
necessity in the conception of prerogative power, namely the “power to act according to
discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even
against it.” Id. at 84.  In Locke’s conception this power “never is questioned,” id., and the
only remedy remains an “appeal to heaven,” id. at 87.
386 Gross, supra note 4, at 1097. R
387 To be fair, Gross proposes an ex post ratification mechanism of any extralegal mea-
sures, arguing that this would constrain executives.  Yet this approach could fall prey to
similar dangers of accountability, since executives might only seek further intensification of
crises to maintain power and emergency measures, and, as such, presents the possibility of
a slippery slope to authoritarianism.
388 By maintaining the doctrine of separation of powers in wartime, our approach
evades the fear stated so eloquently by Justice Brandeis:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.
The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction
incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three depart-
ments, to save the people from autocracy.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 98 28-MAR-05 17:19
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A second problem with extralegal measures is that they play
directly into the fear that Justice Jackson expressed in Korematsu:
“[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes [a government] order [cur-
tailing rights] to show that it conforms to the Constitution, . . . the
Court for all time has validated . . . . [a] principle [that] then lies about
like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any authority . . . .”389  By
explicitly acknowledging the distinction between precedent estab-
lished during times of war and peace, our approach would have the
opposite effect:  It would serve to allay fears that crisis jurisprudence
would lie about “like a loaded weapon.”
Our findings suggest that such fears are probably overwrought,
since the Court, however implicitly, is already deciding ordinary “war”
and “peace” cases differently.  Seen in this way, all our recommenda-
tion accomplishes, some might argue, is the instantiation of a de facto
jurisprudential principle that judges now follow.  This may be so, but
neither scholarly commentators nor the judges themselves have
acknowledged that courts make this distinction, which may explain
why proposals about how the judiciary should respond to September
11 continue to flood legal journals and the op-ed pages of newspapers.
But even if judges already do distinguish cases based on a crisis con-
text, we do not regard requiring them to make the implicit explicit as
trivial or inconsequential.  For until judges state their intent to distin-
guish cases along the dimension we propose, neither the legal commu-
nity, nor the public, can hold them accountable to that principle.  It
should thus be the responsibility of all members of that community—
but especially practitioners—to see it as their affirmative duty to dis-
tinguish ordinary cases on the basis of whether or not the Court
decided them during a time of war, irrespective of whether the prece-
dential case related directly to a war effort.390
B. Institutional Process and the Enemy Combatant Cases
In this Section we look for additional evidence of our alternative
theory by examining the recent enemy combatant cases arising from
the war on terror.  These cases are not contained in our dataset, so
389 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see
also Edwards, supra note 5, at 841 (“Once validated by the courts, emergency curtailments R
of constitutional rights take on legal lives of their own.”).
390 Such claims, of course, ought to cut both ways:  Attorneys should scour “war” cases
for support in times of war, and “peace” cases for support in times of peace.  But they need
not distinguish on the basis of the types of wars—a distinction, our study suggests, that
does not concord with the historical reality.  On the other hand, our results suggest that
attorneys should avoid making analogies between the existence of indisputable armed con-
flict (i.e., all major wars of the 20th century) and rally events.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 99 28-MAR-05 17:19
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they provide some outside qualitative validation for our theory.391  If
our conjecture on the institutional-process dimension of the Court is
correct, as a positive matter the Court should look towards Congress
in the cases most directly related to war rather than concerning itself
with first-order balancing of security versus liberty interests.  In their
own survey of war-related cases, Issacharoff and Pildes find that this
captures much of the jurisprudence of the most prominent war-related
cases.392  We further find here that our alternative theory sheds some
new light on the enemy combatant cases.393  Commentators, evalu-
ating these cases primarily on a rights-based spectrum, have disagreed
sharply.394  Yet in these opinions, the Court saw it as its responsibility
to ascertain the degree of congressional approval of executive actions.
Rather than simply balancing security and liberty interests, the polit-
ical process and institutional interaction between Congress and the
Executive proved crucial, whereas court-determined constitutional
391 We view the following analysis as providing suggestive evidence only.  Much work
remains to subject the institutional-process theory to empirical scrutiny.  For example,
given the criticisms of procedural theories as inevitably entailing substantive judgments,
how does one clearly distinguish institutional-process from rights-oriented dimensions?
How would we assess this in a transparent and replicable manner, in particular to compare
ordinary and war-related cases (since we here select only war-related cases)?  What other
falsifiable hypotheses would we derive from this alternative theory?  We view this as a
particularly promising area where empirical and doctrinal approaches may mutually inform
one another.
392 Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Emergency Contexts Without Emergency
Powers:  The United States’ Constitutional Approach to Rights During Wartime, 2 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 296, 300–19 (2004).
393 Much has been written about the decisions.  For only a sprinkling of the variety of
opinions, see, for example, Ronald Dworkin, What the Court Really Said, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS, Aug. 12, 2004, at 26, arguing that commentators have exaggerated the defeat of the
government position, but that enemy combatant decisions force the government to grant
criminal-law protections to enemy combatants or to treat them as prisoners of war; Oona
A. Hathaway, The Court Puts the White House in Its Place, NEWSDAY, June 29, 2004, at
A33, asserting that, with enemy combatant rulings, “[t]he Supreme Court has rightly
brought the White House back to Earth”; Robert Alt, Dangerous Decision, NAT’L REV.
ONLINE (June 29, 2004), at http://www.nationalreview.com/alt/alt200406291001.asp,
arguing that the enemy combatant decisions encourage forum shopping, increase
caseloads, and “will have a deleterious effect on the military’s ability to carry out the war
on terror” by “opening the courthouse doors to terrorists from every corner of the globe”;
Neal Katyal, Sins of Commissions, SLATE (Sept. 8, 2004), at  http://www.slate.com/
Default.aspx?id=2106406, describing the military commissions in Guantanamo as
“run[ning] roughshod over the American military justice system”; Andrew C. McCarthy, A
Mixed Bag, NAT’L R EV. ONLINE (June 30, 2004), at http://www.nationalreview.com/
mccarthy/mccarthy200406300915.asp, describing the three enemy-combatant cases as “a
mixed bag for the government:  a tie, a shaky win . . . and a defeat that could be cata-
strophic”; and Thomas F. Powers, When to Hold ’Em, LEGAL AFF., Sept.–Oct. 2004, avail-
able at http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/September-October-2004/argument_powers_sep
oct04.html, arguing that the most important implication of the enemy combatant decisions
is the development of a preventative detention policy.
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rights were less prominent.395  In Hamdi, the Court was particularly
concerned with the degree of congressional authorization of detention
of enemy combatants, rejecting, with the exception of Justice
Thomas’s dissent, a broad interpretation of unilateral executive
power.  And in Padilla and Rasul, the Court, perhaps in an effort to
protect itself, employed process-oriented rationales to the detriment
of substantive determinations of first-order constitutional rights.
It is worth noting at the outset that we conceptually distinguish
between an institutional-process method of adjudicating cases and the
Court’s analysis of a procedural question.  Our theory suggests that
war affects the former, but not the latter.
1. Hamdi
Consider the case of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.396  The U.S. military
captured the petitioner Hamdi, an American citizen, on the battlefield
in Afghanistan.  The Government held Hamdi in custody in the
United States on the basis of his classification as an “enemy com-
batant” for allegedly fighting with the Taliban against the United
States.  Hamdi’s father brought a habeas action on behalf of his son,
claiming that Hamdi was being held in violation of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments without access to counsel or the opportunity
to contest his detention at trial.  The district court ruled that Hamdi
should be given access to counsel, but the Fourth Circuit reversed the
order on the basis that it did not adequately consider the
Government’s security and intelligence interests, noting that the
“Constitution’s commitment of the conduct of war to the political
branches of American government requires the court’s respect at
every step.”397  On remand, the Government presented a declaration
from the Under Secretary for Defense Policy, Michael Mobbs, which
stated that Hamdi was an enemy combatant (the Mobbs Declaration).
The district court found the Mobbs Declaration insufficient and issued
a production order to the Government to turn over materials for in
camera review of the basis of Hamdi’s detention.398  On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit sided with a much broader view of executive power,
ruling that judicial inquiry is unwarranted when the detainee was cap-
tured in a zone of active combat.399
395 For a similar analysis of the institutional-process approach for the lower courts, see
Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 392, at 319–25. R
396 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
397 296 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 2002).
398 243 F. Supp. 527, 528, 533 (E.D. Va. 2002).
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The Supreme Court, despite the fact that both briefs framed the
question first in terms of the Constitutional question of executive
powers,400 focused on the degree of congressional authorization of
detention powers.  The habeas petition claimed that Hamdi’s deten-
tion violated the Non-Detention Act, which provides that “[n]o citizen
shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except
pursuant to an Act of Congress.”401  The Government maintained that
(a) congressional authorization was not required because of plenary
powers under Article II, and (b) that even if congressional authoriza-
tion were required, congressional Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) satisfied the Non-Detention Act.402  In the Court’s
plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Breyer, refused to reach the first-
order claim of plenary executive powers.403  Instead, Justice O’Connor
found that the Non-Detention Act’s exception clause was met by the
AUMF, which authorized the President “to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organi-
zations or persons.”404  The plurality reasoned that since the under-
lying justification for detention is to prevent hostile combatants from
returning to the battlefield, detention powers were necessary and
appropriate to fight the war, and hence implied under the AUMF.405
In short, on the most important question presented by Hamdi, the
Court shifted responsibility from itself to the political branches by
deferring interpretation of unilateral Article II powers.
On the second issue of due process requirements for detention,
the plurality, joined on the issue by Justices Ginsburg and Souter,
ruled that a citizen held in the United States was entitled to a “mean-
ingful opportunity to contest the factual basis for that detention
400 Brief for Petitioners at 10–14, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-
6696) (arguing first constitutional question of detention and second whether detention is
permissible under congressional statute); Brief for Respondents at 13–22, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004) (No. 03-6696) (arguing first Article II powers and second
congressional authorization).
401 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000).
402 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639.
403 Id. at 2639 (“The Government maintains that no explicit congressional authorization
is required, because the Executive possesses plenary authority to detain pursuant to
Article II of the Constitution.  We do not reach the question whether Article II provides
such authority . . . .”).
404 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224
(2001).
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before a neutral decisionmaker.”406  Employing a balancing approach,
the Court rejected both the Government’s executive unilateralist posi-
tion407 and the civil libertarian stance of the district court that sought
rights close to criminal trial protections.408  Instead, the plurality held
that Hamdi was entitled to notice of the factual basis for his classifica-
tion as an enemy combatant and a fair opportunity to rebut the factual
assertion.  Yet, the plurality also ruled that these “proceedings may be
tailored to alleviate their uncommon potential to burden the
Executive at a time of ongoing military conflict.”409  The Court
thereby suggested that hearsay and burden-shifting rules might be
changed from standard criminal trials and that “appropriately author-
ized and properly constituted military tribunal[s]” could meet the pro-
cedural standards set out by the plurality.410  While the holding in this
second question of due process protections certainly hints at a more
direct approach towards adjudicating constitutional rights, the Court
rejected the Government’s and petitioner’s more extreme positions
and was quick to emphasize the role of political institutions in the
process.  Citing Mistretta v. United States, the plurality noted that the
Constitution “envisions a role for all three branches when individual
liberties are at stake,”411 and that absent congressional suspension of
the writ, citizens are entitled to the procedural protection of being
able to challenge the factual basis for detention.  In short, the Court’s
jurisprudence maintained as paramount the role of the political
branches in the war on terror.
While concurring in the due process judgment of the plurality,
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented with respect to
the plurality’s statutory analysis of the AUMF.412  Analyzing the legis-
lative history of the Non-Detention Act, Justice Souter found that the
Act was intended to prevent detentions of the sort in Korematsu, that
the Act codified a clear statement rule militating against vague autho-
rizations of detentions, and that the stark tradeoff between security
and liberty necessitates “an assessment by Congress” and “the need
for a clearly expressed congressional resolution.”413  Based on the leg-
406 Id. at 2635.
407 Id. at 2650 (rejecting “the Government’s assertion that separation of powers princi-
ples mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts [during war]”).
408 Id. at 2648.
409 Id. at 2649.
410 Id. at 2649, 2651.
411 Id. at 2650.
412 Id. at 2653 (disagreeing with plurality and finding that “[t]he Government has failed
to demonstrate that the [AUMF] authorizes the detention complained of here even on the
facts the Government claims”).
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islative history, Justice Souter would have held that the Non-
Detention Act was clearly intended to apply to wartime, that the
AUMF did not clearly authorize detentions, and that the AUMF did
not protect government actions under the laws of war.414  Finally,
citing the Youngstown proposition that “Presidential authority is ‘at its
lowest ebb where the President acts contrary to congressional will,’”
Justice Souter rejected the Article II constitutional claim.415  It is
instructive that Justice Souter’s opinion, concurring in part and dis-
senting in part, focuses not on the constitutional question of Article II
powers as much as the crisis literature might suggest a priori.  Instead,
Justice Souter’s analysis is plainly consistent with an institutional-pro-
cess approach, focusing overwhelmingly on the statutory analysis of
congressional authorization and the need for bilateral endorsement of
the exercise of war powers.
Further suggestive evidence of the fact that conventional ideolog-
ical roles do not fit neatly over the jurisprudence of war-related cases
is Justice Scalia’s dissent from the majority.  Contrary to expectations
based on ideological grounds, Justice Scalia is joined by Justice
Stevens, holding that the Government can detain citizens only
through the criminal system or the Suspension Clause.416  This dissent
criticized the plurality’s reliance on the AUMF, for the AUMF does
not constitute a suspension of the writ.  Moreover, the dissent found
that the Court’s analysis wrongly empowers the Court to determine
first-order rights of detainees.417  The underlying assumption in Justice
Scalia’s formalistic approach appears to be that a strict bifurcation of
the criminal process and suspension of the writ would incite Congress
to act if the public will so desired.418  Justice Scalia’s conception of the
judiciary during war rejects a rights-oriented constitutional balancing,
that is “the view that war silences law . . . has no place in the interpre-
tation and application of a Constitution designed precisely to confront
war and, in a manner that accords with democratic principles, to
accommodate it.”419  The Court should not “fix” a legislature’s failure
414 Id. at 2655–59.
415 Id. at 2659 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952)).
416 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
417 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2671–72 (concluding that AUMF does not “authorize[ ] deten-
tion of a citizen with the clarity necessary to satisfy the interpretive canon that statutes
should be construed so as to avoid grave constitutional concerns” and that “the major
effect of its constitutional improvisation is to increase the power of the Court”).
418 Id. at 2673 (noting that “by repeatedly doing what it thinks the political branches
ought to do [the Court] encourages their lassitude and saps the vitality of government by
the people”).
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to act or an Executive’s inability to provide reasonable procedural
safeguards for detainees.  To do so would be to eviscerate the purpose
of the Suspension Clause in mandating congressional support, i.e., to
channel crisis decisionmaking to the politically accountable branches.
Although at times described as such,420 Justice Scalia’s dissent fails to
be squarely characterized as adopting a civil libertarian position.
While the dissent certainly favors Hamdi in the outcome of the spe-
cific case, Justice Scalia envisions a drastically reduced role for the
Court in adjudicating substantive rights questions (i.e., the plurality
did not take the procedural institutional method far enough), and
instead demands an explicit channeling of detention questions to bilat-
eral endorsement by Congress and the Executive under the
Suspension Clause.
The only opinion in Hamdi that remains primarily rights-oriented
is that of Justice Thomas, who in essence endorses the executive uni-
lateralist position of the crisis thesis and the Government:  The
“detention falls squarely within the Federal Government’s war
powers. . . .  I do not think that the Federal Government’s war powers
can be balanced away by this Court.”421  Justice Thomas concluded
that the courts are entirely unsuitable for reviewing detentions
because of the lack of information and expertise in security and for-
eign affairs, the complexity of executive information in such cases, and
the dominance of the political branches in security and foreign
affairs.422  And even if the balancing approach of the plurality, which
Justice Thomas so eschews, were to be applied by him, Justice Thomas
would find that the government interest in waging war is so compel-
ling as to outweigh Hamdi’s due process interests entirely.423  Justice
Thomas thereby appears to be the only one to bite at the broad
Article II claim, despite paying lip service to congressional
authorization.424
Overall, Hamdi illustrates quite well the potential prevalence of
the institutional-process approach in war-related cases.  While peti-
tioners argued in large part that the citizen detentions under Article II
were unconstitutional, the Court failed to reach the issue because of
congressional authorization.  Similarly, the Government also sought a
broad affirmation of plenary Article II power, which was denied by
the Court because of a lack of congressional suspension of the writ.
420 See McCarthy, supra note 393. R
421 124 S. Ct. at 2674.
422 Id. at 2676.
423 Id. at 2683–85.
424 Id. at 2678–80.  Perhaps the reason for this short shrift to congressional intent lies in
Justice Thomas’s unwillingness to consider Congress’s mandate of the Non-Detention Act.\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 105 28-MAR-05 17:19
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On both claims, the Court drew a narrow line between the Milligan
and crisis theses, and instead of taking a strict rights-oriented
approach, the Court focused on the institutional process of wartime
decisionmaking.
2. Padilla
Padilla presented a similar fact pattern to Hamdi.  The President
designated Padilla, a U.S. citizen, an enemy combatant, charging that
he had conspired with al Qaeda to commit attacks against the United
States.  Like Hamdi, Padilla was detained without formal charges or
legal proceedings.  Unlike Hamdi, he had been apprehended under a
material witness warrant, on U.S. territory,425 leading many to con-
sider this as the case with more substantial ramifications for the war
on terror.  As in Hamdi, the Government argued for a strong execu-
tive unilateralist position under Article II,426 while the petitioner
asserted broad infringements of due process rights based on the con-
ventional criminal process.427
The alternative theory sheds much light onto the dynamics of the
Padilla decisions, particularly the lower court decisions.428  The
Southern District of New York held that while the President lacked
inherent executive power in light of the Non-Detention Act, the
AUMF authorized detentions of enemy combatants.429  In analyzing
the district court disposition, Issacharoff and Pildes note that the dis-
trict court refused to adopt both the executive unilateralist position
advocated by the Government and the civil libertarian view that
Padilla deserved an ordinary criminal process.  Instead, the district
court, in a way emblematic of the institutional process theory, focused
“on ensuring that there has been a bilateral institutional endorsement
for the exercise of [war powers]” and minimized the determination of
“its own . . . substantive content and application of ‘rights’ during
wartime.”430
425 Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 2715 (2004).
426 Id. at 2716.
427 Id.
428 For an exemplary analysis of the district court disposition of Padilla, see Issacharoff
& Pildes, supra note 392, at 321–24.  We extend the analysis here in two principal ways. R
First, we are able to analyze the enemy combatant decisions of the Supreme Court, for
which the theory is most widely developed.  Second, the recently decided cases enable us
to apply the theory to more than just Padilla. See id. at 325 n.91.  More broadly, our
empirical evidence suggests that the institutional-process dimension is more independent
for war-related cases than for run-of-the-mill cases.
429 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
430 Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 392, at 324. R\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 106 28-MAR-05 17:19
106 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
The Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, but the
decision again exemplifies the institutional analysis that is the
lynchpin of the alternative theory.431  The court placed its analysis
squarely within Youngstown:432
[W]hen the Executive acts, even in the conduct of war, in the face of
apparent congressional disapproval, challenges to his authority must
be examined and resolved by the Article III courts. . . . [W]hile Con-
gress . . . may have the power to authorize the detention of United
States citizens . . . the President, acting alone, does not.433
The Second Circuit thereby held that (a) the President lacked
inherent executive power to detain citizens captured away from a
combat zone since no detention authority had been granted by
Congress, and that (b) the President lacked specific congressional
authorization of detention to overcome the express mandate of the
Non-Detention Act.434  With respect to the second claim, the court
rejected the Government’s unilateralist position that the Non-Deten-
tion Act did not apply to the military and refused to read detention
powers into the AUMF.435
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit, finding, con-
trary to the lower court rulings, that the court lacked jurisdiction over
Padilla’s petition.436  Though perhaps less exemplary of the institu-
tional-process approach, the majority opinion penned by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, first applied the immediate custodian rule that “the proper
respondent to a habeas petition is ‘the person who has custody over
[the petitioner].’”437  As a result, the majority held that only Com-
mander Marr, the physical custodian of Padilla, was the proper
respondent, not Secretary Rumsfeld.438  Second, the Court applied the
so-called district of confinement rule, which requires that the district
court have jurisdiction over the custodian, to conclude that the
Southern District of New York lacked jurisdiction.439  Here the Court
emphasized Congress’s role in limiting jurisdiction by adding the
“respective jurisdictions” clause to the habeas statute.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, concurred in the
judgment but suggested that the custodian and confinement rules are
431 Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003).
432 Id. at 710–24.
433 Id. at 713, 715.
434 Id. at 712, 723.
435 Id. at 722–24.
436 Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2722–24.
437 Id. at 2717 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (2000)) (alteration in original).
438 Id. at 2715–22.
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best conceived of as personal jurisdiction or venue questions that can
be waived by the Government.440  Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, dissented from the majority, finding (a)
that the custodian rule should be applied flexibly such that petitioner
could name as respondent an individual with control over petitioner,
and (b) that the Southern District could assert jurisdiction.441
While the lower courts epitomize the institutional-process
approach, the Court’s opinion in Padilla does not appear particularly
representative of an institutional-process approach.  One might inter-
pret the opinion as the Court emphasizing procedural issues to avoid
reaching the merits of a first-order constitutional question, a strategy
that may be more prevalent for the highly sensitive cases most directly
related to the war.  Certainly one also cannot ignore the fact that the
opinion was jointly issued with Hamdi, suggesting perhaps that having
spelled out the merits in that case, the Court sought to buy some time
for the political branches to respond before ruling on Padilla’s
broader issue of detention of citizens captured at home.
3. Rasul
In  Rasul v. Bush, the Court addressed whether the habeas
statute442 conferred jurisdiction to U.S. courts to consider challenges
to detention of foreign nationals incarcerated at Guantanamo Bay
who were captured abroad in hostilities with the Taliban.443  The dis-
trict court sided with the Government’s claim that under Johnson v.
Eisentrager444 aliens detained outside of U.S. sovereign territories
may not invoke habeas relief.445 Eisentrager ruled that U.S. district
courts did not have jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by German
nationals imprisoned in Germany after having been captured in China
during World War II.446  The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
affirmed the district court.447
Writing for the majority of the Court, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, concluded that the
district court had jurisdiction.  The majority first distinguished
440 Id. at 2727–28 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
441 Id. at 2733–34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
442 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000) (authorizing district judges to grant writs of habeas corpus
“within their respective jurisdictions”).
443 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2690 (2004).
444 339 U.S. 763, 784–85 (1950) (holding that U.S. courts did not have jurisdiction to
hear habeas claims by foreign detainees captured in China and detained in Germany
during World War II).
445 Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 65, 73 (D.D.C. 2002).
446 339 U.S. at 784–85.
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Eisentrager on the grounds that the petitioners here were not
nationals of enemy states, were not afforded a tribunal, and were held
“in territory over which the United States exercises exclusive jurisdic-
tion and control.”448  The majority then held that Eisentrager per-
tained to constitutional, not statutory, habeas rights, and that Braden
v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court449 had subsequently established a statu-
tory basis for jurisdiction as long as the custodian can be reached by
service of process. Braden thereby established jurisdiction for the
Guantanamo detainees.  Consistent with an institutional approach
that eschews the first-order determination of constitutional rights, the
majority emphasized that Congress authorized federal district courts
to have jurisdiction450 and specifically interpreted the statutory, not
constitutional, mandate of habeas jurisdiction.451
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Kennedy took issue with the
Court’s conclusion that Braden overruled the statutory predicate of
Eisentrager.452  Instead, Justice Kennedy would have followed the
framework of Eisentrager, conducting a factual inquiry as to whether
judicial intervention was required.  Acknowledging that “there is a
realm of political authority over military affairs where the judicial
power may not enter,”453 the purpose of this inquiry would be to
assess whether the circumstances permitted judicial interference with
the “joint role of the President and the Congress[ ] in the conduct of
military affairs.”454  Within this framework, Justice Kennedy then
would have distinguished Rasul on its facts—that Guantanamo is
functionally within U.S. territory and far removed from hostilities, and
petitioners were under indefinite detention without access to legal
proceedings.  Justice Kennedy would have thereby reached the same
conclusion that federal jurisdiction was proper.  While Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence noted the role of the political branches in war-
time, his brief analysis does not explicitly address the issue of legisla-
tive endorsement.  Nonetheless, if the Court had adopted Justice
Kennedy’s factual Eisentrager framework, the analysis certainly
appears to contemplate such.  While the majority, similar to Justice
448 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693.
449 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
450 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2692–93 (noting congressional mandate of habeas statute).
451 Id. at 2695 (“Because subsequent decisions of this Court have filled the statutory gap
that had occasioned Eisentrager’s resort to ‘fundamentals,’ persons detained outside the
territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court no longer need rely on the Constitution
as the source of their right to federal habeas review.”).
452 Id. at 2699 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
453 Id. at 2700.
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Kennedy, factually distinguished Eisentrager, it did not rely on this
factual inquiry, turning instead to the statutory analysis.
Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, sharply criticized the majority for its Eisentrager anal-
ysis, finding that Eisentrager squarely governed Rasul.455  Justice
Scalia rebuked the majority for its reading of the habeas statute:
“Congress is in session.  If it wished to change federal judges’ habeas
jurisdiction from what this Court had previously held that to be, it
could have done so.”456  In short, just as in Hamdi, the Court failed to
go far enough in channeling the institutional process.
VIII
CONCLUSION
The evidence we have compiled comprises the only large-scale,
systematic, quantitative test of the crisis thesis to date.  The large
volume of prior literature devoted to this subject is entirely qualitative
and discursive and, although it contains large volumes of useful
description and considerable analytic wisdom, our evidence indicates
that all prior causal inferences drawn about the crisis thesis in this
literature are incorrect or, at best, incomplete.
Our evidence, which spans all civil liberties decisions over six
decades, strongly suggests that the decisions made by the Supreme
Court during wartime would have been systematically different if
these same cases had been decided during peacetime.  We show that
war causes the Court to decide cases unrelated to the war in a mark-
edly more conservative direction than they otherwise would.  How-
ever, war appears to have no effect on the conservatism of the Court’s
decisions in cases closely related to an ongoing military conflict.  In
those cases, the Court retreats from its usual rights versus security
focus of decisionmaking to a focus on institutional process.  By
changing its focus to a mostly unrelated dimension, the effect of war
on the conservatism of decisionmaking in war-related cases vanishes.
Contrary to the rhetoric of Ex parte Milligan, the judiciary is no
panacea for wartime curtailments on civil rights.  The justices of the
U.S. Supreme Court seem to feel little responsibility to “rebuke the
legislative and executive authorities when, under the stress of war
455 Id.  at 2703–04 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting idea that Braden  overruled
Eisentrager “would not pass the laugh test”); see also id. at 2706 (“Today’s opinion, and
today’s opinion alone, overrules Eisentrager . . . .”); id. at 2711 (characterizing majority’s
opinion as “clumsy, countertextual reinterpretation that confers upon wartime prisoners
greater habeas rights than domestic detainees,” a “monstrous scheme,” and “judicial
adventurism of the worst sort”).
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[those authorities] have sought to suppress the rights of dissenters.”457
Nor have the justices acted entirely in accordance with Cicero’s
maxim.  During times of war, the Court does indeed speak, but it does
so in a seemingly paradoxical manner, curtailing civil rights and liber-
ties with more frequency in times of war than in peacetime and taking
this action only in cases unrelated to war.  In fact, ordinary civil rights
and liberties cases are precisely the ones for which war has the most
detectible impact.
In reviewing the enemy combatant cases, in particular, we find
some suggestive support for our institutional-process theory
explaining the war-related cases.  Contrary to what political spin may
suggest, none of the cases presented clear-cut victories for executive
unilateralists or civil libertarians (i.e., crisis or Milligan thesis adher-
ents).  And contrary to what the crisis literature might suggest, the
Court rarely turned to a direct balancing of first-order constitutional
rights.  Instead, the Court sought to protect itself by turning to the
political branches in the war on terror.
In a brief in Rasul, the World War II detainee, Fred Korematsu458
urged the Justices to
make clear that even in wartime, the United States . . . . does not
constrict fundamental liberties in the absence of convincing military
necessity. . . .
Our failure to hold ourselves to this standard in the past has led
to many of our most painful episodes as a nation.  We should not
make that mistake again.459
Our study suggests that in deciding whether to “constrict funda-
mental liberties” in war-related cases, the Court looks toward
Congress.  This institutional-process theory remains the strongest can-
didate for resolving our paradoxical empirical findings.  Aside from
increasing our understanding of the jurisprudence of cases most
directly related to the war, the theory also bears other implications for
research and practice.  Political scientists may well reap the fruits from
systematically examining further the dimensionality of judicial deci-
sions and crisis decisionmaking in other contexts.  Practitioners may
want to emphasize statutory and legislative intent arguments more
457 FORTAS, supra note 16, at 38. R
458 Korematsu was the defendant in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
459 Brief of Amicus Curiae Fred Korematsu in Support of Petitioners at 28, Al Odah v.
United States/Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 1706 (2004) (No. 03-343) & 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004)
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prominently in briefs.  And more generally, our evidence suggests the
importance of Congress in the war on terror.460
This brings mixed news to normative adherents of executive uni-
lateralism and civil libertarianism alike.  On the one hand, strong uni-
lateral executive powers are still checked by the ebb and flow of
congressional will.  Nonetheless, majoritarian preferences are thereby
left to prevail, often at the sacrifice of minority rights, when collective
security appears most at risk.  And areas to which civil libertarians
have paid the least attention are vulnerable to infringement during
wartime (indeed, perhaps because of this lacuna of attention).
Those disturbed by these odds ought to consider turning to
Congress, not the courts, to impose an effective check on the execu-
tive branch during times of war.  For, as Justice Cardozo wrote nearly
a century ago, “‘It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a
degree as the courts.’”461
460 For example, the administration of military tribunals in response to Rasul may well
benefit, at least from the perspective of judicial enforcement, from eliciting congressional
input.  See Katyal, supra note 393 (noting that creation of American military justice system R
“should  not be done without the deliberate and considered help of the Congress”);
Benjamin Wittes, Enemy Americans, ATLANTIC M ONTHLY, July–Aug. 2004, at 127, 135
(noting that blending of criminal justice and laws of war would “[i]deally . . . take place not
in the courts but in Congress”).
461 CARDOZO, supra note 88, at 90 (quoting Mo., Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. R
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APPENDIX
THE U.S. SUPREME COURT DATABASE’S
CATEGORIZATION OF ISSUES
Criminal Procedure the administration of justice that do not rise
to the level of a constitutional matter.  This
010 involuntary confession
is the residual category insofar as criminal
013 habeas corpus (cf. 704):  whether the
procedure is concerned.  Note that this issue
writ should issue rather than the fact that
need not necessarily pertain to a criminal
collateral review occurred.  Note that this
action.  If the case involves an indigent, con-
need not be a criminal case
sider 381–386.
014 plea bargaining:  the constitutionality of
111 confession of error
and/or the circumstances of its exercise
112 conspiracy (cf. 163)
015 retroactivity (of newly announced consti-
113 entrapment tutional rights)
114 exhaustion of remedies 016 search and seizure (other than as per-
115 fugitive from justice tains to 017 and 018)
116 presentation of evidence 017 search and seizure, vehicles
117 stay of execution 018 search and seizure, Crime Control Act
118 timeliness, including statutes of 020 contempt of court
limitation 021 self-incrimination (other than as pertains
119 miscellaneous to 022 and 023)
120 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 022 Miranda warnings
including application of the Federal Rules of 023 self-incrimination, immunity from
Evidence in criminal proceedings. prosecution
__statutory construction of criminal laws: 030 right to counsel (cf. 381–82)
these codes, by definition exclude the consti- 040 cruel and unusual punishment, death
tutionality of these laws penalty (cf. 106)
161 assault 041 cruel and unusual punishment, non-death
162 bank robbery penalty
163 conspiracy (cf. 112) 050 line-up (admissibility into evidence of
164 escape from custody identification obtained after accused was
165 false statements (cf. 177) taken into custody, or after indictment or
166 financial (other than in 168 or 173) information)
167 firearms 060 discovery and inspection (in the context
168 fraud of criminal litigation only, otherwise 537)
169 gambling 070 double jeopardy
171 Hobbs Act; i.e., 18 U.S.C. § 1951 080 ex post facto (state)
(2000) 100 extralegal jury influences, miscellaneous:
172 immigration (cf. 371–76) no question regarding the right to a jury trial
173 internal revenue (cf. 960, 970, 975, or to a speedy trial (these belong in 190 and
979) 191, respectively); the focus, rather, is on the
174 Mann Act fairness to the accused when jurors are
175 narcotics exposed to the influences specified
176 obstruction of justice 101 prejudicial statements or evidence
177 perjury (other than as pertains to 102 contact with jurors outside
165) courtroom
178 Travel Act 103 jury instructions
179 war crimes 104 voir dire
180 sentencing guidelines 105 prison garb or appearance
181 miscellaneous 106 jurors and death penalty (cf. 040)
190 jury trial (right to, as distinct from 107 pretrial publicity
100–07) 110 confrontation (right to confront accuser,
191 speedy trial call and cross-examine witnesses)
__subconstitutional fair procedure:  nonsub- 199 miscellaneous criminal procedure
stantive rules and procedures pertaining to (cf. 504, 702)\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 113 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Civil Rights __military (cf. 441, 705)
361 draftee, or person subject to
induction 210 voting:  does not extend to reapportion-
362 active duty ment and districting, which is 250, or to liti-
363 veteran gation under the Voting Rights Act, which is
__immigration and naturalization (cf. 172, 211, or to durational residency requirements,
271–72) which is 341.  Entries are limited to cases
371 permanent residence raising constitutional questions regarding the
372 citizenship right to vote; typically, but not exclusively,
373 loss of citizenship, denaturalization under the 14th or 15th Amendments.
374 access to public education 211 Voting Rights Act of 1965, plus
375 welfare benefits amendments
376 miscellaneous 212 ballot access (of candidates and political
__indigents (cf. 311–12):  procedural protec- parties)
tions for indigents because of their indigency. 220 desegregation (other than as pertains to
Typically in matters pertaining to criminal 221–23)
justice. 221 desegregation, schools
381 appointment of counsel (cf. 030) 222 employment discrimination:  on basis of
382 inadequate representation by race, age, or working conditions.  Not
counsel alienage, which is 272, or gender, which is
(cf. 030) 284.
383 payment of fine 223 affirmative action
384 costs or filing fees 230 sit-in demonstrations (protests against
385 U.S. Supreme Court docketing fee racial discrimination in places of public
386 transcript accommodation):  to be sharply distinguished
387 assistance of psychiatrist from protests not involving racial discrimina-
388 miscellaneous tion.  The latter are coded as 451.
391 liability, civil rights acts (cf. 616–17): 250 reapportionment:  other than plans gov-
tort actions involving liability that are based erned by the Voting Rights Act
on a civil rights act 261 debtors’ rights (other than as pertains to
399 miscellaneous civil rights (cf. 701) 381–88):  replevin, garnishment, etc.  Typi-
cally involve notice and/or hearing require-
First Amendment
ments or the takings clause.
271 deportation (cf. 371–76) 401 First Amendment, miscellaneous (cf.
272 employability of aliens (cf. 371–76) 703):  the residual category for all First
283 sex discrimination:  excluding employ- Amendment litigation other than the free
ment discrimination, which is 284 exercise or establishment clauses
284 sex discrimination in employment (cf. 411 commercial speech, excluding attorneys
283, 222) which is 544
293 Indians (other than as pertains to 294) 415 libel, defamation:  defamation of public
294 Indians, state jurisdiction over officials and public and private persons
301 juveniles (cf. 321) 416 libel, privacy:  true and false light inva-
311 poverty law, constitutional:  typically sions of privacy
equal protection challenges over welfare 421 legislative investigations:  concerning
benefits, including pension and medical “internal security” only
benefits 422 federal internal security legislation:
312 poverty law, statutory:  welfare benefits, Smith, Internal Security, and related federal
typically under some Social Security Act pro- statutes
vision.  Excludes 321 and 331. 430 loyalty oath (other than in 431–34)
321 illegitimates, rights of (cf. 301):  typically 431 loyalty oath, bar applicants (cf. 546, 548)
inheritance and survivor’s benefits, and 432 loyalty oath, government employees
paternity suits 433 loyalty oath, political party
331 handicapped, rights of:  under Rehabili- 434 loyalty oath, teachers
tation Act and related statutes 435 security risks:  denial of benefits or dis-
341 residency requirements:  durational, plus missal of employees for reasons other than
discrimination against nonresidents failure to meet loyalty oath requirements\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 114 28-MAR-05 17:19
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441 conscientious objectors (cf. 361–62):  to 555 union antitrust:  legality of anticompeti-
military service tive union activity
444 campaign spending (cf. 650):  financing 557 union or closed shop:  includes agency
electoral costs other than as regulated by the shop litigation
Taft-Hartley Act.  Typically involves the 559 Fair Labor Standards Act
Federal Election Campaign Act. 561 Occupational Safety and Health Act
451 protest demonstrations (other than as 563 union-union member dispute (except as
pertains to 230):  demonstrations and other pertains to 557)
forms of protest based on First Amendment __union-management disputes (other than
guarantees other than the free exercise or those above)
establishment clauses 575 bargaining
455 free exercise of religion 576 employee discharge
461 establishment of religion (other than as 577 distribution of union literature
pertains to 462) 578 representative election
462 parochiaid:  government aid to religious 579 antistrike injunction
schools, or religious requirements in public 581 jurisdictional dispute
schools 582 right to organize
471 obscenity, state (cf. 706):  including the 599 miscellaneous union
regulation of sexually explicit material under
the 21st Amendment Economic Activity
472 obscenity, federal
601 antitrust (except in the context of 605
Due Process and 555)
605 mergers 501 due process, miscellaneous (cf. 431–34):
611 bankruptcy (except in the context of the residual code for cases that do not locate
975) in 502–07
614 sufficiency of evidence:  typically in the 502 due process, hearing or notice (other
context of a jury’s determination of compen- than as pertains to 503 or 504)
sation for injury or death 503 due process, hearing, government
615 election of remedies:  legal remedies employees
available to injured persons or things 504 due process, prisoners’ rights
616 liability, governmental:  tort actions 505 due process, impartial decisionmaker
against government or governmental officials 506 due process, jurisdiction (jurisdiction
other than actions brought under a civil over nonresident litigants)
rights action.  These locate in 391. 507 due process, takings clause
617 liability, nongovernmental:  other than as
Privacy in 614, 615, 618
618 liability, punitive damages
531 privacy (cf. 416, 707) 621 Employee Retirement Income Security
533 abortion:  including contraceptives Act (cf. 587)
534 right to die 626 state tax (those challenged on the basis
537 Freedom of Information Act and related of the supremacy clause and the 21st
federal statutes Amendment may also locate in 931 or 936)
631 state regulation of business (cf. 910, 911) Attorneys
636 securities, federal regulation of
542 attorneys’ fees 638 natural resources—environmental pro-
544 commercial speech, attorneys (cf. 411) tection (cf. 933, 934)
546 admission to a state or federal bar, dis- 650 corruption, governmental or govern-
barment, and attorney discipline (cf. 431) mental regulation of other than as in 444
548 admission to, or disbarment from, Bar of 652 zoning:  constitutionality of such
the U.S. Supreme Court ordinances
653 arbitration (other than as pertains to Unions
labor-management or employer-employee
relations (cf. 553)) 553 arbitration (in the context of labor-man-
656 federal consumer protection:  typically agement or employer-employee relations)
under the Truth in Lending; Food, Drug and (cf. 653)\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 115 28-MAR-05 17:19
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Cosmetic; and Consumer Protection Credit __no merits:  use only if the syllabus or the
Acts summary holding specifies one of the fol-
lowing bases __patents and copyrights
661 patent 751 writ improvidently granted:  either in so
many words, or with an indication that the 662 copyright
reason for originally granting the writ was 663 trademark
mistakenly believed to be present 664 patentability of computer processes
752 dismissed for want of a substantial or __federal transportation regulation
properly presented federal question 671 railroad
753 dismissed for want of jurisdiction 672 boat
(cf. 853) 673 truck, or motor carrier
754 adequate non-federal grounds for 674 pipeline (cf. 685)
decision 675 airline
__federal public utilities regulation (cf. 935) 755 remand to determine basis of state
court 681 electric power
682 nuclear power decision
683 oil producer 759 miscellaneous
684 gas producer __standing to sue
685 gas pipeline (cf. 674) 801 adversary parties
686 radio and television (cf. 687) 802 direct injury
687 cable television (cf. 686) 803 legal injury
688 telephone company 804 personal injury
699 miscellaneous economic regulation 805 justiciable question
806 live dispute
Judicial Power 807 parens patriae standing
808 statutory standing __comity, criminal and First Amendment (cf.
809 private or implied cause of action 712):  propriety of federal court deference to
810 taxpayer’s suit ongoing state judicial or state or federal
811 miscellaneous quasi-judicial proceedings, the abstention
__judicial administration (jurisdiction of the doctrine, exhaustion of state provided
federal courts or of the Supreme Court) (cf. remedies
753) 701 civil rights
851 jurisdiction or authority of federal dis- 702 criminal procedure
trict courts 703 First Amendment
852 jurisdiction or authority of federal courts 704 habeas corpus
of appeals 705 military
853 Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority 706 obscenity
on appeal from federal district courts or 707 privacy
courts of appeals (cf. 753) 708 miscellaneous
854 Supreme Court jurisdiction or authority 712 comity, civil procedure (cf. 701–08):  pro-
on appeal from highest state court priety of federal court deference to ongoing
855 jurisdiction or authority of the Court of state judicial or state or federal quasi-judicial
Claims proceedings, the abstention doctrine, exhaus-
856 Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction tion of state provided remedies
857 review of non-final order; i.e., allegation 715 assessment of costs or damages:  as part
that the decision below is not a final judg- of a court order
ment or decree, or that it is an interlocutory 717 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
judgment (cf. 753) including application of the Federal Rules of
858 change in state law (cf. 755) Evidence and the Federal Rules of Appellate
859 federal question (cf. 752) Procedure in civil litigation
860 ancillary or pendent jurisdiction 721 judicial review of administrative agency’s
861 extraordinary relief or administrative official’s actions and
862 certification (cf. 864) procedures
731 mootness (cf. 806) 863 resolution of circuit conflict, or conflict
741 venue between or among other courts\\server05\productn\N\NYU\80-1\NYU101.txt unknown Seq: 116 28-MAR-05 17:19
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864 objection to reason for denial of 930 commodities
certiorari 931 intergovernmental tax immunity
(cf. 862) 932 marital property, including obliga-
865 collateral estoppel or res judicata tion of
866 interpleader child support
867 untimely filing 933 natural resources (cf. 638)
868 Act of State doctrine 934 pollution, air or water (cf. 638)
869 miscellaneous 935 public utilities (cf. 681–88)
870 Supreme Court’s certiorari 936 state tax (cf. 626)
jurisdiction 939 miscellaneous
871 jurisdiction, authority of states and terri- 949 miscellaneous federalism (cf. 294,
torial courts 701–08, 712, 754–55, 854, 858, 860)
899 miscellaneous judicial power
Interstate Relations
Federalism
950 boundary dispute between states
900 federal-state ownership dispute (cf. 920)
951 non-real property dispute between states
910 federal pre-emption of state court juris-
959 miscellaneous interstate relations conflict
diction:  almost always found in the context
of labor union activity.  Does not involve Federal Taxation
constitutional interpretation.  Rests rather on
960 federal taxation (except as pertains to a primary jurisdiction rationale.
970 and 975):  typically under provisions of 911 federal pre-emption of state regulation
the Internal Revenue Code (cf. 631):  rarely involves union activity.
970 federal taxation of gifts, personal, and Does not involve constitutional
professional expenses interpretation.
975 priority of federal fiscal claims:  over 920 Submerged Lands Act (cf. 900)
those of the states or private entities __national supremacy:  in the context of fed-
979 miscellaneous federal taxation (cf. 931) eral-state conflicts involving the general wel-
fare, supremacy, or interstate commerce Miscellaneous
clauses, or the 21st Amendment.  Distin-
guishable from 910 and 911 because of a 980 legislative veto
constitutional basis for decision. 989 miscellaneous
Source:  http://www.polisci.msu.edu/pljp/supremecourt.html (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).  Note that
for our analyses of all civil rights, liberties, and justice cases, we include cases categorized as
Criminal Procedure, Civil Rights, First Amendment, Due Process, Privacy, and Attorneys.
These are the categories that Spaeth, the creator of the database, and other social scientists
typically use to define “Civil Liberties and Rights.” See, e.g., EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note .